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                In contemporary Platonic scholarship, Socrates is quite often depicted as a 
hyper-rationalist, i.e., an individual that relies upon reason alone in his philosophical 
pursuits. And, such a position is not entirely unsupported, especially when one considers 
the rigor with which Socrates engages his interlocutors via the elenchtic method, not to 
mention the charges of impiety and atheism, for which he was found guilty.  Yet, while 
Socrates did indeed hold reason in the highest esteem, when we look to the texts, we find 
evidence to suggest that he also took seriously the role played by divine inspiration in the 
pursuit of truth.  Not only do we find examples of Socrates recognizing the potential for 
truth that the divinely inspired seem to exhibit, but further, we find Socrates himself to be 
the recipient of such divine revelation in the form of his daimonion. And, while some 
scholars have dismissed such references as mere ironic gestures, I argue that these 
dismissive, and admittedly anachronistic, claims are entirely unfounded.  Instead, I 
propose that Plato recognized, and valued, the role that divine inspiration played in the 
case of Socrates.  Yet, while the divine inspiration experienced by Socrates is seen in a 
positive light by Plato, given the uniqueness of his situation, Socrates, and his 
methodology, can no longer be the model upon which philosophical investigation is 
founded.  Thus, recognizing the limitations of Socrates, limitations which are alleviated 
via divine assistance, Plato, in his late period, develops a new methodology, i.e., 
collection and division, one which might allow for the definitional knowledge which he 
seeks without reliance upon divine revelation.  Despite this change, however, I maintain 
 vii 
that even in the late Platonic period, Plato still recognizes the value of divine inspiration.  
As such, Socrates, while perhaps not a philosopher in the unqualified sense according to 
Plato’s later understanding of philosophy, might rightly be understood as a unique 
individual, one who, through divine inspiration, is given access to truth, albeit a truth he 
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 As the title indicates, this dissertation is a defense of divine inspiration in the case 
of Socrates.  This idea, i.e., that we ought to take seriously the role that divine inspiration 
plays in Plato’s dialogues arose from my reading of Plato’s Sophist, wherein we find the 
Eleatic Stranger, replacing Socrates as the main protagonist, attempting to establish a 
precise definition of Sophistry using the new methodology of collection and division. 
Interestingly, one of the stranger’s attempts towards a definition of the sophist seems to 
perfectly describe Socrates.  And, while the Stranger expresses reservations about such an 
individual truly being a sophist, the ambiguity we are left with following this definition is 
quite troubling.  Given Socrates’ place of prominence throughout Plato’s dialogues, that 
he would now be associated with sophistry, as opposed to the shining example of what a 
philosopher ought be, seems problematic.  Thus, given the fairly drastic change in Plato’s 
methodology that occurs in these late dialogues, one which not only places Socrates in 
the background, but also exchanges the Socratic elenchos for the method of collection 
and division, Socrates’ status is not altogether clear, an ambiguity that leaves us with the 
question as to how are we to understand Socrates in Plato’s late period.  Is this new 
methodology an indication that Plato’s understanding of philosophy has changed?  If so, 
as Socrates is now no longer occupying center stage, does Plato still consider Socrates to 
be a philosopher?  If not a philosopher, then is he a sophist?  Surely this cannot be true, 
for considering Plato’s view of sophistry throughout his dialogues, that he would 
associate Socrates with sophistry is cause for concern.   
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 Yet, it must be noted that, despite his consistent disavowal of knowledge, 
Socrates does seem to know things with certainty, not simply specific ideas, such as his 
claim that in matters of justice we should follow the one and not the many, or that the 
virtues of piety, justice, temperance and wisdom are interconnected, but further, his 
ability, when engaged in the elenchos with his interlocutors, somehow always properly to 
guide the discussion towards what is right.  Is Socrates simply feigning ignorance then, as 
Thrasymachus accused him of in Book I of the Republic?  If true, then indeed it would 
seem that such behavior would make him closer in kind to the very sort of sophist Plato 
seems to abhor, one who utilizes deception to defeat his opponents in argument.   
 Given the unpleasantness of such a prospect, I proposed a new thesis, one which 
would explain Socrates’ seemingly inexplicable ability to “know” what is right, while all 
the while being sincere in his proclaimed state of ignorance. My thesis is this: We must 
take seriously the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates, for, in so doing, we 
might save Socrates from the dreary fate of Sophistry, all the while gleaning insight into 
Plato’s understanding of Socrates in the late dialogues.   
 However, as this thesis is dependent upon the idea that his confidence in his 
beliefs is inexplicable by purely rational means, I first needed to establish that Socrates’ 
methodology of choice, the elenchos, was unable to allow for the acquisition of positive 
moral doctrine.  And, while all who read Plato are well aware of the aporetic nature of the 
dialogues, specifically the earlier Socratic dialogues wherein we are left without an 
answer to the inquiry put forth, in recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the 
elenchos can, and does, allow for Socrates to establish the very sort of positive moral 
truth that seems to elude him at every turn.  
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 At the center of the newly invigorated debate regarding the merit of the elenchos 
was Gregory Vlastos, who, after mining through the Gorgias, made his “discovery” of a 
particular passage (479e), wherein, following a long elenchtic debate, exclaims,  
(T1)  Has it not been proved that what was asserted  [by myself] is true?  
Drawing from this passage and others of a similar vein, Vlastos proceeds to argue that we 
can take this as evidence in support of the position that the elenchos allows Socrates the 
ability to establish positive moral doctrine.  As my thesis depends on Socrates inability to 
establish positive moral doctrine through the elenchos alone, I spend the majority of 
Chapter 1 arguing against Vlastos’s position, doing so through raising a series of 
objections which, I believe, make his position untenable.  I conclude the chapter by 
claiming that the Elenchos is used by Socrates not to establish positive moral truths, but 
rather, as a tool to expose the inconsistencies in the beliefs of others.  Given this 
conclusion, one which removes the possibility of the elenchos being solely responsible 
for the confidence with which Socrates carries his moral beliefs, the origin of this 
conviction still remains uncertain. 
  With this uncertainty established, that Socrates might be considered a sophist by 
Plato is not an altogether implausible prospect.  Thus, I begin Chapter 2 of my 
dissertation by focusing on Plato’s Sophist, his major work on sophistry, wherein, as 
noted above, the 6th attempt to define the sophist seems to be an exact description of 
Socrates.  If we are to save Socrates from sophistry, it must be proven that we are not to 
take this definition as a true definition of the sophist.  To accomplish this task, I start first 
by providing an analysis of the new methodology utilized in the dialogue, that of 
collection and division, for it is this method of division that the Stranger utilizes to define 
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the Sophist.  Yet, we find that when it comes to defining the sophist, things are not quite 
so simple.  So difficult is this task, in fact, that we are presented with seven attempts to 
define the sophist, each providing a different conclusion than the last.  In his various 
attempts, the Stranger defines the Sophist as a hunter (of young men), various types of 
salesmen, a combatant, a cleanser of souls, and finally, a deceitful imitator.  And, while it 
is the 6th definition, i.e., that of the cleanser of souls, that will eventually be associated 
with Socrates, as my thesis is dependent upon Socrates not carrying the title of sophist, I 
argue that, despite the varying definitions we are given, it is the seventh and final 
definition, i.e., the individual who creates the false appearance of being wise, that we are 
to take as Plato’s final, and exclusive, definition of the sophist.   
 Having argued that the 6th definition should not be considered a proper definition 
of sophistry, a point which would seem to excuse Socrates from the charge of sophistry, 
the question remains as to whether or not Socrates is thus to be considered a Philosopher? 
As I noted above, given the changes in methodology, as well as Socrates’ diminished role 
in the later dialogues, not to mention the similarities between Socrates and the individual 
described as the noble sophist of the 6th definition, that Socrates is still considered by 
Plato to be the paradigmatic example of the philosopher is, on my view, very unlikely.  
Indeed, given the evidence we find in these later dialogues, I argue that Plato has 
recognized the limitations of the elenchtic method, which, as I argued in Chapter 1, 
cannot produce positive doctrines, but rather, only expose the inconsistencies in the 
beliefs of others, and, while that is a necessary component of the philosophical process, if 
one is to truly establish the sort of definitional knowledge Plato seeks, a new 
methodology is required, i.e., the method of collection and division.  And, while Socrates 
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does engage in the new method on a couple of occasions, most notably in the late 
dialogue the Philebus, we find that, in comparison to the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist 
and Statesman, Socrates lacks the requisite skill to properly complete the divisions to 
achieve a proper definition.  This failure, coupled with the new requirements Plato sets 
for philosophy, led me to the conclusion that while Plato does not now consider Socrates 
to be a sophist, neither does he consider him a philosopher in the unqualified sense. 
 Given this point, the question arises: How are we to understand Socrates?  In 
answer to this response, I argue in the second half of my dissertation that Plato takes 
seriously the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates.  And, while my initial 
thoughts on this conclusion were of gleeful excitement, when I presented this idea in its 
nascent stages, I was met with some particularly aggressive dissent from the audience.  
To suggest that Socrates, the same individual who banished the poets from the kallipolis, 
would seriously entertain such fantasy was obviously absurd!  Granted, Socrates does 
reference his daimonion at times, but surely this is to be taken in jest, an ironic tongue in 
cheek reference not to an actual divine entity, but to reason itself.  Yet, while this hyper-
rationalist understanding of Socrates may fit nicely in our contemporary understanding, 
one which quite consistently pits philosophy against religion, such views are, on my 
view, exceptionally anachronistic, not to mention simply unsupported by textual 
evidence.  Indeed, the role of the divine is so prevalent throughout the dialogues that to 
ignore the role of religion and the divine in the case of Socrates would be akin to, to 
quote Gregory Vlastos, “a Surgery which kills the patient.”   
 My defense of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates is thus divided between 
two chapters.  In Chapter 3, I examine the early dialogues, i.e., those dialogues that are 
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traditionally held to be Socratic in nature, whereas in the final chapter, I turn my attention 
back to the later dialogues to show that, despite the changes in methodology, and the 
development of Plato’s thought, Plato still holds religion and the concept of divine 
inspiration in high esteem.  Beginning with Chapter 3, my reasoning is divided into two 
main sections, arguing (1) that the character of Socrates has a sincere reverence for 
matters of religion, and (2) that Socrates takes seriously the role of divine inspiration.  
Beginning with the former, when faced with accusations of impiety (and then atheism) in 
the Apology, it would seem that Socrates is making a mockery of the charges, as he 
cleverly manipulates Meletus into befuddlement.  Yet, while it may be true that in 
manipulating the charges, Socrates’ true beliefs are still somewhat ambiguous, we are 
presented with a significant amount of evidence throughout the early dialogues to suggest 
that while Socrates may not believe in the gods of Homeric and Hesiodic myth, he did 
believe in the existence of divine beings.  And, as we are told, these gods are perfectly 
wise, and, given the connection Socrates posits between knowledge and morality, these 
gods are also perfectly moral.  Given the obvious disparity between such perfectly moral 
gods and the somewhat lascivious gods of Homer, such a belief may seem somewhat 
blasphemous.  Yet, I argue that such a conception of the gods, i.e., perfectly wise/moral, 
was not at all uncommon at the time in Athens.  Further, while this belief may not 
perfectly align with the tradition, it is still clear that Socrates does believe in the gods, a 
point which would save him from the charge of atheism. 
 Following the defense of Socrates belief on matters of religion/theology, I 
conclude the chapter with an analysis of divine inspiration in particular.  And, while the 
daimonion is perhaps the most obvious example, there are other passages that would 
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indicate that Socrates takes divine inspiration and revelation quite seriously.  For 
example, in the Apology, not only does Socrates admit that the poets have access to the 
truth through inspiration (albeit a truth they cannot explain), Socrates clearly states that 
he has a duty to philosophize as he was ordered to do so by the gods.  What is important 
about this claim, and others like it, wherein Socrates follows the command of the gods is 
that, on such occasions, Socrates does not understand, at least at first, why the gods 
command him to do such things.  Yet, despite his lack of understanding, Socrates obeys.  
Such blind obedience void of immediate understanding becomes particularly problematic 
for those scholars who would claim that these references to the divine are nothing more 
than mere allusions to reason dressed up in language of divine reference. On the other 
hand, if we take his belief in the existence of perfectly wise/moral gods seriously, then 
his willingness to obey such divine commands blindly (a blind acceptance which is, in 
and of itself, somewhat uncharacteristic for Socrates) makes much more sense.   
 Turning our attention to the daimonion, we find even more evidence to support 
this position.  For, while there are a number of passages wherein Socrates’ daimonion 
offers its advice as to what he ought not do, those instances that are of particular 
importance to my argument are those where we find Socrates, having decided to perform 
some action, only to be warned against it by his daimonion, a warning that, it should be 
noted, Socrates always heeds.  If, as has been noted by scholars such as Martha 
Nussbaum, we are to take these instances of divine intervention ironically, as mere 
references to reason itself, then how do we explain odd circumstance of Socrates deciding 
upon some course of action, a decision which itself would require a deliberative process, 
only to, when confronted by his daimonion, act against his initial decision.  In examples 
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such as these, which are many, we find evidence that Socrates takes his daimonion and 
the advice offered with exceptional sincerity, doing so, in fact, often times against his 
originally intended course of action! 
 Having argued that we ought to take divine inspiration to play a significant role in 
the early dialogues, my final chapter focuses upon the late dialogues and the continued 
importance of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates.  As mentioned above, with these 
later dialogues comes a number of significant changes, most notably the change in 
methodology, as well as the diminished presence of Socrates.  And, while Socrates is not 
entirely absent, in those dialogues wherein Socrates is once again leading the discussion, 
it seems to be the case that we are given varying images of Socrates.  In the Theaetetus, 
we are presented with Socrates the midwife.  In the Sophist, as I have argued, we find 
Socrates the noble sophist. And finally, in the Philebus, we find a Socrates who gives up 
the elenchos for the new method of division!  Given these seemingly disparate images, it 
is difficult to determine precisely how we are to understand Socrates in the eyes of Plato.  
In answer to this problem, I argue that, while there are indeed differences between the 
images of Socrates as presented, we find that there is a common thread between them all, 
and that is a continued reverence for and reliance upon divine inspiration.  Indeed, in the 
Theaetetus, Socrates clearly claims that his ability to determine which ideas are good and 
which are mere wind eggs is due to the god’s assistance.  In the 6th definition, we find 
similar connections to the divine, as the “noble sophist” of definition 6 is the individual 
who is able to purge others of their false beliefs.  An ability of this sort would surely be 
required in order to determine which belief requires purging, just as the midwife 
maintains. And finally, in the Philebus, while Socrates does use the method of division to 
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determine the varying types of goods, the discussion begins with a moment of revelation, 
wherein Socrates admits to having received a revelation directly from the gods, a 
revelation that serves as the initial foundation for the discussion that follows.  As such, 
we once more find a continued reliance upon divine inspiration in the case of Socrates 
even throughout Plato’s late period.   
 Thus, I believe that these late images provide us with a very interesting insight 
into Plato’s understanding of Socrates, specifically that Plato recognized the role that 
divine inspiration played in the case of Socrates.  And, while this gift provided Socrates 
with the ability to excel in argumentation, and life, Plato recognized that individuals such 
as Socrates were exceptionally rare, and as such, a new method was required that could 














Chapter 1: The Limitations of the Elenchos 
Overview of the Elenchos 
 The guiding question for Chapter 1 is the following: Does the elenchtic method of 
the early Platonic dialogues provide Socrates with knowledge?1  Considering Socrates’ 
consistent disavowal of knowledge, this question has opened the door to rigorous 
scholarly debate.  Further confounding the issue is the fact that despite Socrates’ claims 
to ignorance, there are instances where Socrates expresses his beliefs with such 
conviction that he seems to contradict his own disavowal of knowledge.2   As absolute 
ignorance regarding the very definitional knowledge he seeks would preclude the 
possibility of any claims to knowledge by Socrates, many scholars have strived to make 
sense of this paradox,3 doing so through a careful examination of the elenchos, the 
methodology of choice for the Socrates of the early dialogues.4  
 At the center of this debate regarding the merit of the elenchos was Gregory 
Vlastos.  Inspired by an unwillingness to accept Socrates as a dogmatist, Vlastos, in his 
now famous article, “The problem of the elenchus: method is all,” proposes a 
                                                
 1 I will be following the generally agreed upon ordering of the dialogues as noted in Vlastos 
 
 2 Examples listed by Vlastos (1994 pp. 11-12) include but are not limited to the following: Crito 
47a-48a – That in matters of justice we should follow not ‘the many’ but ‘the man who knows.’  Ion – That 
the poet and rhapsode are guided by madness, not via techne.; Protagoras 329e-333b – that piety and 
justice, temperance and wisdom are inter-entailing. 
 
 3 There are those who argue that Socrates is merely feigning his ignorance, relying upon it as a 
tool to manipulate his interlocutors, not for malicious purposes, but rather to encourage them on, allowing 
them to believe Socrates is traveling with them on their journey towards Truth. See Gulley, (1968) p. 69. 
This doubtfulness is toyed with by Plato himself through Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic (337a4-
7), albeit in a much more aggressive manner, as Thrasymachus believes it to be a tactic utilized to avoid 
answering questions honestly. 
 
 4 That the elenchos is the only methodology used by Socrates is a point of contention amongst 
scholars.  Benson (2000) pp.34-37 and Kahn (1992) pp. 248-253, for example, argue that Socrates employs 
varying methodologies, e.g., in passages in the Crito, wherein Socrates drops the elenchos altogether in 
favor of a direct form of speech, or in the Menexenus, wherein we find Socrates delivering a funeral oration 
with little to no interaction with his audience.   
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controversial argument which, he believes, provides sufficient evidence to prove that the 
elenchos can, and does, allow Socrates to acquire positive moral truths.5  As there has 
been much debate regarding the precise nature of the elenchos, let us first establish the 
definition of the elenchos as provided by Vlastos: 
Socratic elenchos is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary 
argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own 
belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own 
beliefs.6 
 
We find that for Vlastos, while the elenchos is necessarily adversarial, i.e., Socrates must 
be engaged with an interlocutor in debate; the key component for the elenchos is that it is 
a search, a search limited to moral truths.7  In other words, the elenchos is not to be used 
to determine the truth of mathematical principles, nor is it geared towards more specified 
practical applications, such as those pertaining to proper diet or medical advice.8  Further, 
                                                
 5 Vlastos 1983. 
 
 6 Vlastos 1994, 4 
 
 7 See Ap. 29c, 28e, and 41b. 
 
 8 In response, one could look to the Meno as evidence to Socrates using the elenchos towards the 
proving of mathematical principles.   Vlastos believes the elenchos as such to be a reduced form, used 
strictly in a negative sense to correct the “mistakes” of the slave boy.  As Vlastos (1991, ch.4 n. 54) 
explains, the mistakes of the slave boy, “are due to his having placed unthinking trust in suggestions he 
reads into what Socrates has said.” Instead, “the boy must say what he judges for himself to be true for his 
own reasons, prepared to defend it against Socrates.”  For Vlastos, this use of the elenchos, i.e., one that is 
strictly “negative” or corrective, in its deployment, is incomplete due to its failure to prove any particular 
doctrine.  Further, it is important to note that on Vlastos’ account, the mathematical topic at hand in the 
Meno is indicative of a major change in Plato’s thinking and methodology, one which marks a distinct 
change in the character of Socrates from one concerned solely with moral issues, to a Socrates now 
interested in more epistemological and metaphysical ideas.  For Vlastos (1991, cps. 2 and 3), given this 
major change in Socrates from the Meno onwards, we must be careful to distinguish the Socrates of the 
early dialogues from the Socrates of the middle and late periods.  
   However, while I find much of Vlastos’ argument regarding the evolution of the character 
Socrates to be quite compelling, there is evidence to suggest that Socrates, as early as the Euthyphro, was 
very much concerned with epistemological issues, as well as matters of methodology.  It is perhaps too 
long of an argument to make in full here, however, I will point out that we need think only of Socrates’ 
response to Euthyphro’s first attempt to define piety.  On Socrates’ view, Euthyphro’s first attempt fails to 
capture the definition of piety itself, as it is merely an example of an action that might be considered pious.  
Indeed, given Socrates’ attention to acquiring the proper definition, one that satisfies the definitional 
requirements stipulated by Socrates, it is not altogether clear that we can entirely divorce the 
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the elenchos is not used to investigate the very nature of the methodology itself.  In other 
words, when engaged in a “What is the F?” question, e.g., “What is Piety?” Socrates 
never debates the conditions for a correct answer, but rather sets those conditions himself, 
asking only for assent from his interlocutors.9  
 As to what the elenchos does focus on, we find that Socrates is quite clear in his 
own agenda, i.e., that he is searching for truth as it pertains to morality.10 And, to be sure, 
Socrates does not discriminate in his pursuit of this truth, as he is willing to talk to 
anyone who is willing to engage him so long as they adhere to a very rigid condition: that 
each individual answer his questions honestly.11 Regarding this condition, Vlastos offers 
three points to explain why it is important that all interlocutors be honest in their 
answers:12 (1) To test the honesty of the argument.  If the goal of the elenchos is to not 
simply to win the argument, but to uncover the truth, then it is imperative that all parties 
offer forward only their own personally held beliefs.  If this adherence to truth is not 
maintained, then the interlocutor is free to argue any position that might give him an 
advantage. Should this occur, and the interlocutor is particularly skilled in argumentation, 
                                                                                                                                            
epistemological from the moral in these early dialogues.  Further, concerning the claim that the elenchos of 
the Meno is “incomplete,” I will argue in this chapter in full that the elenchos is never used in any of the 
dialogues to successfully prove any doctrine at all, mathematical or otherwise.   
 
 9 See Laches 191e11 – Here, Socrates explains to Laches that the definition of courage to be given 
must cover all of the agreed upon cases of courage.  As Vlastos notes, Socrates does not ask if Laches 
agrees with these parameters, but rather, simply asks if he understands how they are to proceed.  However, 
given that they have already agreed upon various cases of courage, one could argue that Laches has already 
assented to the parameters. 
 
 10 Vlastos provides examples to this end from Republic 352d, as well as from Gorgias 487e-488a 
and 472c-d 
 
 11 See Gorgias. 500b: “By the god of friendship, Callicles, don’t think that you can play games 
with me and answer whatever comes to your head, contrary to your real opinion.” Republic I. 346a: “My 
good man, don’t answer contrary to your real opinion, so that we may get somewhere.” 
 
 12 Vlastos (1994) pp. 9-10 
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conclusions could be reached that not only fail to uncover the truth, but further, present as 
“truth” a falsehood. 
 (2) To test one’s seriousness in their pursuit of the truth.  The point here is that in 
order to guarantee that the interlocutor does indeed value the truth as much as Socrates, 
the interlocutor must fully invest themselves in the process. By offering their own beliefs, 
by putting themselves on the line, such dedication is solidified.  Thus, if I were to engage 
in an argument, and was arguing from a position that I did not truly believe, then, if the 
opposing side began to gain the advantage, the drive to continue defending my position 
would be lacking.  On the other hand, if my position is one I truly believe in, then I will 
be more rigorous in my responses, and as a result, both parties are able to dig deeper into 
the question at hand.  
 (3) The elenchos is not merely a methodology used towards the establishment of 
moral truths but also one that seeks to effect change in those who participate. Vlastos 
points to the Apology 29e-30a: 
And if one of you says…he does care, I will not let him go nor leave him, but will 
question and examine and refute him.  And if he seems to me to not have the virtue 
he says he has, I shall reproach him for undervaluing the things of greatest value 
and overvaluing trivial ones. 
 
It is not enough then to simply inquire as to how, in general, humans should live their 
lives, but further, to ensure that those specific individuals with whom Socrates engages is 
living the life that they should be in that moment. In other words, Socrates is not satisfied 
with uncovering truth and leaving it available to take or leave.  If the interlocutor does 
not offer their own beliefs to the discussion, if they do not put themselves on the line, if a 
conclusion is reached regarding a moral truth, and they are not invested, then they are not 
beholden to the answer.  If, on the other hand, the interlocutor is honest throughout the 
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discussion, then the revelation of an inconsistency in his beliefs should be, at the very 
least, a cause for self-reflection. 
The Elenchos in the Gorgias 
 Following these preliminary stipulations regarding the elenchos in general, 
Vlastos proceeds to detail the process of what he classifies as the “standard elenchos”.13 
As Vlastos explains, the traditional understanding of an elenchtic dialogue proceeded as 
follows: (1) Socrates engages with an interlocutor who claims to possess knowledge or 
expertise in a particular field of moral inquiry, eliciting from them a belief they hold (p) 
regarding this field. (2) With this first belief p established, Socrates then draws out 
additional premises from his interlocutor, q, r, and s. (3) Socrates then proceeds to show 
that these new premises, in conjunction with the original posited belief, result in the 
negation of p.  (4) Thus, the interlocutor is forced to admit that there is an inconsistency 
in his beliefs.  The result of this exchange as it is stated is not the positive assertion of an 
alternative to the interlocutor’s original belief, but rather the exposure of the 
inconsistency that exists within the beliefs of the interlocutor.  
 However, while Vlastos was once a proponent of this model,14 he offers a 
substantial amendment by claiming that the elenchos additionally shows the original 
belief, p, to be false, and, consequently, not-p to be true.15  In other words, Vlastos claims 
                                                
 13 ibid. p. 12.  Vlastos explains that an alternative to the “standard” elenchos, i.e., the “indirect 
elenchos”, has been suggested by Robinson. (1953)  While Vlastos (1983) dismisses the distinction as 
Robinson states it, the argument has been taken up by Polansky (1985) and Brickhouse and Smith (1994). 
 
 14 Vlastos, 1956 – Such an understanding of Socrates, Vlastos argues, serves as the perfect 
representation of the “Sophist of Noble Lineage” (Soph. 230a-e) found in the Sophist.  We find in that 
description (which will be detailed in depth in Ch. II of this dissertation), the description of a figure that 
seems to resemble Socrates, albeit one that, despite a lack of his own knowledge, is able to purge his 
interlocutors of their false beliefs.  
 
 15 Vlastos, 1983 
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that the elenchos succeeds in establishing positive moral truths.   The impetus for this 
change regarding his own position was the inconsistency within the character of Socrates 
himself.  Put plainly, if the elenchos only succeeded in exposing the inconsistencies 
within the beliefs of his interlocutors, how could Socrates justify his own moral 
convictions?  In other words, if the elenchos does not allow for the establishment of 
moral truth, and the elenchos is the only method used by Socrates, then Socrates, in 
claiming certain things to be true, would himself be a dogmatist.16  
 And yet, it is through the “discovery” of a passage in the Gorgias that Vlastos 
believes to have solved the “problem of the elenchos”.  The “discovered” passage is 
found at Gorgias479e: 
      (T1)     Has it not been proved that what was asserted [by myself] is true?17 
For Vlastos, this simple question illustrates Socrates’ belief that via the elenchos he has 
proven his thesis to be true.  Yet, this claim of certainty is the capstone of one of the most 
puzzling arguments in the Platonic corpus, and one that in recent years has been subject 
to an immense amount of literature.18  
  Socrates begins by asking Polus whether it would be better to suffer injustice or 
inflict injustice.  In response, Polus responds with the following thesis: 
 p To commit injustice is better than to suffer it.19 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 16 Again, that the elenchos is the only methodology used by Socrates is a point of contention. See 
footnote 4. 
 
 17 οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο.   “By myself” (ἐµαυτῷ) added by Vlastos.   It should 
be noted, however, that while Socrates does suggest here that he has proven what was asserted, Polus 
responds in a non-committal fashion, answering only φαίνεται, i.e., “It appears” or “It seems”.   
 
 18 See Dodds, 1959: 249, Vlastos, 1967: 454-60, Santas, 1979: 233-46, Kahn, 1981: 84-97, and 
Vlastos, 1991: 139-48 
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Following this initial thesis, Socrates proceeds on with the elenchos, eliciting from Polus 
a number of additional premises:20 
 q To commit injustice is baser (αἴσχιον) than to suffer it. (475c5-6) 
 r Doing injustice is more shameful than to suffer it. (474c7-8) 
 s x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is more  
  beneficial than y. (475a5-b2) 
 t Doing injustice is either more painful or more evil than suffering               
  injustice. (475b5-8) 
 u Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering injustice. (475c1-4) 
 v Doing injustice is more evil/worse than suffering it. (475c7-9) 
  
For the purposes of his argument, Vlastos lumps premises r-v into a singular premise r, 
and concludes that following the completion of this elenchtic episode, we find Polus 
conceding to Socrates that given set {p, q, r}, p is proven to be false, and thus, not-p to be 
true.  Yet, from the evidence given thus far, it is not altogether clear that Socrates has 
proven not-p to be true.  In other words, even if premise q is inconsistent with premise p, 
why would such inconsistency necessarily require Polus to recognize the falsity of p?  
Could he not abandon premise q instead, and admit that it was premise q that was false, 
thereby allowing him to maintain his adherence to his initial belief?  According to 
Vlastos, if this did occur, and the interlocutor backslid on the secondary premises, “he 
(Socrates) would have the resources to recoup that loss in a further elenchos.”21  On 
Vlastos’s view, the driving force behind the ability of Socrates to expose the 
inconsistencies of his opponents’ beliefs is not simply his argumentative prowess, but 
further, that Socrates is in possession of certain moral truths.  Indeed, in response to Polus 
                                                                                                                                            
 19 Translations from Vlastos (1991)  
 
 20 This is the summary as provided by Benson, 2000: 81, who himself relied upon Irwin, 1979: 
157.  Further, for Vlastos’ complete analysis of this argument see Vlastos, 1991: 139-148. 
 
 21 Vlastos 1994, 22 
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claiming that it would be difficult to refute a thesis issued by Socrates himself, Socrates 
responds “Not just difficult, Polus, but impossible: for what is true is never refuted.”22  
 To support this view, Vlastos turns his attention to arrival of Callicles, who, in 
response to the failure of Polus, quickly dispatches with premise q, noting that had Polus 
had the courage to admit the seemingly ugly truth regarding the committing of injustice, 
he would have won the debate.23  However, despite his clever attempts to escape the 
incisive attacks of Socrates, Callicles fails as well.  It must be noted that while Socrates 
manages to deflate the attempts of Callicles, it does not necessarily follow that Socrates 
would always be able to answer future arguments against this position.  Could we not 
imagine an instance where a new interlocutor, one more skilled than both Polus and 
Callicles, manages to defend the position at hand?  In other words, while Socrates has 
been successful thus far in his elenchtic engagements, without textual evidence to support 
the claim that Socrates will always emerge victorious in any given debate, one cannot 
rule out the possibility of a future interlocutor emerging that would force Socrates to 
admit defeat.   
 In response to this potential critique, and in an effort to defend the thesis that it is 
not merely his argumentative acumen, but rather, his possession of moral truths that 
allows for Socrates to always win the engagements with his interlocutors, Vlastos cites 
two additional passages from the Gorgias that he believes, when taken in concert, provide 
sufficient evidence to support the claim that Socrates does believe himself to be in 
possession of such truths, and further, that it is because of this that he will always emerge 
                                                
 
 22 G. 473b10-11 
 
 23 G. 482d7-e2 
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victorious in any debate that would seek to argue against the truth of the Socratic 
position.  The first of these crucial passages is found at Gorgias 474b: 
I believe that I and you and the rest of mankind believe that committing injustice is 
worse [for the agent] than is suffering it. 
 
To properly interpret this passage, Vlastos deems it necessary that we acknowledge two 
different types of “belief”: Overt belief, which is defined as those beliefs we actively 
think about and posit, and Covert belief, which are those beliefs that are entailed by the 
positing of our overt beliefs. To use Vlastos’ own example, if I overtly believe that a 
given figure is a Euclidian triangle, then I covertly believe that the angles of that triangle 
will add up to 180 degrees, even if I have yet to learn about this particular aspect of 
triangular shapes.  Applying this division of belief to the argument regarding the 
suffering of injustice, Vlastos claims that while Polus and Callicles might honestly think 
themselves to believe premise p to be true, they hold additional overt beliefs that, when 
taken together, result in not-p.  In other words, by positing the whole set of beliefs vi, they 
are also covertly positing not-p, even if they are unaware of doing so.    
 With this position established, Vlastos offers his second piece of textual evidence.  
We read at Gorgias 482a-b:   
Don’t be astonished that I should say these things.  My love, philosophy, is the one 
you must stop from asserting them.  It is she, my friend, who asserts these things 
you hear from me, and she is much less unstable than is my other love.  For the son 
of Cleinias says now one thing, now another, while philosophy always says the 
same thing.  She says the things you find astonishing; you were yourself present 
when they were spoken. 
 
So you must either refute her saying those very things that I was asserting – that to 
commit injustice and do so with impunity is the greatest of all evils – or if you 
leave this unrefuted, then, by the dog, god of Egypt, Callicles will not agree with 
you, Callicles, but will dissent from you your whole life long. 24 
                                                
 
 24 G. 482a-b 
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For Vlastos, this passage suggests that unless Callicles is able to refute the Socratic 
thesis, then Callicles will always be in possession of contradictory beliefs, for, as he is 
taking as his own the beliefs posited by Polus, i.e., belief set Vi, his currently held beliefs 
would necessarily indicate that he is also in possession of the covert belief not-p.25 
Further, the resolute nature of Socrates’ claim would indicate that even if the interlocutor 
retracts or modifies beliefs other than the one Socrates has shown to create an 
inconsistency, e.g., dropping belief q instead of p, Socrates will always manage to refute 
their thesis, for, “there will always be others in their belief system which entail the 
Socratic thesis.”26   
 In order to account for the certainty he is attributing to Socrates, Vlastos 
controversially posits what he describes as two “tremendous” assumptions:  
(A) Whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs 
entailing the negation of that false belief. 
-and- 
 (B) The set of elenchtically tested moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given moment is 
consistent.27    
Looking first to assumption A, Vlastos begins by restating the claim that regardless of 
which premise is jettisoned by his interlocutor, as well as whatever new premise is placed 
in its stead, Socrates will always be able to build a new argument which would reveal that 
                                                
 25 Granted, one could argue that Callicles is not beholden to the belief of not-p as the belief set vi 
is not his but that of Polus.  However, such an occurrence is precisely the reason for the “say what you 
believe” requirement discussed previously.   
 
 26 Vlastos, (1994). P. 24  
 
 27 Vlastos 1994, 25 
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the interlocutor still covertly believes not-p.  Yet, if this is true, i.e., if Socrates truly 
believes that his elenchtic method is so unequivocally effective, why not argue for proof 
of such efficacy?  In other words, why would Socrates settle for the mere assumption, 
and not simply use the elenchos to prove to his interlocutors that their efforts are futile in 
the face of such an effective methodology?   
 In answer to this concern, Vlastos claims that doing so would be distinctly 
uncharacteristic of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues.28  Whereas the Socrates 
of dialogues such as the Meno and Republic does in fact engage in more epistemological 
and/or metaphysical lines of inquiry, we find that the Socrates of the early dialogues is 
not only seemingly disinterested in such areas of study, but further, is specifically 
interested only in matters of morality.  As a result of this disposition, questions regarding 
the nature of a philosophical method itself would, for the Socrates of the early dialogues, 
be of little concern or importance.29 Yet, Vlastos notes, despite lacking the definitive 
proof that such an inquiry might yield, Socrates does have, at the very least, empirical 
evidence to support assumption A that arises in the form of his consistent success, as he 
has always been able to expose the inconsistencies within the beliefs of those individuals 
who hold what he perceives to be a false belief.30   And, while his impeccable success 
rate may not be able to definitively prove that the beliefs of Socrates are true, given the 
                                                
 28 For a detailed discussion regarding the evolution of the character of Socrates throughout Plato’s 
corpus, see Vlastos 1991, 47-49 
 
 29 On this point I find issue with Vlastos’ position.  To explain, if we take Assumptions A and B to 
be taken seriously by Socrates, and further, if these assumptions are instrumental to his method’s success in 
proving moral doctrine, then, if Vlastos is correct regarding the role these assumptions play for Socrates, it 
would appear that Socrates is fundamentally concerned with questions of methodology.   
 
 30 Richard Kraut 1983, rightly notes that “proof” is reserved only for deductive arguments, never 
for arguments of an inductive nature.  For Kraut, this becomes problematic for Vlastos if he is claiming, as 
Kraut believes him to be, that it is precisely the sort of proof associated with deductive arguments that 
Socrates seeks via the elenchos.   
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untenable nature of the oppositional beliefs held by his interlocutors, and his own 
experience that those who hold and live by the beliefs he does think true are happier than 
those that do not, Vlastos sees no reason why Socrates would not make the further 
inductive leap regarding the truth of his own beliefs.  Finally, if it were the case that 
Socrates himself was in possession of a false belief, then, similar to his interlocutors, his 
beliefs would eventually be exposed as inconsistent.  And, as such inconsistency is never 
brought to light, Vlastos posits that it is safe to assume that this consistency is evidence to 
the truth of Socrates’ beliefs.31 
 The take away from this is that the sort of consistency of belief that Socrates 
holds to be of the utmost importance has been found to be absent in all others aside from 
himself. One might think that this is not a fair claim to make, as it was always the 
interlocutors, not Socrates, that were the target of the elenchos, i.e., it was always the 
beliefs of others that were subject to Socrates’ incisive questioning.  The question arises 
as to how Socrates could, having not gone through the rigor of his own interrogation, 
positively believe his own beliefs to be true?  And, while this claim is not entirely 
without merit, according to Vlastos, it is simply not the case that his own views have not 
undergone any investigation.  We recall that Socrates, by engaging in the elenchos with 
others, is subjecting his own views to the very same scrutiny.  In discovering that time 
and time again the views of others have been exposed as inconsistent on account of their 
false beliefs, and additionally, that it is his views, and his views alone, that seem to 
maintain consistency despite this exposure to such engagements, Vlastos believes 
Socrates has sufficient evidence to make assumption B, i.e., that the set of elenchtically 
                                                
 31 This consistency within the beliefs of an individual is of such great importance for Socrates that 
he declares he would rather be in contradiction with others than be cursed with the sort of internal strife that 
internal contradictions would cause. See G. 482b-c. 
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tested moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is consistent.  Remember, 
however, that for Vlastos, the elenchos is not merely a methodology used by Socrates to 
expose the inconsistencies within the beliefs of his interlocutors, but rather, it is one that 
allows for the positing of moral truths.  And, for Vlastos, this final step arises through the 
combination of assumptions A and B.  To explain, if it is the case that the belief set of 
Socrates has been shown time and time again to be consistent, and further, if the only 
belief sets that can maintain such consistency are those that lack any false beliefs, then, if 
Socrates can safely assume his own belief set to be consistent (which Vlastos believes he 
can), then Socrates would be justified in claiming that his own beliefs are true.  Thus, as 
it was via elenchtic investigation that Socrates was able to establish the truth of his own 
beliefs, Vlastos argues that Socrates is justified in believing the elenchos to be an 
effective methodology towards the establishing of moral truths. 
The Problem of Consistency 
Vlastos on Inconsistency 
 While I greatly admire the imaginative elegance of Vlastos’ argument, I do have a 
number of deep-seated concerns that I believe present insurmountable problems for his 
position.  The first of these problems I will refer to as the “problem of consistency”.   We 
recall that, on Vlastos’ view, Socrates is justified in positing his own beliefs as true on 
account of the consistency of his own set of beliefs.  Yet, I would like to dispute this 
claim, as one can find numerous instances of Socrates expressing inconsistent beliefs 
throughout the early dialogues.32  Given that Vlastos’ argument depends largely upon 
                                                
 32 While incorporating the middle dialogues into this search for inconsistency might have proven 
to be fruitful, as Vlastos’ argument is meant to speak only to the Socrates of the early dialogues, we must 
limit our search to those parameters.  As an additional concern, one might argue that we should not hold 
Socrates accountable for such inconsistency on the grounds that he might simply have revised his own 
 23 
passages mined from the Gorgias, it is an obvious starting point for our investigation, 
and, to be sure, there is one passage in particular that demands our attention: 
And when we’ve practiced it together, then at last, if we think we should, we’ll 
return to politics, or then we’ll deliberate about whatever subject we please, when 
we’re better at deliberating than we are now.  For it’s a shameful thing for us, 
being in the condition we appear to be at present – when we never think the same 
about the same subjects, the most important ones at that – to sound off as though 
we’re somebodies.33 
  
Looking to this passage, it would appear that we are confronted with a blatant admission 
by Socrates that he does not exclude himself from inconsistency of belief, including 
himself in that group of people who “never think the same about the same subjects.”34 
To be fair, Vlastos does respond to this potential critique, warning us that readers should 
not be fooled by the ironical nature of Socrates’ statement.35  Indeed, according to 
Vlastos, we can find many instances throughout the dialogues with similar “ironical 
substitution of ‘we’ for ‘you’.”  To begin, let us look to the Euthyphro, which contains 
the first passage Vlastos cites as evidence: 
Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or, if we were right then, we are   
wrong now.36 
 
                                                                                                                                            
beliefs as a result of various elenchtic encounters. Indeed, Assumption B seems to take this into 
consideration, as it claims that Socrates beliefs are consistent “at any given time”.  Yet, while this is a 
plausible scenario, not only is there a complete lack of elenchtic evidence to support the claim that Socrates 
used to believe one thing, and then was persuaded to jettison that belief, there is evidence, specifically in 
the Protagoras 372d and 376c, of Socrates expressing uncertainty and inconsistency within the same 
dialogue. Therefore, even if we allow for the evolution of Socrates’ beliefs, we still find cause to believe 
that Socrates is not entirely consistent regarding his own beliefs. 
 
 33 G.527d. Translation by Donald Zeyl 
  
 34 See Kraut 1983, p. 69 
 
 35 Vlastos cites Dodd (1959) in support of his claim, who writes on the matter, “This reproach 
applies of course to Callicles only…but Socrates politely includes himself.” 
 
 36 Eu. 15c8-9  
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In this instance, Vlastos claims that context reveals to us that this final usage of the “we” 
refers only to Euthyphro, and thus, Socrates is excluded from any admission of 
inconsistency.  To illustrate Vlastos’ claim, we look to the text beginning at 15b: 
SOCRATES: So the pious is once again that which is dear to the gods. 
EUTHYPHRO: Most certainly. 
SOCRATES: When you say this, would you be surprised if your arguments seem 
to move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus 
who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus 
and make them go around in a circle? Or do you not realize your argument has 
moved around and come again to the same place?  You surely remember that 
earlier the pious and god-loved were shown not to be the same but different from 
each other.  Or do you not remember? 
EUTHYPHRO: I do 
SOCRATES: Do you then not realize now that you are saying that what is dear to 
the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god-loved? Or is it not? 
EUTHYPHRO: It certainly is. 
SOCRATES: Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or if we were right 
then, we are wrong now. 
 
What can be gleaned from this is that the agreement to which Socrates is referring is that 
the pious is not the same as the god-loved.  Thus, we find that Vlastos is correct in his 
claim that this instance is not an example of inconsistency in the beliefs of Socrates, as 
Socrates did not offer his own beliefs regarding the nature of piety, but rather, merely 
agreed with Euthyphro that the third definition was untenable.  This being the case, we 
can rightly assert that no inconsistency is present.  
  Vlastos’ position is further bolstered when we look to his second example from 
the Charmides.  The moment in question comes at line 175b6-7:  
We have admitted that there is knowledge of knowledge although the argument 
said “No”. 
 
Vlastos argues here that while Socrates seems to be admitting to the joint assertion that 
there exists a knowledge of knowledge, we should bear in mind that it was Critias who 
argued this point, while Socrates maintained the contrary.  And, when we look to the 
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argument itself in the text, we find Vlastos to be justified by the text once again.  Looking 
to 169d: 
But since his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the 
company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of dealing with 
the question I had asked him, he said nothing clear but concealed his predicament.  
So I, in order that our argument should go forward, said “But if this seems right, 
Critias, let us grant the point that the existence of a science of science is possible – 
we can investigate on some other occasion whether this is really the case or not. 
 
We find that it is not the case that Socrates is actually assenting to the position offered by 
Critias, but is, in fact, merely allowing the claims of Critias to stand in order that they 
may proceed forward with the discussion.   
 In one final example from the Laches, we find evidence to support Vlastos’ claim 
that while Socrates does quite often use the plural 1st person pronouns in his argument, 
we should take this as an instance of Socratic irony, and not as evidence that Socrates has 
posited any belief of his own that would result in an inconsistency.  Looking to Laches 
194c, we read: 
Come along then, Nicias, and, if you can, rescue your friends who are storm tossed 
by the argument and find themselves in trouble.  You see, of course, that our affairs 
are in a bad way, so state what you think courage is and get us out of our 
difficulties as well as confirming your own view by putting it into words. 
 
Prima facie it would appear that Socrates is placing himself within the group of those 
who are flustered by the argument regarding courage.  However, upon examining the 
context within which this statement was made, we find that it was Nicias, not Socrates, 
who was struggling through the exchange, so much so in fact that not 12 lines earlier at 
194a-b a very frustrated Nicias all but admits defeat to Socrates, claiming that while he 
may wish to continue, he is simply unable to define courage in such a way that would 
withstand the scrutiny of the elenchos.  This is in direct contrast to Socrates, who, as 
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Vlastos comically notes, has been “sailing very smoothly” throughout the exchange, 
consistently rebutting the attempts of Nicias to the point of exasperation. Given his 
comfort and poise, it seems incorrect to suggest that Socrates was serious when he placed 
himself within the group of those who had been “storm-tossed” by the debate.   
Further Evidence of Inconsistency  
 With these examples bolstering his position, I would agree with Vlastos that we 
cannot simply assume that, given any instance of Socrates’ substitution of the plural 
pronoun for the singular, we are to take him at his word and attribute the beliefs posited 
as his own.  However, while the textual examples cited above may seem to give us reason 
to question the seemingly blatant admission of inconstancy we find in the Gorgias, it 
does not follow from this that there exists no instances of inconsistencies within the 
beliefs of Socrates. However, before we investigate possible discrepancies, I would like 
to first revisit the passage from the Gorgias.  In his comments on the 1983 version of 
Vlastos’ “The Socratic Elenchos,” Richard Kraut suggests that we should take Socrates at 
his word in the Gorgias.37  To prove his position, Kraut first looks to other instances 
where Socrates seems to profess an inconsistency in his beliefs.  We look first to the 
Protagoras where we find at 361a-b Socrates to be holding two distinct positions:  
(1) That virtue can be taught. 
-and- 
 (2) That virtue is knowledge.   
On Kraut’s view, taken together these claims result in an inconsistency within the beliefs 
of Socrates.  Indeed, earlier in the dialogue, Socrates first claims that virtue cannot be 
taught, only to seemingly waffle on his earlier convictions, and reverse his position.  
                                                
 37 Kraut 1983, 68-70 
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Further, at 361c-d, Socrates himself admits to this confusion, and urges his interlocutors 
to push on with him in order to clear up the troubles they have encountered.  And, while 
this apparent inconsistency on the part of Socrates could be dismissed as Socratic irony at 
work, Kraut believes that such an interpretation is flawed, particularly in the face of 
additional textual evidence drawn from the Apology.   
  To explain, in the Apology we find Socrates consistently denying that he teaches 
virtue, and, that those who do claim to do so, “are wise with a wisdom more than 
human.”38 We can glean two important points from this claim.  First, that Socrates, on 
account of his lack of knowledge, could not be teaching virtue, a position that bolsters the 
claim that Socrates considers virtue to be a kind of knowledge. Second, that Socrates 
believes that those who do claim to teach virtue must be in possession of a wisdom that 
he qualifies as divine.  And, while we might take this line to be a slight against the truth 
of those claims to knowledge made by other sophists of the time, it is telling that this 
attack is grounded in the idea that no one could teach virtue, as it pertains to a type of 
knowledge that is divine.  Thus, on the one hand, in the Protagoras, Socrates asserts 
plainly that virtue can be taught, while on the other hand, in the Apology, Socrates seems 
to suggest that virtue cannot be taught, for such a task would require the sort of 
knowledge reserved only for the gods.39 As a result, it appears as if Socrates is expressing 
sincere doubts about the teachability of virtue.  As Kraut concludes, “If Socrates is really 
                                                
 
 38 Apology 20d-e 
 
 39 Granted, one could argue that Socrates’ claims here do not necessarily preclude the possibility 
of an individual possessing the very sort of divine knowledge required regarding virtue, thus allowing 
virtue to be taught.  And, while this point is well taken, there is no textual evidence to support the claim 
that Socrates has met such a person.  Thus, (1) if virtue could be taught only by someone in possession of 
divine wisdom, and (2) Socrates is not certain if such a person exists, then the claim that Socrates is 
expressing uncertainty regarding the teachability stands. 
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doubtful about the teachability of virtue, then he is faced with a dilemma, since (in the 
Protagoras) he takes virtue to be knowledge and thinks that knowledge is teachable.”40  
 As a second piece of evidence, Kraut looks to the Hippias Minor, wherein we find 
Socrates arguing with Hippias regarding the nature of voluntary and involuntary acts of 
injustice.  Looking to 372d-e, we read: 
To me, Hippias, it appears entirely the opposite to what you say: Those who harm 
people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and do wrong voluntarily, rather than 
involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily.  However, sometimes I 
believe the opposite, and I go back and forth about all of this – plainly because I do 
not know. 
 
On Kraut’s view, while Socrates is confident that his belief that it is better to do injustice 
involuntarily rather than voluntarily is the correct position, he fully admits that he, at 
times, “believes the opposite.”  Now, to be fair, one could argue that this claim of 
Socrates is simply a clever ruse designed to further prove his point, and, given the context 
of the argument that follows this admission of inconsistency, it is easy to construct such 
an interpretation.  To explain, we look to 373b:          
EUDICUS: Well, Socrates, I don’t think Hippias will need us to plead with him.  
For that’s not what he said earlier; he said that he wouldn’t flee from any man’s 
questioning.  Right Hippias? Isn’t that what you said? 
HIPPIAS: I did.  But Socrates always creates confusion in his arguments, and 
seems to argue unfairly. 
SOCRATES: Oh excellent Hippias, I don’t do that voluntarily, for then I’d be wise 
and awesome, according to your argument, but involuntarily.  So please be lenient 
with me, for you say that one who acts unfairly involuntarily should be treated with 
leniency. 
 
     Now, given this exchange, one could posit that the earlier admission by Socrates of his 
own vacillating beliefs was done purposefully, setting the stage to put Hippias to task 
regarding his own beliefs.  As the argument would go, by purposefully admitting 
                                                
 
 40 Kraut 1983, p. 69 
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inconsistent beliefs (though untrue), thereby causing unfair confusion in the argument, 
Socrates can then claim he did so involuntarily, which would then force Hippias, if 
Hippias truly stands by his convictions, to treat Socrates with leniency, which would in 
turn, allow Socrates the room to maneuver more easily through the remainder of the 
argument. 
 And, while I admit that this interpretation is appealing, there are a number of 
issues that arise.  First, simply because Socrates is able to use his confusion against his 
interlocutors to help further the discussion, it does not necessarily follow that his 
admission of inconsistency is insincere.  We recall that it is Hippias who suggests that 
Socrates is being unfair in his tactics, to which Socrates responds by using the views of 
Hippias against him.  The using of one’s claims against them is a common tactic of 
Socrates, and one in which he is particularly adept.  Given this point, while his admission 
of inconsistency could seem to put Socrates at an advantage over his interlocutors, such 
circumstance does not require we dismiss his earlier claims as fraudulent.    
 Further, even if we take the admission of inconsistency at 372d to be simply a set-
up put into play by Socrates to further his position, he goes on to repeat his inconsistency 
regarding the point in question at the close of the dialogue. Looking to 376c, the final 
paragraph of the dialogue, we read:  
But given the argument, we can’t help having it look that way to us, now, at any 
rate.  However, as I said before, on these matters I waver back and forth and never 
believe the same thing.  And it is not surprising at all that I or any other ordinary 
person should waver.  But if you wise men are going to do it, too – that means 
something terrible for us, if we can’t stop our wavering even after we’ve put 
ourselves in your company.41 
 
                                                
 41 Italics mine. 
 30 
Faced with this second admission of inconsistent beliefs on the same point, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to claim that Socrates’ earlier position is to be taken as an insincere 
claim made only to further the discussion.  Granted, if the first instance were the only 
time Socrates made such an admission, then a healthy dose of skepticism may be 
appropriate. Yet, this second claim comes in the final paragraph of the dialogue, thus 
precluding the possibility of further discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors.  If 
it is true that his admission of uncertainty is merely a ruse to further the discussion, then 
what purpose would this identical statement serve given its positioning in the dialogue? 
Taking this placement and repetition into consideration, it seems plausible that we should 
take Socrates at his word.42  
Inconsistency and the Daimonion 
With this evidence from the Gorgias, Hippias Minor and Protagoras set before us, I 
contend that we cannot dismiss Socrates’ professions that he holds inconsistent beliefs as 
merely ironic gestures.  As further evidence for this position, there also occur more subtle 
examples that would cause trouble for Vlastos’ position that manifest themselves through 
Socrates’ adherence to the warnings of his daimonion.43 To explain this point, we look 
first to the Apology 40a-c where we find Socrates providing a detailed account of his 
daimonic encounters: 
A surprising thing has happened to me, jurymen – you I would rightly call jurymen.  
At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, 
frequently opposed me, even in small matters when I was about to do something 
wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one 
                                                
 
 42 Further, as Kraut notes, if we can take Socrates at his word when he pleads ignorance at the 
conclusion of the aporetic dialogues such as the Euthyphro, Laches, and Hippias Minor, then why should 
we not take him seriously in those instances when he professes an inconsistency in his own beliefs?  Kraut, 
1983: 70. 
 
 43 See Brickhouse and Smith 1994, p. 21, n. 35. 
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might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine sign 
has not opposed me…Yet in other talks it has often held me back in the middle of 
my speaking, but now it has opposed no word or deed of mine…those of us who 
believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken.  I have convincing proof of this, 
for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do 
what is right.44 
 
 On the face of it, this passage is merely an explanation by Socrates of the 
activities of his ever watchful daimon, i.e., his guardian angel that watches over him, 
preventing him time and time again from saying or doing the “wrong thing”.  Regarding 
the case of Socratic consistency, however, this passage is particularly telling, especially 
when we take into consideration the Socratic claim that no one would ever willingly do 
wrong.45  
 To explain, we look to the Protagoras, wherein Socrates explains that, “…no one 
goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, 
so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of good.”46  In other 
words, when one is deliberating about a potential action, one will always do what one 
believes to be best at that time.  This is no guarantee that the decided on action is in fact 
the right thing; however, correctness of action is not the point, but rather the perceived 
rightness of the action by that individual.  On the Socratic view, if this were not the case, 
then individuals would engage in a particular course of action even if they were well 
aware of a better method to achieve their goals.  This, of course, is absurd according to 
                                                
 
 44 Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 45 For a full discussion on the intricacies of this thesis, see Norman Gulley 1965.  Gulley argues 
convincingly that of two major formulations of this thesis, (1) Prot. 358b-d and (2) G. 509e, we should take 
the formulation from the Protagoras to be more Socratic in nature, while the revised account of the 
Gorgias reflects more intently Plato’s own views on the issue.  Given this argument, we can rightfully 
attribute this claim to Socrates. 
 
 46 Prot. 358d 
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Socrates, and so such errors must be attributed to ignorance, i.e., false beliefs.  Given this 
claim, it must be the case that, whenever Socrates was to engage in a particular action, 
prior to the intervention of his daimon, he falsely believed that action to be the right thing 
to do.  It was only after his daimon (who, interestingly, is never wrong on Socrates’ 
account) intervenes that he recognizes the error in his beliefs, changes them, and then acts 
in accordance with his new belief on the matter.  And, indeed, his beliefs must change, 
for if they did not change, then he would continue to think that his originally planned 
course of action was the correct one, and given the Socratic thesis that we always act in 
accordance with what we believe to be right, he would ignore the advice of his daimon 
(which Socrates never does).  
 With this argument fully fleshed out before us, the problem for Vlastos’ position 
becomes clear.  If, as Vlastos claims, the beliefs of Socrates are always consistent, then it 
would be impossible for Socrates to believe at one moment that performing action x is the 
right thing to do (which he would necessarily have to believe at that moment), and then, 
after being influenced by his daimon, change his belief on the subject and act contrary to 
his original decided on action.  And yet, as we read in the passage above from the 
Apology, Socrates plainly admits to precisely this chain of events, which, when taken in 
concert with the thesis that no one would willingly do the wrong thing from the 
Protagoras, suggests that not only is Socrates inconsistent in his beliefs, but that he is 
aware of these inconsistencies.  And so we recall that, according to Vlastos, the set of 
moral beliefs held by Socrates is, in fact, true, and, that the truth of these beliefs is 
contingent upon the consistency thereof, and further, that in order for any set of beliefs to 
be consistent, it must be void of any false beliefs.  However, as the evidence above has 
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shown, Socrates was in possession of false beliefs, and therefore, as these false beliefs 
preclude the possibility of consistency47, which in turn, precludes the possibility that the 
belief set is true, Vlastos cannot rightfully claim, on such terms, to be in possession of 
true beliefs. 
The Problem of True Premises  
 It has thus far been argued that, contra Vlastos, Socrates is not always consistent 
regarding his beliefs.  As has been shown, we find multiple examples throughout the 
dialogues of Socrates expressing what appear to be contradictory beliefs, in some cases 
within the same dialogue. Yet, as my major point of contention regarding the elenchos as 
practiced by Socrates48 pertains to its inability to establish or discover moral truths, it will 
be useful to concede the problem of consistency for now in order that we might see how, 
even if we concede the point that Socrates is always consistent, the elenchos still does 
                                                
 47 One might argue that it is entirely possible (though perhaps not probable) for someone to be 
entirely consistent in their beliefs even if those beliefs are all entirely false.  As an example, we might 
imagine an individual who believes that he is a cat.  All of his actions are founded in this belief set.  How 
he dresses, what he eats, how he approaches relationships with others, etc.  And, while in this scenario that 
individual would seemingly be consistent, the major force of Vlastos’ position in Assumption A is that not 
only do we have what Vlastos refers to as “overt” beliefs, i.e., beliefs that we actively hold and 
acknowledge in any given moment, we are also in possession of “covert” beliefs, i.e., which, as Vlastos 
explains, are beliefs that are necessarily entailed by our overt beliefs.  So, to use Vlastos’ example, if I 
believe Mary to be John’s sister, and I believe John is Bill’s grandfather, then I covertly believe that Mary 
is Bill’s great-aunt, regardless of whether or not I have actively realized or consciously held that particular 
belief.  And, it is precisely by appealing to his interlocutor’s covert beliefs that Socrates is so successful in 
his elenchtic encounters.  He extracts overt beliefs from his interlocutor and, once posited, is able to draw 
out the covert beliefs that are entailed by those overt beliefs, beliefs that expose the inconsistencies with the 
belief set of the interlocutor.  Returning then to our example of the individual who actively believes they 
are a cat, while that individual might be entirely consistent regarding their actively held overt beliefs, they 
also hold covert beliefs regarding his humanity, even if he is actively unaware of these beliefs.  For 
example, he would recognize that he has outlived every cat he has ever met, that he has two hands with 
opposable thumbs, that he is capable of speaking and understanding language, etc.  If this individual were 
ever subject to a Socratic investigation, it would be a fairly easy task to expose the inconsistencies within 
their belief set, as their own life and appearance would stand in direct contradiction to their belief that they 
are, in fact, a cat.   
 
 48 It must be noted that while Socrates may be more successful than anyone else in his elenchtic 
endeavors, he advocates for its use by others.  See Ap. 23c2-7, 38a2-3, and 39c3-d9).  See also Brickhouse 
and Smith 1994, pp. 27-29. 
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not, and cannot, establish moral truth.49   To begin, we recall that for Vlastos, the solution 
to “the problem of the elenchos,” i.e., how Socrates is able to establish the falsehood of a 
given belief, is contingent upon the truth of the additional premises agreed to by the 
interlocutor.  Since these additional premises are understood as true, and the conjunction 
of these premises and the original thesis result in the negation of that thesis, Vlastos 
claims that Socrates is properly able to establish the thesis to be false, and thus, the 
opposite of that thesis to be true.  For Vlastos, the truth of the additional premises in any 
given elenchtic engagement is assured by the fact that Socrates himself believes them to 
be true, as opposed to the original thesis, which only the interlocutor, not Socrates, 
believes to be true.50  As explained in section one of this dissertation, Vlastos feels 
confident in Socrates’s ability to assert this truth claim regarding his own beliefs on 
account of the consistency of those beliefs, a consistency which, for Vlastos, is only 
possible if the set of beliefs held by a person are, in fact, true.51 
 As could be expected, an array of critiques have been offered in response to this 
claim regarding the perceived truth of Socrates’ own beliefs, an assertion of truth which, 
given that these beliefs serve as the premises for his “proof”, Socrates must be able to 
account for.52 Richard Kraut, for one, in his commentary on Vlastos’ original 1983 
                                                
 
 49 While this section of the chapter will be, for the most part, a direct response to Vlastos, it should 
be noted that Brickhouse and Smith 1994, pp. 18-21 will argue in favor of the positive nature of the 
elenchos as well, albeit in a significantly different way than Vlastos.  For a discussion on this approach, see 
section 1.4 of this dissertation. 
 
 50 This particularly efficient summary of Vlastos’ argument was largely derived from Benson 
(2000). p. 34 
 
 51 For an explanation as to how consistency is dependent upon truth, see note 49. 
 
52 These critiques are similarly cited by Hugh Benson 2000, p. 35.  However, given his cursory 
account of each, as well as a failure to address the more salient components of their arguments, I felt it 
necessary for additional exposition. 
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version of the essay, suggests that Vlastos needlessly creates his “problem of the 
elenchos.”  On Kraut’s view, when one gives an argument, they need not necessarily 
explain the reasoning behind their use of the premises contained within.   Drawing from 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,53 Kraut notes: 
 “…if arguments contain a finite number of steps, and circularity is to be avoided, 
then every demonstration will contain statements for which no explanation is 
given…If the only way to prove a proposition is to deduce it from others, then at 
some point or other demonstration will have to rest on unproved premises, and it 
would be unreasonable to criticize an alleged proof on the grounds that it rests on 
undemonstrated premises.”54  
 
Given this position, Kraut suggests that to ask Socrates to prove not only the conclusion 
but also the premises would be to ask him to perform the impossible.   
 Ronald Polansky follows a different path in his critique, making note of the fact 
that, despite Vlastos’ arguments to the contrary, Socrates quite often relies upon endoxa 
when positing premises.  Given Socrates’ consistent concern regarding the ignorance of 
the majority,55 it is of no surprise that Vlastos would find any reliance by Socrates upon 
public opinion to be fairly hypocritical.  Further, Polansky notes, if Vlastos is correct, and 
the interlocutors only submit premises that they truly believe, then what possible good 
could come from an additional appeal to common opinion?56  On the one hand, if the 
interlocutor posits a particular belief p, and that belief coincides with public opinion, then 
nothing is gained by appealing to public opinion.  On the other hand, if the interlocutor 
                                                
 
 53 Pos. An. I.3 
 
 54 Kraut 1983, p. 62 
 
 55 E.g., Ap. 24b-28a and Crito 46b-50a. 
 
 56 Polansky, 1985: 249 
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posits belief p, and that belief stands in contrast to common opinion, then the individual, 
faced with the overwhelming opposition of the majority, might rescind their initial 
premise, which would ruin the elenchtic encounter on Vlastos’s view, as the interlocutor 
must always say what he believes.  In defense of his position, Vlastos goes so far as to 
suggest that the only time there is an appeal to common belief it is done by the 
interlocutor, not Socrates.57  For example, in the Gorgias, Polus asks, “Socrates, don’t 
you think you’ve been refuted already when you say things with which no one would 
agree? Just ask any of these people here.”58  As Vlastos argues, Socrates rejects this sort 
of appeal entirely, citing G. 472b-c, “If I cannot produce one man – yourself – to witness 
to my assertions, I believe I shall have accomplished nothing.”   
 However, according to Polansky, while the above example may show Socrates 
denying Polus in his appeal, such a denial does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
Socrates would dismiss all such appeals to common belief.  Indeed, it is only one line 
later at 474b where, in response to Polus, Socrates himself appeals to endoxa, as he 
claims, “…you and I and the rest of the world, believe that doing wrong is worse than 
suffering it, and escaping punishment worse than incurring it.”59 Indeed, it is precisely 
such appeals to public opinion that fuel the anger of Callicles, who accuses Socrates of, 
“…bringing the discussion around to…crowd-pleasing vulgarities.”60  Thus, Polansky 
concludes, “even in those contexts in which Socrates questions his interlocutor’s too 
                                                
 57 Vlastos, 1994, 14 –For additional evidence in support of Vlastos’s position, see La. 184e and 
Cr. 46d-47d. 
 
 58 G. 473e (Italics added) 
 
 59 G. 474b 
 
 60 G. 382e   
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facile reliance upon what is universally believed, Socrates employs premises that gain 
acceptance and plausibility precisely because they are in accord with commonly held 
views.”61   
 Now, while Polansky’s critique is well taken, one could counter that while there is 
evidence to suggest that Socrates does utilize endoxa to bolster his arguments, if the 
appeals to endoxa made by Socrates are in regard to premises that he believes to be true 
regardless of public opinion, then Polansky’s critique is easily dismissed.  In other words, 
simply because a premise falls in line with common opinion, it does not necessarily 
follow that the premise in question is untrue.  While perhaps not common, it is entirely 
within the realm of possibility that Socrates holds beliefs that happen to be endoxa as 
well.  And, while this alignment of endoxa and the beliefs of Socrates are quite often not 
the case, if it were to occur, then on Vlastos’s view, Socrates would be entirely free to 
acknowledge this point to further his own argument.62   
 Now, while the critiques made by Polansky and Kraut are not especially 
damaging, that both arguments are directed towards Socrates and his belief that the 
premises used in the elenchos are true is quite telling.  Following these attempts then, if it 
can be shown that Socrates employs premises which he does not believe, then the rigid 
position of Vlastos becomes much less tenable.63  
                                                
 61 Polansky, 1985: 251 
 
 62 Indeed, this very argument is made by Vlastos, which, oddly, Polansky must have neglected to 
notice.  See Vlastos, 1994: 15. 
 
 63 This line of argument borrows heavily from the work of Hugh Benson 2005, pp. 47-56.  It is 
important to note that Benson maintains that his position is only at odds with what he perceived to be 
Vlastos’s original thesis from the 1983 version of the article, i.e., that Socrates can prove a moral truth 
through a single elenchtic episode.  Vlastos, in the revised version of his original essay denies that this was 
his position, claiming instead he has always held a position akin to the “induction” account, first posited by 
Brickhouse and Smith, 1991.  In reviewing the original essay however, it is quite clear that Vlastos is 
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 According to Benson, a particularly clear example of an elenchtic episode within 
which we find premises that Socrates does not believe arises early on in the Euthyphro.64  
Benson reconstructs the elenchos as follows:65 
1. If x is god-loved, then x is pious, and if x is god-hated, then x is impious. (7a6-8) 
2. The gods fight with, differ with, and hate each other. (7b2-4) 
3. The just and the unjust, the fine and the foul, and the good and the bad are the 
subjects of difference that make individuals hate each other. (7b6-d10) 
4. So, there are some things that some gods consider just, fine, or good and other 
gods consider unjust, foul, or bad. (7e1-3) 
5. The things one considers fine, good, or just, one loves and the opposite of these 
one hates. (7e6-7) 
6. So, the same things are hated and loved by the gods. (8a4-5) 
7. So, the same things are god-hated and god-loved. (8a5) 
8. So, the same things will be pious and impious. (8a7-8) 
 
With this elenchos laid out before us, we now need to determine if Socrates believes each 
of the premises to be true.66   To begin, premise (2) emerges as immediately problematic, 
as we earlier find Socrates troubled by Euthyphro’s unabashed belief in the stories about 
the gods, lamenting to Euthyphro that he, “…finds it hard to accept things like that being 
said about the gods.”67 Yet, despite this difficulty, Socrates uses premises 2, 4, 6, and 7.  
Now, if it is the case that Socrates must believe each of the agreed upon premises to be 
true, then, given his admitted disbelief in the very stories he uses as evidence, it would 
                                                                                                                                            
arguing for that original thesis, as Vlastos writes, “Here Socrates says in so many words that he has done 
what Grote and I had maintained he never did in an elenchtic argument: He says that he has ‘proved’ his 
thesis true.” (1983: p. 47).  Considering Vlastos’ own revisions, regardless of his original intentions, this 
note should be taken as directed only in regard to the original essay. 
 
 64 It should be noted that while Benson explains the point in significantly greater detail, his 
example from the Euthyphro as an instance of Socrates using premises he did not believe to be true was 
suggested first by Brickhouse and Smith 1994, p. 15, a fact which Benson fails to mention. 
 
 65 Benson, 2000: 48 
 
 66 Benson, 2000: 48-50 
 
 67 Euth. 6a7-9 
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not be possible for him to allow those premises which assume the existence of the gods to 
stand.  As a supplemental point to Benson’s argument, even if we allow this premise to 
stand, regardless of Socrates’ expressed difficulty regarding his belief in the gods, we 
find that immediately following Euthyphro’s suggestion of premise (2), Socrates pleads 
ignorance as to the truth of that premise.68  We are left then with two options, neither of 
which favor Vlastos’ interpretation:  (1) Socrates allows a premise that conflicts with his 
own beliefs regarding the gods, or (2), Socrates admits that he knows not whether the 
premise he allows to stand is in fact true.  In either case, we find Socrates granting 
premises that he does not actively believe to be true. 
 In addition to the problems that arise from premise 2, Benson also notes that 
Socrates actively disassociates himself from premise 4, clearly stating to Euthyphro that 
the premise in question is κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, i.e., “according to your (Euthyphro’s) 
argument”.69  Socrates then reemphasizes this distancing of himself from the premise, 
reiterating the premise but adding the qualifier ὡς σὺ φῄς, i.e., “so you say”.70  Granted, 
one could argue that these remarks need not be taken to be attributing premise 4 
exclusively to Euthyphro, as it could simply be the case that Socrates wished to make 
clear that both he and Euthyphro were in agreement regarding the details of the premise.   
However, when taken in concert with the preceding point regarding Socrates’ lack of 
belief in the stories from which these descriptions of the gods are founded, Benson 
                                                
 68 Euth. 7a2 – “Whether your answer is true, I do not know yet, but you will obviously show me 
what you say is true.”  
 
 69 Euth. 7e1-3 
 
 70 Euth. 7e9  Translation by Benson, 2000. 
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believes, and I agree, that the evidence clearly suggests that Socrates is disassociating 
himself with the view in question.71 
 In addition to examples such as the above in which Socrates allows for premises 
to stand although he has expressed his reservations regarding their alethic status, one can 
additionally find examples of elenchtic encounters wherein Socrates, under the guise of 
honesty, deceptively posits premises he does not accept.  In other words, whereas in the 
example from the Euthyphro Socrates plainly, and repeatedly, admits he does not agree 
with Euthyphro, we can point to other instances, such as the discussion of courage in the 
Protagoras, where Socrates offers no such admission of skepticism, and yet relies upon 
certain premises, e.g., (351c2-6) that pleasures are good on account of their pleasantness, 
that, given his stated position on the matter in other dialogues, specifically the Gorgias, 
he simply could not believe to be true without then admitting contradictory beliefs.72 To 
illustrate this point we look to Protagoras 353c-354c2, wherein we find Socrates, through 
a series of suggested scenarios, compelling Protagoras to agree that the goodness of any 
action or thing is directly determined by the ratio of pleasure over pain that one 
                                                
 
 71 Benson notes that one might object (as Vlastos in fact does) to this example due to the failure to 
distinguish between direct and indirect elenchoi.  Quickly stated, Vlastos distinguishes between direct 
elenchos, those elenchoi that do not use the refutand as a premise from which the negation of the thesis is 
deduced, and indirect elenchoi, i.e., those elenchoi that do use the refutand as a premise from which the 
negation of the refutand is deduced.  Vlastos (1983: 39) specifically labels the first elenchos of the 
Euthyphro as indirect, which, if true, would excuse Socrates from the requirement that he believe the 
premise set to be true.  In response, Benson suggests that such a critique is problematic on two levels.  
First, Benson objects that the use of the refutand as a premise does not preclude the possibility of deducing 
the falsehood of that refutand.  On Benson’s account, this is precisely the format of a reductio ad absurdum 
argument, which, as Benson notes, “no one would be inclined to claim that a reductio cannot succeed in 
establishing the falsehood of its refutand.  The mere fact that a refutand is used as a premise does not 
prohibit the reductio’s claim to proof or soundness.  What matters is whether or not the refutand has the 
same alethic status as the other premises employed.  If it does, then the reduction can do no more than 
establish inconsistency.  If it does not, then the reduction can establish falsehood.”  (2000, 49-50)   
 
 72 This bulk of this argument is derived from the work of Richard Kraut, 1984: 262-267.   
As an additional point, given Vlastos’ position that Socrates beliefs must be consistent, such a contradiction 
is not possible. 
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experiences via their engagement with that activity or object.  And, while in the 
Euthyphro Socrates seems to distance himself from particular premises via a healthy dose 
of skepticism, in our current example, Socrates explicitly includes himself as sharing 
these beliefs.  Indeed, looking to Protagoras 353e5, we find Socrates asking the 
following: 
Does it not seem to you, my good people, as Protagoras and I maintain, that these 
things are bad on account of nothing other than the fact that they result in pain and 
deprive us of other pleasures?73 
 
This passage, along with other similar admissions, seems to suggest that Socrates is 
professing himself to be, at the very least, in agreement with the hedonist perspective.  
However, given the substantial amount of evidence to the contrary, specifically his 
vehement denial of the hedonistic position in the Gorgias,74 not to mention the ink that 
has been spilled by scholars arguing against this position,75 that Socrates might seriously 
be considered to be a hedonist seems untenable, let alone that he considered himself one.  
Given this evidence, I submit that we must understand Socrates to be arguing dishonestly 
in the Protagoras, relying upon subterfuge to achieve his goal of exposing the 
inconsistencies in the beliefs of his interlocutors.76  If this is correct, then once again the 
requirement that Socrates believe all of his premises to be true reveals itself to be 
unsupported by the text. 
                                                
 73 Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 74 Perhaps most notably G. 494e9-500e1 
 
 75 For the most compelling case against Socrates honestly espousing a hedonist view, Vlastos, 
1969; 71-88, Santas, 1979; 198-199, and Zeyl, 1980; 250-269.   
 
 76 Kraut, 1984; 266.  Kraut adds that a similar example of dishonesty can be found, in this instance 
regarding the varying definitions of courage in the Laches and Protagoras.  In the Laches (194e11-199e11) 
Socrates argues against the definition of courage that Protagoras is lead to in the Protagoras, i.e., courage is 
knowledge of what is and is not fearful. 
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The Problem of Establishing Moral Truths 
The Euthyphro 
 It has thus far been argued that two of the conditions of Vlastos’ argument, (1) 
that all of Socrates’ beliefs are consistent, and (2) that Socrates must believe all of his 
premises to be true77, are not supported by the text.  However, as Vlastos’ position 
centers around the claim that the elenchos is capable of establishing moral truths, let us 
set aside the previously discussed issues in Vlastos’ argument, and turn our attention to 
actual elenchtic encounters to determine if the elenchos as utilized by Socrates is capable 
of achieving all that Vlastos claims.  Granted, there are far too many elenchtic arguments 
found throughout the early dialogues to analyze each elenchos in full.78  Thus, on account 
of the sheer number of elenchoi, I will limit my analysis to selected arguments I believe 
to be paradigmatic examples, each of which adhering to the standards as stipulated by 
Vlastos.79 
 Beginning with the Euthyphro, we recall from our account of the first elenchos of 
this dialogue that Vlastos considers this particular elenchos to be of the “indirect” kind, 
which, as we recall, on Vlastos view, is, unlike the standard “direct” elenchos, unable to 
                                                
 77 See Vlastos 1994, ch. 3. “Does Socrates, for his part, believe that q and r are true? In a standard 
elenchtic argument there can be no doubt of this: it follows from Socrates’ conviction that the contradiction 
does more than expose inconsistency within the interlocutors beliefs  - that it refutes his thesis, as we can 
see, for instance, when Polus is told that the argument which faulted him “proved true” the Socratic thesis 
against his (G. 479e8).  Socrates could not have said that unless he were convinced that q and r which are 
shown to entail not-p are themselves true.”   Granted, this example is in reference to the elenchos of the 
Gorgias that inspired Vlastos’ position.  However, given Vlastos’ claim that such must be the case in any 
“standard elenchos,” it appears as if this is a universal claim by Vlastos regarding Socrates’ belief in the 
premises, not merely the belief of the interlocutor. 
 
 78 Vlastos 1994, p.3, citing Robinson 1953, p.24, suggests that one can find 39 elenchoi in the 
early to middle dialogues.   
 
 79 For a detailed account of each of the elenchoi from the Euthyphro, Charmides, and Laches, see 
Benson, 2000, pp.58-95.   
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establish moral truths.  Thus, to be fair to Vlastos’ argument, my first example here will 
be the second elenchos of the Euthyphro (10d1-10d14), an argument Vlastos specifically 
claims to “prove the doctrine, so fundamental for Socrates’ rational theology, that pious 
action is god-loved because it is pious.”80 The complete second argument of the elenchos 
proceeds as follows:81 
1. X is pious because it is loved by all of the gods. (10d1-2) 
2. X is loved because it is pious. (10d4-6) 
3. It is not the case that X is pious because it is loved. (10d6-7) 
4. X is a loved thing and god-loved because it is loved by the gods. (10d9-19) 
5. It is not the case that x is loved by the gods because it is god-loved. (10e6-7) 
6. “Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the 
same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.” (10d12-
14) 
7. The pious is being loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being 
loved. (10e2-3) 
8. “The god-loved …is so because it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of 
being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved” (10e4-6) 
9. “If the god-loved and the pious were the same, then if the pious was being loved 
because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because it was 
god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the 
gods, then the pious would also be the pious because it was being loved by the 
gods.” (10e9-11a3) 
10. “But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different 
from each other: the one is such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other 
is being loved because it is such as to be loved.” (11a4-6) 
 
 Beginning with claim (6), we find cause for Vlastos to believe that Socrates has been 
able to prove Euthyphro’s posited definition to be false, as we find Socrates being rather 
clear in his own position: 
                                                
 80 Vlastos, 1983; n.32  Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 81 This summary follows closely the summary provided by Benson, 2005; p.59, particularly 
premises 1-6.  Further, while one might argue that as premise 2 conflicts directly with premise 1, then we 
have evidence of Euthyphro failing to posit his actual beliefs, only agreeing to the apparent contradiction to 
move the elenchos along.  However, it could equally be argued that Euthyphro believes both premise 1 and 
2 at the time of Socrates’ inquiries, not fully recognizing the conflict until having gone through the 
elenchos with Socrates.  We find evidence for Euthyphro’s own belief in the premise at 10d4, when in 
response to Socrates’ suggestion that a thing is loved because it is pious, Euthyphro emphatically responds 
that something is loved “for no other reason” than it being Pious.  
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“Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the 
same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.” (10d12-14) 
 
Indeed, prima facie this passage seems to support Vlastos’ position.  Socrates is 
seemingly claiming to have undeniably shown Euthyphro’s initial thesis to be false.  Yet, 
as some scholars have shown, this need not be the case.  Hugh Benson, for one, suggests 
that while it may seem to be the case that Socrates is examining (and determining) the 
truth of Euthyphro’s claim, if we turn our attention to Socrates’ comments immediately 
preceding the elenchos in question, we find cause to question the standing interpretation 
as given by Vlastos.82  That pivotal line, Euthyphro 9d6-8, finds Socrates responding to 
Euthyphro’s inquiry as to what might stand in the way of their modifying the definition 
of piety previously posited.  In response to this question, Socrates explains:  
For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal 
will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised.83 
 
Taking this statement into consideration, we are able to parse out two particularly 
important points. First, the opening of the passage has Socrates clearly stating that it is 
not he at all that would be preventing the modification of the definition as previously 
posited.  If the definition in question was to be analyzed for its alethic status, and, as 
Vlastos claims, Socrates (and Socrates alone) uses the elenchos to determine the truth of 
any given definition, then it seems incorrect for Socrates to distinctly distance himself 
from the process.  Second, building from this first point, Socrates is clearly requesting 
that Euthyphro himself look to the definition now under consideration to ensure that he 
(Euthyphro) agrees with its terms.  Given this request, it seems that Socrates is ensuring 
                                                
 82 Benson 2000, p. 60-62 
 
 83 Euth. 9d6-8. 
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that this new definition to be examined is something to which Euthyphro can agree, i.e., it 
is a definition Euthyphro believes to be consistent with his own beliefs.84  
 That this elenchos exposes the inconsistency of Euthyphro’s beliefs is further 
emphasized by Socrates in the exchange immediately following the conclusion of the 
elenchos.  As we read at 11b8-c4: 
Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus.  If I were 
stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making fun of me 
and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run 
away and will not stay where one puts them.  As these propositions are yours, 
however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say 
yourself.85 
 
Now, while this passage may further the point that inconsistency is apparent, it is still not 
certain that Socrates has not also determined the truth (or lack thereof) of a particular 
doctrine.  Yet, following Benson’s lead, we might find the evidence required through a 
careful consideration of the Daedalus analogy used by Socrates in the above passage.  To 
explain, Benson notes that reference to Daedalus is not limited to the Euthyphro alone, 
but is also utilized by Plato in the Meno.  Looking to the Meno, we read:  
To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway 
slave, for it does not remain but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are 
beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions.  For true opinions, 
as long as they remain, are a fine thing, and all they do is good, but they are not 
willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so they are not worth 
much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of reason why…After they 
are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then remain in place.  
That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs 
from correct opinion in being tied down.86 
 
                                                
 
 84 Benson 2000, p. 61.  Once again, I do not dispute the position that Socrates uses the elenchos to 
establish the inconsistency of the beliefs of his interlocutors. 
 
 85 Euth. 11b8-c4  -  Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 86 Meno 97e1-98a8 
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From this passage we find Plato emphasizing the necessity of stability regarding 
knowledge, i.e., to claim one is in possession of knowledge, then they must be able to 
support their beliefs via reason.  Similar to the untied Daedalus statues that run away, 
quickly leaving their owner empty handed, unsubstantiated opinion falters under 
scrutiny.87 Taking this shared analogy into consideration, it is not necessarily the case 
that Socrates has proven Euthyphro’s definition to be false (nor the negation of this 
definition to be true), but rather, has simply exposed the inconsistency of his beliefs, for 
had they been true, then his beliefs would have, similar to a secured Daedalus statue, 
“stayed put”.88   
 To further the argument against the elenchos’ ability to establish moral truths, let 
us take as an additional example the very next elenchos of the Euthyphro (12e5-13d2), 
which, prima facie, seems to support Vlastos’ position.  Before providing an argument 
against this view, however, let us first reconstruct the argument as found in the text: 
1. “Piety is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods.” (12e5-6) 
2. Care for the gods is the same as care for livestock. (13a1-5) 
3. “Care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and benefit of the object 
cared for.” (13b6-7) 
4. Caring for the gods does not make the gods better. (13c6-9) 
5. Therefore, Piety is not the same as caring for livestock, namely, providing benefit 
to the object of care. (13d2) 
 
Again, on first glance, this conclusion seems to suggest that Socrates has proven the 
thesis offered by Euthyphro, i.e., that Piety is the same sort of care as one would have for 
livestock, to be false.  Yet, if we look to the text, we find Socrates expressing his concern 
                                                
 
 87 Benson is careful to note that the epistemology of the Meno is distinct from that of the early 
dialogues, and that we must exercise caution in reading too much of the Meno back into the Euthyphro.  
However, Benson rightly claims that, “it would be odd for Plato to use an analogy he had previously used 
to describe an individual whose belief has been shown to be false to now in the Meno describe an 
individual whose belief is true but nevertheless fails to amount to knowledge. Benson 2000, 61. 
 
 88 See also Woodruff 1990, 104.   
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not with the truth of the thesis itself, but rather whether or not this thesis was one that 
Euthyphro truly believed.  In response to Euthyphro’s agreement that, on second thought, 
care for the gods is not the same as care for livestock, Socrates notes in relief, “Nor did I 
think that this is what you meant – far from it – but that is why I asked you what you 
meant by care of the gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care.”89  
 According to Benson, this concluding passage provides us with two crucial 
insights: First, we find that Euthyphro’s acceptance of premises 3 and 4 seems 
incompatible with his accepting of premise 2.  To explain, let us take premise 3, i.e., 
“Care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and benefit of the object cared 
for.” (13b6-7) While this may be an acceptable way to understand care in regard to 
livestock, one could offer an alternative definition of care, e.g., that one cares for cattle in 
order to benefit themselves.  In other words, while it would behoove the cattle owner to 
ensure his cattle are well fed and healthy, their well-being is a means to an end, i.e., the 
owner’s own benefit.  And, while one might argue that even in this scenario the cattle are 
still being afforded the food and shelter required to make their lives better, if this “care” 
is implemented only towards their eventual slaughter, it is difficult to maintain the 
argument that this care is beneficial for the animal.  Thus, we find premise 3 is potentially 
incompatible with premise 2.  
 Second, we find that Socrates once again focuses on precisely what Euthyphro 
meant, not on whether or not the premise itself is true or false.90  It is thus not clear that 
any truth has been established regarding the definition of piety.  And, it is this failure to 
                                                
 
 89 Euth. 13c6-9 
 
 90 Benson 2000, 63 
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establish any positive moral doctrine that arises as the major problem for Vlastos’ 
interpretation.  To explain, even if we hypothetically grant that Socrates has “proven” 
that Euthyphro’s definition of piety is untenable, he nevertheless fails to replace it with a 
working definition of his own.  If the elenchos was capable of such positive work, then 
one must inquire as to why the Euthyphro, not to mention the majority of the so-called 
Socratic dialogues, would end in aporia.  If, as Vlastos has argued, Socrates91 is entirely 
concerned with issues of morality, and further, Socrates believes himself capable of 
establishing the definitional knowledge required to answer the very questions he finds 
before him, then what reason could he have for leaving them unanswered? Thus, given 
the absolute lack of such positive doctrine, not to mention the consistent state of aporia 
that is present at the conclusion of these dialogues, Vlastos’ claims regarding the positive 
powers of the elenchos become increasingly difficult to defend. 
The Gorgias  
 In addition to the examples above, Benson carefully deconstructs every elenchoi 
found within the Euthyphro, Charmides, and Laches.  In each case, it is shown that there 
is not sufficient evidence to support the position that the elenchos establishes a positive 
moral truth.  And, while it is not necessary here to further replicate the work of Benson 
regarding the elenchoi of these early dialogues, we recall that the entire argument as 
given by Vlastos is dependent upon an argument found within the Gorgias, i.e., that it is 
better to suffer injustice than commit injustice.  Given Vlastos’ dependence upon various 
passages from the Gorgias, it is necessary then to determine if his interpretation of the 
                                                
 
 91 In particular, the Socrates of the early dialogues. 
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text in question is correct. To do so, I will follow closely the argument against Vlastos as 
given by Benson, adding detail and correction where I believe appropriate.  
 To begin, in comparison to the earlier dialogues such as the Euthyphro and 
Laches, the Gorgias is not a paradigmatic elenchtic dialogue.92  In the place of the 
inquisitive, self admittedly ignorant man of the early dialogues, we find a more assertive 
Socrates, one openly declaring particular beliefs that stand in direct opposition to those of 
his interlocutors.93  Granted, one could argue that the ignorance displayed in the earlier 
dialogues was merely a ruse utilized by Socrates to further his own arguments94, 
however, the sincerity of Socrates’ claims to ignorance are irrelevant, as the point is not 
whether or not he is sincere in his claims, but that he is making and standing by his own 
claims that distinguishes the tone of the Gorgias from the earlier dialogues.  Given this 
distinction, any textual evidence gleaned from the Gorgias that is used to promote a 
theory incorporating the Socratic dialogues as a whole must be taken with a grain of salt.  
As Benson explains: 
The point here is not that the Gorgias is not an early dialogue or that it fails to 
provide evidence for the views, methodological or otherwise, for the Socrates of 
the early dialogues.  Rather the point is simply that the Gorgias is an unusual early 
dialogue.  As a result, should these passages compel us to understand Socrates as 
believing that individual elenchoi can establish positive moral doctrines, that 
maybe due to the special nature of the Gorgias rather than due to what is in 
common with the other early dialogues.95 
 
Given the distinct nature of the Gorgias then, if there can be found no passages within the 
earlier dialogues that mirror the positive claims made by the Socrates of the Gorgias, 
                                                
 92 See Irwin 1979, 6-7, and Vlastos 1983, 70 
 
 93 E.g., G. 470e as well as 472e-473a1 
 
 94 See n. 3 
 
 95 Benson 2000, 81 
 50 
which I believe, in agreement with Benson, that there are none, then we should not take 
the elenchos from the Gorgias, nor the “truth” it seems to establish, as the paradigmatic 
example upon which our understanding of the elenchos as a whole is to be understood.96  
 However, even if we ignore the issue of distinction between the Gorgias and 
earlier dialogues, the argument and positive claims that arise therefrom which serve as 
the foundation of Vlastos’ argument are cause for further concern.  To clarify this, let us 
re-examine the argument in question, which, for the sake of ease of reference, I once 
again provide here: 
 p To commit injustice is better than to suffer it 
 q To commit injustice is baser (αἴσχιον) than to suffer it. (475c5-6) 
 r Doing injustice is more shameful than to suffer it. (474c7-8) 
 s x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is more  
  beneficial than y. (475a5-b2) 
 t Doing injustice is either more painful or more evil than suffering  
  injustice. 
  (475b5-8) 
 u Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering injustice. (475c1-4) 
 v Doing injustice is more evil/worse than suffering it. (475c7-9) 
 
Putting aside the oft-noted issues regarding the controversy of the argument itself,97 the 
question arises as to whether or not the argument in question, and the premises upon 
which it is constructed, can meet the standards as set forth by Vlastos.  In other words, we 
recall that on Vlastos’ view, for a particular Socratic elenchos to provide proof for a 
moral doctrine, Socrates must believe each of the premises contained within the argument 
to be true.98  And, on Benson’s account, this requirement is not met.  Benson takes issue 
                                                
 
 96 This point is somewhat conceded by Vlastos himself in his revised version of his article.  
Vlastos 1994, 33-34. 
 
 97 For the problems of ambiguity regarding translation, see Irwin 1979, 157.  Additionally, for 
issues regarding the potentially purposive fallaciousness of the argument, see Dodds 1959. 
 
 98 See n. 78. 
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first with premise s, i.e., that x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is 
more beneficial than y, a point which Socrates happily seems to accept as an adequate 
standing definition of the fine.99 Yet, in spite of this agreement on the part of Socrates to 
the truth of the premise in question, whether or not Socrates actually believes this to be 
true is not entirely certain.100  According to Benson, the problem arises following 
Socrates’ efforts to, “extract from Polus an account of the fine compatible with his dual 
claims that doing injustice is better than suffering it (1) and that doing injustice is more 
shameful/less fine than suffering it.”101  Further, as we read at 474d1, Socrates elicits 
from Polus the additional belief that the “fine” and “good” are necessarily distinct from 
one another.  Yet, as Benson notes, this additional premise regarding the distinction 
between the good and the fine is a premise that Socrates himself is unable to accept, a 
position expressed by Socrates in the proceeding passages (474d2-476a1).102  Given this 
contradiction, it is not clear that Socrates accepts as true premise s.  Thus, according to 
                                                
 
 99 Benson cites 475a2-4 as evidence for this, as we find Polus noting in response, “Yes, Socrates, 
your present definition of the admirable in terms of pleasure and good is an admirable one.”   
 
 100 Benson’s first attempt to show issue with the certainty of Socrates regarding this premise draws 
from an assortment of passages from Greater Hippias, in particular 286c8-e2 and 304d4-e5, in which 
Socrates explicitly disavows any knowledge whatsoever regarding the definition of the fine.  However, 
while the textual evidence from the Greater Hippias does seem to contradict that from the Gorgias, i.e., in 
the former he pleads ignorance whereas in the latter he seems to have a working definition, such a 
contradiction does not rule out the possibility that Socrates (or Plato, for that matter) might have changed 
his mind on the subject between the writing of the Greater Hippias and Gorgias.  And, while cross 
dialogue evidence can be useful and convincing, in this instance it is my belief that the stronger argument 
can be made solely from evidence drawn from the Gorgias.  For Benson’s argument on the former, see 
Benson 2000, 82-83. 
 
 101 Benson 2000, 83 
 
 102 Benson 2000, 83 notes that Socrates refusal to accept the position offered by Polus is similarly 
found in other dialogues, namely: Protagoras (359e5-7).  Irwin provides similar evidence drawing from 
Charmides 160e, Laches 193d-e, Protagoras 349e-350b, and Crito 48b. 
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Benson, “… Socrates commitment is open to question, as is his commitment to the 
soundness of the argument that depends upon it.”103 
 As a final, yet simpler point, we find that despite the seemingly powerful claims 
made by Socrates regarding the establishment of a positive moral doctrine, multiple 
instances arise that would suggest Socrates is not quite as certain as Vlastos would have 
us believe.104  According to Benson, a number of such instances exist. (1) In the lines 
following 479e8, wherein Socrates claims he has proven his position to be true, we find 
Socrates immediately backsliding.  As we read at 480a1-2, “All right. If these things are 
true, then what is the great use of rhetoric, Polus?”  Against Benson, however, one could 
argue that the conditional nature of Socrates statement above need not be read as 
uncertainty on Socrates part regarding the truth of his own belief.  It could be the case 
that Socrates, taking into consideration the truth of his own belief, is now delivering a 
pointed attack upon rhetoric itself, noting that it is through the elenchos, not rhetoric, that 
the truth can be uncovered.  
 Yet, while I do find Benson’s initial argument to be somewhat problematic, it is 
the final two pieces of textual evidence he offers that provide the more compelling case.  
First, following Socrates’ claim at 508e7-509a2, where he claims to have built a case that 
is “clamped down by arguments of iron and adamant,” we discover Socrates very quickly 
                                                
 
 103 Benson 2000, 83.  Benson furthers his position by noting that if premise s is not truly accepted 
by Socrates, then this premise “infects” the very passages from the Gorgias that Vlastos has cited as his 
evidence for the establishment of positive moral doctrine (479e8: “Has it not been proved that what was 
asserted [by myself] is true.” As well as 508e7-509a2: “These things having become evident in the 
foregoing arguments, I would say, crude though it may seem to say it, that they have been clamped down 
and bound by arguments of iron and adamant.” Both translations by Vlastos, 1994.   
 
 104 Benson 2000, 83-85. 
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weakening his resolve, stating, “or so at least it would appear so far”.105  And, if this 
disavowal of certainty was not quite enough, we find that not two lines later Socrates 
reminds his audience of his ignorance of the topic at hand, as he claims to know nothing 
regarding the issue at hand.106  As Benson explains, “This (Socrates’ lack of certainty) is 
at least odd if Socrates had understood his preceding arguments as establishing or 
proving the thesis that to do injustice and not be punished is worse than suffering 
injustice.  Whatever else Socrates thinks his previous arguments have established he 
evidently does not think they established knowledge.”107   
 To be fair, Vlastos does take this issue into consideration,108 a problem he 
believes he resolves through his positing of two distinct types of knowledge: (1) 
KnowledgeC, which is to be understood as infallible knowledge of which one is absolutely 
certain, and KnowledgeE, or “knowledge” that is acquired through the elenchtic method.  
For Vlastos, it is only KnowledgeE that Socrates would avow.  So, on Vlastos’ account, 
when Socrates claims to know, for instance, that it is better to suffer injustice than to 
commit injustices, such “knowing” is of the elenchtically provable variety, whereas more 
profound knowledge, e.g., the definition of the “fine,” would be classified as knowledgeC, 
which, for Socrates (and Vlastos) would be, if not impossible to truly obtain, at the very 
least held to much more rigorous standards.  
  However, I take issue with this distinction as given by Vlastos, for, when we take 
into consideration the type of knowledge that would seem to fall under the category of 
                                                
 105 ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί 
 
 106 G. 509a4-5 - “And yet, for my part, my account is ever the same: I don’t know how these 
things are…”  
 
 107 Benson 2000, 84  
 
 108 Vlastos 1994, p. 59-60 
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KnowledgeC, i.e., moral doctrine and definitional knowledge of the virtues, we find 
textual evidence that would prove troubling for Vlastos.  To explain, looking to the 
Apology 20d-e, we recall that Socrates states that any claiming of knowledge regarding 
issues of virtue are claiming a kind of knowledge that is beyond human understanding, 
i.e., divine.  And, considering the issue at hand in the Gorgias is without question one 
that pertains to virtue, to say that such knowledge is to be classified as KnowledgeE is 
problematic, as it is not altogether clear how such knowledge would not be categorized as 
the sort reserved for KnowledgeC,   
 Thus, at best it appears that the “proof” established regarding the suffering of 
injustice is nothing more than an agreement between Socrates and his interlocutor 
regarding their justified belief on this particular issue.  As the issue at hand concerns the 
suffering of injustice, such a proof would first require that Socrates produce a proper 
definition of Justice itself.  Given Socrates’ lack of definition regarding the basic 
principles of Justice, it does not seem possible for Socrates to then prove as true in the 
sense of KnowledgeC that inflicting injustice is always worse than suffering it.   
The Problem of Induction   
 In addition to the issues argued above, there remains one final issue that must be 
addressed, and that is the problem of induction.  According to Vlastos, Socrates is able to 
posit his own belief set as consistent because never in all his years of questioning has any 
interlocutor been able to expose inconsistencies therein, in fact quite the contrary.  As a 
result of this perceived consistency, “…he has evidence – as before, inductive evidence – 
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for a further assumption,” i.e., to believe his own beliefs to be consistent.109  In other 
words, Socrates’ confidence regarding the consistency of his beliefs is derived entirely 
from his own experience of never having his beliefs proven inconsistent by an 
interlocutor.110  However, if this is true, and Socrates is only able to establish the 
consistency of his beliefs via induction, then a number of additional problems arise.   
 First, we are faced with the somewhat obvious issue of uncertainty.  To explain, 
we recall that according to Vlastos, the beliefs of Socrates are in fact true on account of 
their consistency,111 which itself is dependent upon the beliefs of Socrates never being 
exposed as inconsistent via an elenchtic engagement.  And, while it may be the case that 
up until a certain point Socrates has never been refuted by an interlocutor, previous 
victories in these engagements do not guarantee that tomorrow a particularly skilled 
interlocutor might not rise to the occasion and expose Socrates’ beliefs as inconsistent.112  
In other words, while the many previous victories may indeed allow Socrates to be 
                                                
 109 Vlastos 1983, 55  I again maintain, in agreement with Benson, that despite this appeal to 
induction, Vlastos, in this earlier version of his essay, argues that individual elenchoi do establish moral 
truths.   
 
 110 A similar position is posited and argued for by Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 18-21.  On their 
account, however, it is precisely because Socrates is unable to acquire knowledge as to how his own 
generalized account is correct that he must continue to question others, doing so to determine, “whether 
anyone can hold an opposing view consistently with his other beliefs…(the) argument is only that repeated 
elenchtic examinations can confirm the untenability of the opposed view and give Socrates grounds for 
claiming that leading the examined life has constructive doctrinal consequences.”  In effect, the purpose of 
the elenchos is not solely to establish moral truths, as Vlastos claims, but further, and more importantly, to 
convince the interlocutors that the examined life is the only one worth living, for “only by leading the 
examined life is one able to uncover those inconsistent beliefs one holds which frustrate their goals.” 
 
 111 Vlastos 1983, 55 
 
 112 It is on this point where Brickhouse and Smith’s version of the induction argument is 
particularly strong, as, under their interpretation, even if this were to happen, and Socrates’ beliefs were 
exposed as inconsistent, then the elenchos is still a success, as the errors now exposed in Socrates’ belief 
set will only aide him in his search for the truth.  
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justified in his belief that his own belief set is true, it in no way actually “proves” the 
objective truth of his beliefs.113   
 Second, we recall that, according to Vlastos, the Gorgias provides us with textual 
evidence to support the claim that the elenchos is able to prove moral doctrines.  And, 
while we already discussed a number of problems with this interpretation from a textual 
level, if we ignore these inconsistencies for now, we find that the appeal to induction 
creates problems of its own.  To explain, if, as Vlastos claims, Socrates is able to gain 
evidence for the truth of his beliefs only through induction, then Vlastos is forced to 
admit that single elenchtic arguments do not prove positive moral truths (a point he does 
concede).  In other words, if Socrates must rely upon numerous encounters to posit any 
particular truth, then the argument found in the Gorgias, and the “proof” gleaned from it 
must be no exception.  Therefore, it is not the particular arguments from the Gorgias that 
result in the positing of the truth in question, but rather this particular encounter in 
concert with multiple previous encounters.  However, if this is the case, and the “proof” 
of the Gorgias is entirely dependent upon previously held elenchtic encounters, then how 
could the particular argument in the Gorgias be considered proof of anything as Vlastos 
seems to argue?  Again, the consequence of this is that the evidence found in the Gorgias 
results only in Socrates being justified in his belief that his own belief set is true at that 
moment, a position which, again, considering the future possibility of a particularly 
skilled interlocutor exposing Socrates’ inconsistencies, arises as deeply problematic for 
Vlastos.   
 To explain, the conviction with which Socrates espouses his own beliefs seems at 
                                                
 
 113 See Kraut 1983, 59 
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odds with the explanation provided by Vlastos, i.e., that Socrates is justified in believing 
his beliefs to be true on account of his previous encounters failing to expose 
inconsistencies.  Given the distinct possibility of a future encounter proving Socrates 
wrong, not to mention Socrates failure to prove any positive moral doctrine throughout 
the early dialogues via the elenchos, it would seem that something more would be 
required to explain the firm conviction with which Socrates expresses his beliefs.  And, 
while it is true that the dialogues provide no evidence of Socrates being exposed as 
inconsistent, it is not the elenchos that is explicitly considered infallible in the eyes of 
Socrates, but rather, it is his daimon that he finds to unfailingly guide him towards the 
truth.  Given Socrates’ recognition of this point, as well as the failure of the elenchos to 
establish any positive moral doctrine, it is perhaps not through the elenchos alone, but 
rather the elenchos in concert with divine dispensation that Socrates is able to stand so 
firm in his convictions.  It is this possibility that I will explore in the remainder of this 
dissertation. 
Conclusion 
 As I have argued, on its own the elenchos is, contra Vlastos, unable to establish 
positive moral doctrine.  Faced with these inadequacies, as well as Socrates’ unexplained 
claims to knowledge, determining how Socrates could avow knowledge requires an 
investigation into new possibilities.  In an effort to take up this challenge, in the 
remaining chapters I will investigate the relation between Socrates and sophistry, as well 




Chapter 2: Socrates and Sophistry in the Late Dialogues  
 As I have argued in the previous chapter, Socrates is not able to achieve 
knowledge through the elenchos.  Given this fact, coupled with Socrates’ consistent 
disavowal of knowledge, the question arises as to how Socrates is able to excel to the 
point of supremacy in his encounters and debates with others.  In other words, if Socrates 
had knowledge, then his ability to dominate any argument would make sense, as his 
questions would thus be guided by the truth.  However, as this is not the case, his ability 
remains a mystery.  As a possible explanation to this phenomenon, some scholars have 
concluded that Socrates must therefore be considered as a kind of sophist, one skilled in 
the art of appearing to be wise, when in fact they themselves lack such wisdom.1  And, 
such claims are not entirely unfounded, for, if we look to Plato’s Sophist, his major work 
on the subject of sophistry, we find that, amongst a variety of possible definitions of the 
sophist, one definition seems an almost perfect description of Socrates.  This point, 
coupled with the fact that in the Sophist, as well as other later Platonic dialogues such as 
the Statesman and the Laws, the character of Socrates takes a back seat to the Eleatic and 
Athenian strangers, has driven some scholars to argue that, at the close of Plato’s life, he 
no longer considers his mentor to meet the standards of the philosopher.   
 The goal of this chapter, then, is to argue against this claim.  In the following I 
will argue that, despite the apparent similarities between the sixth definition of the sophist 
as found in the Sophist and Socrates, we should not, and cannot, consider Socrates to be a 
sophist.  However, while my aim is to save Socrates from sophistry, I will further argue 
                                                
 1 Most notably Taylor (2006). 
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that he also cannot be considered a philosopher in the unqualified sense.  On my 
interpretation, while Plato did, at one point, consider Socrates to be a philosopher, he 
came to realize that, given the failures of the elenchos, a new methodology was required.  
I will thus argue that this new methodology of division is, if not the methodology of the 
philosopher, at the very least a necessary component of philosophy.  And, as Socrates 
was a not a practitioner of this new method, he does not meet the standards that Plato sets 
for philosophy in the later dialogues. 
Defining the Sophist 
 Looking first to the Sophist and Plato’s attempts to define sophistry, we find that 
Socrates has taken a back seat to the Eleatic Stranger, an individual that Theodorus 
introduces as “very much a philosopher.2   Given the task of defining sophistry, the 
Eleatic Stranger employs a methodology wherein, through a series of subsequent 
divisions, he is able to further narrow the field of inquiry until the term in question is 
adequately defined.   Yet, as the Stranger is set to begin his investigation into the 
definition of the sophist, he expresses his concern regarding the difficulty of the task at 
hand.  Thus, in order to ease into the analysis, he suggests to Theaetetus that it would 
serve them well to first use a model, i.e., an angler, as a starting point for their inquiry.3  
As explained by the Stranger, it is decided to begin with the example of the angler, for 
not only is it an easily recognizable profession, and thus, easily definable, but it is also a 
profession which, similar to certain conceptions of sophistry, pertains to “hunting”.4   The 
                                                
 2 Soph. 216a3 
 
 3 Soph. 218c7-e1.  See also Gill (2012, 140) – Gill adds that here in the Sophist the example of the 
angler is used for its everydayness, i.e., the ease with which the student would be able to follow the 
divisions as well as the conclusions drawn.   This practice is also utilized in the Statesman, with the weaver 
used as a model for the Statesman. 
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similarities between the two would thus allow for an easy transition into the primary 
agenda of defining the sophist.   
 With the model decided upon, the Stranger begins by positing angling as a type of 
expertise.  From this position, the stranger divides expertise into two broad categories: 
productive and acquisitive.  Recognizing that the art of angling does not deal with 
production, the stranger divides the acquisitive branch, making further divisions down the 
line until he is able to isolate angling from all other types of expertise.5  Thus, through 
this method of division, the Stranger was able to discover a precise definition of the 
angler.6  
 With the definition of the angler now firmly established, the Stranger begins his 
search for the definition of the sophist by attempting to determine to which sort of 
expertise sophistry might pertain7.  As with the angler, the Stranger first determines that 
sophistry is a sort of acquisitive art, specifically engaged in the “hunting of rich, 
prominent young men.”8 However, while we might agree that this first definition of the 
sophist as a sort of hunter seems plausible, we quickly discover that our object of inquiry 
is not so easily defined.   To explain, if we retreat back up the branches of division as 
                                                                                                                                            
 4 Soph. 218e-219a 
 
 5 For a wonderfully concise model of the divisions see Gill, (2012, 142). 
 
 6 Soph. 221b2-c3 – “Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive; half of the acquisitive 
was taking possession; half of the possession-taking was hunting; half of hunting was animal hunting; half 
of animal hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower portion of aquatic hunting was fishing; half of 
fishing was hunting by striking; and half of striking was hooking.  And the part of hooking that involves a 
blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that’s derived by its similarity to the 
action itself, i.e., it’s called draw-fishing, or angling – which is what we were searching for.” 
 
 7 Interestingly, while both Theaetetus and the Stranger agree at the outset that sophistry, similar to 
angling, requires expertise, as the dialogue comes to a close and the sophist is finally defined, precisely 
what expertise the sophist has, if any, is called into question.  See Gill (2012, 143).   
 
 8 Soph. 223b   
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given by the Stranger, we discover that the sophist could be seen not merely as (1) a 
hunter of young men, but also as (2) one who deals in the commerce of exchange, i.e., a 
traveling salesman selling his wisdom to those that would pay for his services.9 This kind 
is then divided into two further kinds of salesman: (3) the stay at home retailer who sells 
goods of his own, and (4) the salesman that sells goods purchased from others.10  For the 
fifth definition we find the sophist defined as (5) a combatant, constantly engaged in 
discussions of justice, and makes money doing so.11    
 Moving on to the sixth and seventh definitions, however, we see a break from the 
mold, positing the expertise of sophistry not as an acquisitive art, but instead as a 
separative and productive art, respectively.  With these additional definitions, we begin 
to see the problem that has arisen in the Stranger’s attempt in defining sophistry, i.e., the 
multitude of definitions that are not individually dismissed as erroneous, thus adding to 
the confusion as to whom the sophist truly is, and how it is that we might recognize him.   
As Mary Louise Gill explains, the problem is twofold12.  First, unlike the angler, whose 
activity is easily observable, i.e., one could easily witness the angler fishing with a hook, 
the activity of the sophist is somewhat complicated, as he seems to engage in a wide-
                                                
 9 The second definition thus reads at 224c-d “We’ll say that the expertise of the part of the 
acquisition, exchange, selling, wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing in words and learning that have 
to do with virtue – that’s sophistry in its second appearance.” 
 
 10 Soph. 224a-d.  See also Brown (2010,152).    Socrates here is of course exempt from the charge 
of traveling salesman (as he has practiced his art only in Athens, a point he makes explicit in the Crito via 
his refusal to escape into exile to philosophize elsewhere).  Interestingly, as to being a salesman of goods 
purchased from others, while Socrates is similarly exempt from this charge on account of his never 
charging for his services, there are occasions that Socrates does use the teachings he has acquired from 
others, e.g., the account of love given to him by Diotima in the Symposium, as well as Aspasia’s funeral 
oration he recites in the Menexenus,  
 
 11 Soph. 225c -  This seems to resemble Socrates quite a bit, particularly in reference to the 
discussions found in the Crito and the Republic Book I.  However, as Taylor (2006) yet again rightly notes, 
the combatant referenced here by the stranger is still compensated for their efforts. 
 
 12 Gill (2012, 144). 
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variety of activities.   As a result, it would seem that at the end of each “definition” we 
are left not with the “essence” of the sophist, but only with what appears to be a singular 
aspect of his various activities.  Second, not only is the essential activity of the sophist 
difficult to observe, but precisely what that activity would be is up for dispute, for, as is 
evidenced by the seven varying definitions, there exist a multitude of opinions 
concerning its nature.   
 And, for Gill, this problem comes to the fore with the addition of the sixth 
definition, which, unlike the preceding definitions, places the art of sophistry not under 
the acquisitive branch, but rather as a “separative” art form.  As the Stranger notes, this 
sixth definition defines the sophist as an individual who is able to purge others of their 
false beliefs.  We read: 
 They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying something though 
he is saying nothing.  Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these 
people will easily scrutinize them.  They will collect his opinions together 
during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with 
each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things 
and in the same respects.  The people who are being examined see this, get 
angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others.  They lose their 
inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter 
to hear or has a more lasting effect on them.13 
 
Given this description, one is immediately reminded of Socrates and the elenchtic 
method. And, while I will return to a more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
Socrates and this definition later in this chapter, what is important to note here is the 
impact that this wildly different definition has upon the attempts to pin down the sophist.  
We have seen the sophist as a hunter, a salesman, and now a cleanser of souls.  Given 
these disparate definitions, a realization is made by the Stranger and Theaetetus that they 
                                                
 13 Soph. 230b3-c2 
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have ultimately failed to recognize a crucial aspect of the sophist’s talent, one that 
enables him to appear to be an expert in so many fields.  
 In response to this concern, the Stranger proposes the seventh and final definition 
of the sophist.  To do so, the Stranger inquires not into the nature of the activity itself, but 
into the object of that activity.  Specifically, the Stranger notes that the Sophists present 
themselves to be wise in all lines of inquiry.  However, as is made clear in the discussion, 
to possess knowledge of everything is simply impossible.14  Therefore, the skill of the 
sophist is not the possession of all knowledge, but the ability to produce the appearance 
of wisdom as such.15  In effect, the sophist is merely an imitator of the wise man. Yet, 
with this seventh definition a problem arises that requires addressing:  As the techne of 
the sophist seems to be the production of false appearances, how is such a production 
possible?  
The Seventh Definition and the Production of False Appearances 
Non-Being as Difference  
 Regarding the production of false appearances, we find that the problem is as 
follows:  If the Sophist is defined as an individual who produces false appearances, then, 
in effect, the sophist produces that which is not.  Yet, it would seem to be the case that if 
one is producing something, then they must be producing something that is.  Thus, we are 
seemingly presented with a contradiction, for how could something that is not, be 
something that is?16 As the above conclusion seems to reduce to an absurdity, the 
                                                
 14 Soph. 233a-234b 
 
 15 Soph. 233c 
 
 16 Soph. 237e “Therefore don’t we have to refuse to admit that a person like that speaks but says 
nothing?  Instead, don’t we have to deny that anyone who tries to utter that which is not is even speaking?” 
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Stranger is faced with the task of explaining how the Sophist is able to produce 
something that is not.  
  As a possible answer to this concern, we turn to the recent work of Mary Louise 
Gill.17  According to Gill, the Stranger explains that in instances of negation, e.g., “I am 
not hungry,” the negation is in reference to the predicate term, not the subject.18  
Understood in this manner, negation is not indicating the non-being, i.e., non-existence, 
of the term in question, but rather as an indication of difference.   Looking to the text of 
the Sophist, we find the following explanation:  
It seems then that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary 
to that which is, but only something different from it…It’s like this.  When we 
speak of something as not large, does it seem to you that we indicate the small 
rather than the equal...So we won’t agree with somebody who says that negation 
signifies a contrary. We will only admit this much: When “not” and “non-“ are 
prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, 
or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are 
applied.19 
 
Understood in this way, negation is not to be considered an assignment of non-existence, 
and as a result, we can avoid the Parmenidean problem of non-being20.  To explain, if 
negation is understood to imply opposites, then when we say that something is-not, we 
are implying the thing’s non-existence, an implication that would result in the absurd 
conclusion noted above.  However, if negation is merely an indicator of difference as the 
Stranger now suggests, then the negation is not in reference to the existence of the thing 
                                                
 
 17 Gill, M. (2012) Philosophos, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 18 See Gill (2012: 158) 
 
 19 Soph. 257b3-c4.  As is pointed out by Olga Alieva (2010: 87), this argument as made by Plato is 
a precursor to Aristotle’s own argument against the Parmenidean problem of non-being.  
See Sophistical Refutations 166b37-a7. 
 
 20 DK28B2 – Here Parmenides makes clear that he believes being and non-being to be opposites. 
 65 
itself, but rather, as an indication that the subject in question is different from the 
predicate attached to it.  In a sense, difference applied in this way serves as a sort of 
categorizing tool, distinguishing various aspects of the subject in question, e.g., size, 
shape, temperature, etc.21  
 To help clarify this understanding of difference, we look to the example as given 
by the Stranger, i.e., the not-beautiful.  According to the Stranger, when we are 
discussing the not-beautiful, we are pointing to a thing that is different from the 
beautiful.22 As the stranger explains: 
Isn’t it in the following way that the not beautiful turns out to be, namely, by 
being both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against 
one of those that are…Then it seems that the not beautiful is a sort of setting of a 
being over against a being…Then, according to this account, is the beautiful more 
a being than the not beautiful?23 
 
The point being put forth by the Stranger here is that when we are discussing the not-
beautiful, we are not expressing a form of non-existence, but rather a thing in and of 
itself, i.e., the not-beautiful, as set against that from which it is different.  In other words, 
both the beautiful and not-beautiful “equally are.”24  For example, when we say, “The 
Painting is not beautiful,” we are not merely distinguishing it from the Beautiful, but we 
are further establishing that it has its own distinct qualities within the realm of 
                                                
 
 21 And, while the discussion of difference as non-being is here being investigated by the Stranger 
to justify the final definition of the sophist as the producer of false-appearances, we find that this 
understanding of non-being as difference serves another purpose, one absolutely essential to the new 
methodology of collection and division itself, as it allows for the very distinctions between categories 
required for division.   See Morgan (1993, 100) 
 
 22 Soph. 257d9-11 
 
 23 Soph. 257e1-10 
 
 24 Soph. 258a1. 
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aesthetics.25  Given this explanation, we can now see how non-being in the form of 
difference does not imply the non-existence of that thing in question, but rather, implies 
merely a difference from, albeit a difference within a specific field.26   
The Making of False Statements 
 Thus far the stranger has managed to show the possibility of speaking of that 
which is not, specifically in the form of difference.  However, we recall that it is not 
through the speaking of things that are not in general that defines the sophist, but rather 
his ability to make false statements through the production of appearances, specifically 
his ability to produce the appearance of wisdom.  To account for this, we must first 
investigate the possibility of making false statements.27  To begin, we admit that, in the 
simplest of terms, insofar as someone is making a statement, they are making a statement 
about something.  And, we find that for Plato, in their most basic form all statements 
consist of (1) a subject, that which the statement is about, and (2) a predicate, which 
makes a claim regarding the subject in question.   
 Further, as the Stranger explains, if we merely list subjects in a row, e.g., “lion 
stag horse”, or similarly list predicates, e.g., “walks runs sleeps,” we would be uttering 
nonsense; words strung together void of any meaning.  Thus, we must properly weave the 
verbs with nouns,28 and it is only through this weaving of subject with predicate that we 
produce meaningful speech.  Thus, for Plato, to “say something” requires more than 
                                                
 
 25 Gill (2012: 160-161).   
 
 26 It should be mentioned that Gill (2012) pushes this line much further into an investigation of the 
metaphysical implications of these conclusions.  However, this line of argument is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
  
 27 This very succinct account is borrowed from Gill (2012, 167-168) 
  
 28 Soph. 262d4.   
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simply uttering words, but rather it requires organizing these words in such a manner that 
they produce meaning.  Thus, to reiterate the initial point, to speak is to speak about 
something. 
 If we take this to be true, i.e., that all statements are necessarily about something, 
then the question arises as to how it would be possible to make a false statement.29  In 
other words, if one is to make a false statement, would it not be the case that such a 
statement, being false, would necessarily be making a claim about that which is not?  
Yet, as discussed above, to state that which-is-not is not as absurd as it may first appear, 
especially when we recognize, as Plato has established, that any reference to that which-
is-not is need not be a reference to non-existence, but rather as an indicator of difference 
regarding the subject of the statement in question.  So, to use the Stranger’s example 
from the Sophist, if I were to say “Theaetetus sits,” we find that the assigned action of 
“sitting” does correspond rightly to the subject “Theaetetus”.  Thus, I would be making a 
statement that is true, that is. 
 If, however, I were to say “Theaetetus flies,” we would find that the statement is 
false, as, according to Gill, “flying specifies something different from what is the case 
about Theaetetus (namely, sitting).”30 To fully unpack this point, we must revisit our 
earlier discussion of negative predication, as it is here, in the discussion of false 
statement, that its importance becomes most apparent.  To begin, we note that for both 
statements, i.e., “Theaetetus flies” and “Theaetetus sits,” we do have predicates and 
                                                
 
 29 For an exceptionally detailed account of false statements in the Sophist, see Hestir, (2003). 
 
 30 Gill (2012, 167)  Italics added.  See also Crivelli (2012, 249-252).  Here Crivelli takes a similar 
line to Gill.  He writes, “Plato’s solution assumes that a person who speaks falsely says what is not in that 
he or she says  about something what is not  about it to be.” In other words, it is to say something about the 
subject that is different from those things that are true of the subject.   
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nouns to which these predicates are assigned, and further, both statements are making 
claims, thereby meeting the requirements for speech as stipulated by the Stranger.  
However, we find that, on the Stranger’s account, statements such as “Theaetetus sits” 
are true because the predicate properly describes a singular action associated with the 
subject.  On the other hand, statements such as “Theaetetus flies” are false because the 
predicate is not associated with the subject in any way, i.e., flying is a sort of action that 
is different from the entire set of actions engaged in by Theaetetus.  In other words, while 
true statements need only reflect individual aspects of the subject to which they 
correspond, when it comes to false statements, it must be clear that the claim being made 
is universal, i.e., the claim made is entirely different from those things that are in relation 
to the subject. 31   
The Production of False Appearances   
 Having established non-being as a form of difference, a position which 
consequently allowed for the possibility of false statements, all that remains for the 
Stranger to address regarding the seventh definition of the sophist is the sophist’s ability 
to produce false appearances.32  He begins by returning to their initial division of copy-
making into two distinct types: likeness-making and appearance making.   And, while 
earlier attempts concerning where to place the Sophist resulted in confusion on account 
                                                
 
 31 This distinction is an important one.  See Frede (1992, 420) “Only thus can Plato say that the 
false statement says, speaks of, something other than any of the things that are, that is, something other than 
any of the things that are in relation to the given subject.  For it is clear that it will not do simply to say of 
false statement that it speaks of something other than it is.  To be false it has to speak of something of any 
of the things that are, namely in reference to the given subject.”  For a contrary view on the issue of 
universality of false statements, see David Keyt, “Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,” in Exegesis and 
Argument, Phronesis, Supplementary Volume I, A. Mourelatos and R. Rorty, eds. (1973, 295), and J. M. E. 
Moravcsik, “Being and Meaning in the Sophist,” Acta Philosophical Fennica 14 (1962, 69). 
 
 32 Soph. 264c.  We find here the Stranger noting that such a task should not be too troublesome, 
especially considering the work they have just completed regarding the nature of statements and non-being. 
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of issues regarding the possibility of falsity, with these issues now put to rest, the 
investigation into the Sophist as a producer of false appearances can finally begin.33  
First, however, we must focus on precisely what the Stranger means by an “appearance”.   
 Looking to the dialogue we find that the Stranger makes clear a connection 
between two distinct types of judgment, i.e., our ability to affirm or deny.  The first, 
doxa, refers to the affirmation or denial of a particular statement silently thought of 
within our own minds.34  Such judgments are rightly classified as our beliefs.  Yet, as the 
Stanger notes, there is another sort of judgment, phantasia, one that occurs not 
exclusively internally, but in concert with sense perception.35  Thus, the stranger 
concludes: 
So, since there is true and false speech, and, of the processes just mentioned, 
thinking appeared to be the soul’s conversation with itself, belief the conclusion 
of thinking, and what we call appearing the blending of perception and belief, it 
follows that since these are all the same kind of thing as speech, some of them 
must be false. 
 
In other words, just as we make judgments regarding the veracity of our own beliefs, 
so too do we make judgments in matters of appearance, i.e., we affirm or deny the 
truth of those things that appear to us, often times mistaking certain appearances as 
true that are in fact not.  So, just as when walking through the desert one might 
mistakenly judge there to be water on the horizon (when in fact it is merely an 
optical illusion), so too might one mistakenly deem statements made by others to be 
wise, when in fact, quite the opposite is true. 
                                                
 
 33 Soph. 264c1-4 
  
 34 Soph. 263e-264b 
 
 35 Soph. 264a3 
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 Given this understanding of the production of false appearances, the seventh and 
final definition of the sophist finally comes into view.   After once again utilizing the 
method of collection and division to distinguish the sophist from other sorts of 
appearance makers, the final definition is given as follows: 
Imitation of the contrary speech producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the 
appearance making kind of copy making, the word juggling part of production that 
is marked off as human and not divine. 36 
 
Put plainly, the sophist is the individual that, via the imitation of the wise man, produces 
the false appearance that he himself is wise.  
Critiques of the Seventh Definition   
 Considering the Sophist abruptly ends with the positing of this seventh definition 
of the sophist, one could argue that Plato intended us to take this as the definitive 
definition, thereby relegating the preceding six divisions as failed attempts to define a 
notoriously slippery figure.   Yet, as the positing of such a definitive answer to the chosen 
line of inquiry is particularly uncommon for Plato, many scholars are reluctant to accept 
this conclusion at face value.  Granted, there are many differences worth noting between 
the early so-called “Socratic” dialogues and those dialogues that make up much of Plato’s 
later works, such as the Sophist or Statesman.  For one, we find in the latter that Socrates 
no longer holds sway in the discussion.  In his place we find other characters, such as the 
Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist and Statesman, or the Athenian Stranger of the Laws, 
taking center stage.37  And, it is perhaps this Socratic absence that allows for another 
                                                
 36 Soph. 268a-c 
 
 37 This point is especially interesting when we take into consideration that in the Theaetetus, the 
dialogue immediately preceding the Sophist, with Socrates leading the conversation, the discussion ends in 
aporia.  It is only when he is replaced by the Stranger in the Sophist and Statesman that more conclusive 
results are achieved.  Given the connection between these dialogues, both thematically and dramatically, I 
believe this distinction is indicative of a major shift for Plato regarding his understanding as to the 
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major stylistic shift for Plato, for, while earlier works, e.g., the Euthyphro or Laches, 
conclude in aporia, as we come to the close of Plato’s canon, we are presented with, at 
least on the surface, conclusions resembling more definitive answers to the proposed 
inquiries.38  Taking the Sophist again as our example, we find that the final exchange 
between the Stranger and Theaetetus consists of the seventh definition of the sophist as 
given by the Stranger followed by a resounding, single word of agreement from 
Theatetus.39  Yet, despite this apparently conclusive ending that would seem to suggest 
that we take this seventh definition to be the true definition of sophistry, many scholars 
have taken issue with this claim, offering critiques against this line of thinking.  And, as 
the seventh definition plays heavily into my argument regarding how we are to 
understand Socrates in the eyes of Plato, it is necessary to address these concerns in turn. 
Different Sophists or Different Aspects? 
 One of the most compelling cases against the view that the Sophist provides us 
with a viable definition of the sophist comes from Lesley Brown, who, in her article 
“Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist,”40 poses the question as to whether the seven 
definitions presented are intended as separate, but correct, definitions of the sophist41, or, 
                                                                                                                                            
limitations of the Socratic method, and the importance of developing a methodology that produces positive, 
as opposed to merely negative, results.   
  
 38 One could argue that even in these later dialogues, we are still to take the conclusions given as 
ironical, i.e., given to us plainly as to encourage rebuttals.  However, given the slow shift we find over the 
entire canon from the strictly aporetic conclusions of the early dialogues to the more definitive conclusions 
(in particular those found in the Laws), more evidence would have to be given to support such an 
interpretation. 
 
 39 Soph. 268c4-d3 
 
              40 Brown, L. (2010) “Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist.” D. Charles (ed.), Definition in 
Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 151-171. 
 
 41 See Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1973), ‘Plato’s Method of Division’ in J. M. E. Moravcsik 
(ed.), Patterns in Plato’s Thought , Dordrecht. P. 173 
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are they to be viewed as a collective assessment, each individual definition gleaning 
insight into a particular aspect of the sophist?42 Beginning with the latter, we find that 
according to Brown, those that would argue in favor of the collective assessment model 
of definition do so by claiming that just as there are “unique ways of identifying the 
number two, so also with sophistry.”43    
 As a means of clarifying this point, we might take as our example the idea of a 
“professor”.  Granted, the idea of “professor” might be most readily identified with one 
who conducts research.  However, one might also think of the professor as a teacher, or 
perhaps a mentor, etc.  Through this example we might see that each of these 
characterizations are properly associated with being a professor, albeit distinctly different 
from one another.  Yet, while examples such as these might make this view appear 
viable, Brown, in my view, rightly notes that to say that Plato accepts the idea of 
disparate, yet correct, characterizations of any term, let alone sophistry, would seem 
contrary to his entire project up to this point.  Indeed, we need only look to any dialogue 
that precedes the Sophist to find evidence that would suggest that Plato’s understanding 
of definitional knowledge requires that we find the essential characteristic; the defining 
nature of the object of inquiry.  Returning then to our example of “professor,” I would 
argue that while it is true that the professor as a researcher is distinctly different from the 
professor as a teacher insofar as, in these particular roles, they have entirely different 
                                                
 
 42 See Cornford, F. M. (1935), Plato’s Theory of Knowledge , London. And Notomi, N. (1999), 
The Unity of Plato’s Sophist , Cambridge. 
 
 43 Brown (2010, 158).  See Moravcsik (1973, 166) “The existence of a plurality of divisions is in 
no way an argument against their being grounded in reality.” 
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responsibilities,44 if we dig deeper (as Plato would have us do), we find that there must be 
some essential characteristic that cuts to the heart of what it means to be a professor qua 
professor, and it is that singular trait that should stand as the unifying aspect which unites 
the supposedly disparate characterizations. 
 Yet, as I have made clear above, the Sophist is an atypical dialogue for Plato.  
Given the drastic change in methodology, as well as Socrates’ absence, one could argue 
that perhaps we should take these changes as signs that Plato’s own views of definition 
have changed as well.  However, even if we were to examine the Sophist in isolation 
from the rest of the Platonic corpus, such a view remains untenable.  The problem, as 
Brown explains, arises as a result of glaring inconsistencies between the various 
definitions.45   Now, one might make the case that the existence of inconsistencies 
between the definitions does not preclude the possibility of each distinct definition 
rightfully holding the title of sophist.  Indeed, as the argument would proceed, each of the 
seven definitions is not intended to define the sophist, but rather one of many aspects of 
sophistry.  Thus, on this view, the inconsistencies are not a detriment to understanding, 
but rather necessary if we are to truly understand the breadth of the sophistic spectrum.  
To limit ourselves to one single definition at the exclusion of others is to deny ourselves 
complete knowledge.   
                                                
 44 Let alone external factors, e.g., how they are viewed by others. 
 
 45 Brown (2010, 158-160) 
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 And, while I can appreciate the merits of this line of reasoning, it is ultimately 
undone due to lack of textual evidence.  We once more look to Brown, who explains 
precisely how, despite appeals to the contrary:46 
…Definitions 1–5 locate sophistry within acquisitive techne, while the seventh 
proclaims it to be a branch of productive art. If, as the evidence suggests, all 
divisions are intended to be exclusive, even where not exhaustive, it follows that 
sophistry cannot be truly characterized both as a branch of acquisitive art and as a 
branch of productive art….But are divisions intended to be exclusive?…the 
evidence in the Sophist and Politicus strongly suggests that Plato envisages that one 
and the same kind cannot appear on both sides of a given division. Consider, for 
instance, the initial division of technai into acquisitive and productive. The very 
definition of acquisitive art at 219c1–8 includes the clause ‘does not produce 
(demiourgei) anything, but. . . . ’ In other words, to be acquisitive is to be not 
productive.47 
 
Thus, following Brown’s argument, once a division is made and followed, such as 
placing the seventh definition in the productive branch as opposed to the acquisitive 
branch, then we must see those kinds in the alternative branch as entirely distinct from 
the kinds in the productive branch.  To make clear the importance of maintaining this 
exclusivity between branch divisions, we need only take the simpler example of defining 
a particular species of animal, e.g., a dog.   
 To begin, one of the earliest divisions we must make in our efforts towards 
defining a dog is whether or not the animal in question, in this instance a dog, is a 
mammal or reptile or fish, etc.  Upon concluding that a dog, based upon particular traits, 
properly falls into the branch of mammal, it would be rather odd indeed to suggest that 
there is also an equally correct characterization of a dog that is a reptile.  As being a 
                                                
 46 Cohen in Moravcsik (1973, 189). “It allows for the multiplicity of correct characterizations by 
division. Characterization by division consists of giving an entailment chain linking the Form to be 
characterized with the selected genus. It is clear that there can be more than one correct entailment-chain 
since the parts produced by division need not be exclusive or exhaustive.” 
 
 47 Brown (2010, 159) Italics added for emphasis. 
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mammal precludes the possibility of one being a reptile, we can see more clearly that 
Plato intends these divisions to indicate exclusivity. Indeed, if we were to end up with a 
definition of “dog” that was situated within the reptilian branch, such a positioning 
should alarm us to a mistake that has been made on our part, i.e., in our haste or 
misunderstanding we failed to make the proper divisions.   
 Returning then to the issue of the inconsistencies between the varying definitions 
of the sophist, we find that given Definitions 1-5 are situated in the acquisitive branch, 
and definition seven is in the productive branch, and further, that any specific kind cannot 
rightfully be located in two branches of the same division, it is not possible that Plato 
could hold the position that each of the seven characterizations rightfully defines 
sophistry.  Thus, as Brown pithily concludes, “However tricksy a character the sophist is, 
sophistry cannot have incompatible properties.”48 
 Given the problems that arise for the aspect model of the seven divisions, Brown 
suggests that perhaps it is the case that each definition is not to be understood as various 
aspects of sophistry, but rather as seven distinct definitions of those individuals who have 
historically been labeled as a sophist.  And, considering the cast of characters labeled as 
such throughout Plato’s works, we find that this proposed theory is not without merit.  
For example, Protagoras was labeled a sophist on account of his charging a fee in 
exchange for his “knowledge” (Definition 4), whereas the battle-ready, combative 
Thrasymachus from Book I of the Republic seems to perfectly embody the sophist of 
Definition 5.  Indeed, even Socrates seems to fit the mold of sophist under this multiple 
definition interpretation, for upon first glance, Definition 6 seems perfectly modeled after 
the Socratic method.  Given these disparate characters all being branded with the title 
                                                
 48 Brown (2010, 159)  
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“sophist,” it stands to reason that each definition should be taken as its own distinct, yet 
correct, definition of a type of sophist. 
 Despite the attractiveness of this interpretation, upon investigation we find once 
again that it lacks textual support.  To explain, we return to our original example of the 
angler.  We recall that in the attempt to pin down the precise definition of the angler, the 
Stranger began with the most general field regarding professions, i.e., techne, which was 
then divided into two respective branches, productive and acquisitive, with angling 
falling into the latter.  After following eight additional divisions down the branch, we 
finally land on the angler, a specific definition that arose as a result of a branching 
downward from the most general of categories.  And, the same pattern has consistently 
followed for each attempt at defining the sophist.   And so, while it is true that the 
Stranger began with the intention of defining the sophist at the outset, he did not begin 
the process of division with “sophist” at the top, dividing down to discern the different 
types that exist under that particular heading.  As Brown notes, “…sophistry is 
consistently treated as the endpoint of a division, as something to be divided down to, not 
as a generic kind whose branches are to be discerned.”49  To say otherwise would be to 
misunderstand the nature of the method of division itself, a mistake that would result in 
the listing of generic possible descriptions of those individuals who could be called a 
sophist, as opposed to a definitive conclusion to our inquiries regarding the definition of 
the sophist.  
                                                
 49 Brown (2010, 160)  Italics added for emphasis.  See also Gill (2012, 147) “He (The Stranger) 
and Theaetetus carefully defined the sophist in terms of his many activities, but none of those make him 
what he is.  They have so far missed the essence of the sophist, and for that reason they mistakenly call him 
by many names instead of one.”   
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 Considering these issues, I would suggest that a more plausible solution to the 
problem of the multiple definitions can be found through an examination of the text 
itself,50 for, if we look to 232a, we read:  
Well then, suppose people apply the name of a single sort of expertise to someone, 
but he appears to have expert knowledge of lots of things.  In a case like that don’t 
you notice something’s wrong with the way he appears? Isn’t it obvious that if 
someone takes him to be an expert at many things, then that observer can’t be seeing 
clearly what it is in his expertise that all of those many pieces of learning focus on—
which is why he calls him by many names instead of one?”51 
 
  In other words, the mistake is not in the division process, but in our own haste in 
labeling.  To be sure, each of the original six definitions concluded with “the sophist” as 
the endpoint.  However, each of these definitions could also be labeled in other ways, 
such as a hunter (Def. 1), a salesman (Def. 2 -4), a Combatant (Def. 5).   As such, we 
have not yet gotten to the heart of sophistry in these definitions, for we have not yet 
found that one thing that it possesses as set against all other things.   
  This interpretation, i.e., that the multitude of definitions is the result of human 
error, is further bolstered by the very nature of the subject whom they seek.  To explain, 
if we can take the seventh definition as the true definition of the sophist, i.e., that the 
sophist is that individual who is, through the production of false appearances, able to pass 
himself off as a wise man, then, would it not be the case that, given his “talent” of 
presenting himself as that which he is not, we might have trouble distinguishing what it is 
that he is?  Put plainly, of all the individuals we might attempt to define, would it not be 
the sophist, by his very nature, who would emerge as the most difficult to pin down? 
 
                                                
 50 Gill (2012, 146-147) 
 
 51 Soph. 232a  Italics added for emphasis. 
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The Seventh Definition as the Correct Definition 
 Are we then to take the seventh definition as the “true” definition of the sophist?  
Such a view is favored by a number of scholars, in particular Cornford (1935) and 
Notomi (1999).52  And, while I am inclined to accept this view, those who favor this 
interpretation vary widely in their approach, and thus, a quick overview is warranted.  
Beginning with Cornford, we find that while the seventh definition will ultimately 
emerge as the true definition, he argues that the preceding six divisions are not to merely 
discarded as failed attempts towards definition, but rather as an essential step towards the 
success of the final division.  Cornford suggests: 
…these first six definitions actually, though not formally, serve the purpose of a 
Collection preliminary to the seventh.  They bring us before the types to be 
surveyed before we can fix upon the really fundamental character of Sophistry.  
The name Sophist has been loosely applied to various classes…The early Divisions 
analyze and characterize each of these types and so provide a survey of the field 
within which we must discover the really fundamental trait, the generic form that 
will finally yield the correct definition of Sophistry.53 
 
Thus, as the Stranger realizes that the word “sophist” has been used to describe a wide 
range of persons and/or activities, and, if the effort towards proper definition is to be 
achieved, it is important to examine each of these different sorts of persons, as it is only 
when this task is achieved that one would be in the proper position to discover the 
unifying trait which remains subtly hidden under the surface.  And, as we move through 
each of the definitions, we find that each seems particularly pointed towards particular 
individuals within the Platonic corpus.  In Divisions I- IV, those divisions that associate 
                                                
 52 Gill (2012) seems to accept that the seventh view is intended by Plato to be understood as the 
true definition.  Yet, despite this point, Gill ultimately finds issue with Plato’s labeling of sophistry 
understood in this way as a techne.  This issue is also taken up by Brown (2010), though Brown argues 
more emphatically against the seventh definition (or any of the definitions, for that matter) as being 
considered the true definition of sophistry. See also Morgan (1993). 
 
 53 Cornford (1935, 187) 
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sophistry with the hunter or salesman, we are reminded of those caricatures of Protagoras 
and Gorgias, men who, despite their fame and fortune, are ridiculed and belittled by 
Socrates in the dialogues that bear their names.  Division V, the contentious disputer, 
once more reminds us of the likes of Thrasymachus, the man who joined the discussion 
of justice not to discover the truth (as perhaps was Glaucon’s intention following his 
departure), but rather simply to win the day.54  Division VI, of course, points towards the 
practice of elenchos, and thus, to Socrates, which, for Cornford does not present a 
problem, for again, these preliminary definitions are not necessarily true attempts towards 
definition, but merely an effort to round-up, as it were, all those that have been labeled as 
such.  Cornford thus concludes, “Division VII is the only one that goes to the heart of the 
matter and starts from the right genus.  It defines, not any particular class of persons, but 
a whole tendency of thought, the essence of sophistry.”55  For Cornford then, while the 
six divisions leading up to the final definition are necessary to the goal of identifying the 
sophist, we should not take their individual traits to be seen as a part of sophistry itself. 
 Notomi (1999), for his part, while essentially in agreement with Cornford 
regarding the truth of the seventh definition, presents a more subtle interpretation, one 
which takes a sort of middle-ground between Cornford and those whose viewed 
Divisions 1-5 as integral parts of sophistry itself.56   On Notomi’s view, while the seventh 
definition should be taken as the “true appearance” of the sophist, “each of the first five 
                                                
 54 Indeed, this characterization seems a perfect representation of the individual who’s led not by 
the rational part of his soul, but rather the spirited.  A point that could not have been a coincidence given 
the context of the Republic. 
 
 55 Cornford (1935, 173) 
 
 56 Division six, which is widely agreed to be referring to Socrates, is typically dismissed from 
consideration.   
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definitions remains a true appearance seen from a certain viewpoint.”57 In other words, 
the earlier definitions are, in a sense, connected to the art of sophistry.  Notomi explains 
this position as follows: If an individual is not trained in the method of division, then they 
are not in the proper position, i.e., they do not have the proper point of view to see things 
clearly.  As a result, a particular thing may appear to them to be similar to something 
else, e.g., a hunter of young men to that of a sophist, and yet, given their disadvantageous 
point of view, they mistake the appearance for the thing itself.  In simpler terms, on 
Notomi’s view, each of the first five definitions is “true” only from a certain perspective, 
though not, as is the seventh definition, true in an unqualified sense.  
 And, as evidence to this position, Notomi recalls the discussion on the appearance 
of beauty from 236b4-7, which reads: 
Now, what do we call the thing which appears to be like a beautiful thing, because 
it is not seen from a beautiful viewpoint, but is not like what it is said to be like, for 
those who can see such a large thing properly? Since, while appearing to be like it, 
it is not really like, don’t we call it an apparition? 
 
Drawing from this, Notomi concludes, “Although an apparition appears beautiful to 
those who see it from a bad viewpoint, those who have good sight can tell its apparent 
likeness from the true likeness.”58   
 Yet, it seems to me that in using this passage as evidence, Notomi hoists himself 
on his own petard.  To explain, Notomi’s argument as I understand it unfolds as follows: 
(1) The majority is not properly trained in the method of division, and as a result, cannot 
properly discern apparent similarities, or likeness, from true likeness.  (2) Just as it is 
difficult to clearly make out the objects in a room that is not well lit, a lack of dialectical 
                                                
 
 57 Notomi (1999, 277-278) 
 
 58 Notomi (199, 278) 
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training puts individuals at a disadvantage in their ability to properly identify kinds. (3) 
The activities described in Def. 1-5, i.e., the hunting of young men, selling of 
virtue/knowledge, and combative argumentation, are all activities that the sophist 
potentially engages in.  (4) From this disadvantaged point of view, the “appearances of 
the sophist” in Def. 1-5 appear true in a certain way, as they each “represent at least some 
aspects of the sophist’s art.” (5) Thus, while the appearances of Def. 1-5 remain “true”, 
only the seventh definition is the “true appearance” of the sophist in the unqualified 
sense. 
 If my reading of Notomi is correct, however, I find it to be particularly 
problematic, especially when we take into consideration the textual evidence he himself 
supplies to support his conclusions.  To explain, when examining the passage at 236b4, 
we find the Stranger explaining that the thing in question, which is not beautiful, is only 
seen as beautiful because it is not seen from the proper viewpoint.  In other words, the 
thing appears to be beautiful, when in fact it is not.  Thus, the appearance of beauty is 
false.  If this is true, then I cannot see how Notomi can claim that the appearances of the 
sophist in Def. 1-5 are true.   
  As Notomi argues, the appearances of the sophist in Def. 1-5 are true, but only 
from a “certain viewpoint.”  Further, this “viewpoint” as Notomi describes it, is the view 
taken by those who are untrained in the dialectic, i.e., who are not properly equipped to 
discern similarities between kinds.  Thus, if (1) the appearances of the Def. 1-5 are true 
only if they are taken from a “certain viewpoint,” and (2) this “viewpoint” is, by 
Notomi’s own admission, the view seen by the person who is unable to properly assess 
that which they are surveying, then, would the result not be the same as the untrained 
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person who believes the thing to be beautiful when in fact it is not?  In other words, if the 
“truth” of the appearances of Def. 1-5 is dependent upon the observer analyzing the 
appearance from an admitted position of ignorance, then how could those appearances be 
considered true?  At best, it would seem to me that one could claim that, given the limited 
point of view, such appearances might be true, and that, with proper training, this truth 
could eventually be determined.   However, as Notomi makes the much harder claim in 
asserting that they are true, his position remains problematic.59  
 Thus, once again we find that any attempt to include definitions 1-5 into a 
working definition of sophistry ultimately fails, nuanced as it may be.  As a result, it 
would appear as if the seventh definition of sophistry should be taken as Plato’s final 
view on the matter, understood in isolation from all previous definitions. 
The Problem of Sophistry as a techne. 
 In the above treatment, I have argued that any attempt to include the original five 
divisions in a working definition of sophistry is untenable, including Notomi’s hybrid 
interpretation.   Further, if the seventh definition is the correct definition, and the sophist 
is that individual who produces false appearances, then it would stand to reason that he 
would appear to us as so many things that he is not.  In fact, it would be his very nature to 
do just that.60  However, despite the strength of this position, one additional problem 
arises for this interpretation that is difficult to overcome, i.e., the problem of expertise.61 
As Gill expresses the problem, “The final definition seems complete but is marred in a 
                                                
 59 For additional critiques on Notomi’s view, see Liu, W. (2013). “Plato's Attempts at Defining 
Sophistry” Presented at the Frontiers of Philosophy in China conference. 23 Feb. 2013.  
 
 60 See p.19, also n. 49 
 
 61 This issue is discussed in both Gill (2012, 170-171), as well as Brown (2010, 164-8).    
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crucial respect, because the sophist has the mere appearance of expertise.”62  To explain, 
we recall that the seventh definition of sophistry is the end result of numerous divisions 
that begin with the division of techne itself.  And, as each species derived must be a part 
of the genus above it, as well all preceding divisions on the branch, placing the seventh 
definition within the productive branch of techne would be to claim that sophistry as such 
would itself be a techne.63 The question then arises as to whether or not this seventh 
definition meets the standards of techne as given by Plato.   
 Gill, looking back to the discussion of techne in the Gorgias, concludes that such 
a definition of sophistry cannot meet the rigid standards Plato sets for techne.  Recalling 
the discussion on whether oratory64 is a craft65, we find Socrates explaining to Polus that 
he does not believe oratory to be a craft at all, but rather a “knack” (tribe).  He continues 
on to say it is a sort of flattery, a method used to appease those that would listen, lulling 
them into satisfaction, which, in turn, makes them amenable to suggestion.  And, yet, 
while the orator speaks as if he knows what is best for his audience, for Socrates it is 
precisely knowledge of this sort that he lacks.  We read at Gorgias 465a: 
…because it guesses at what’s pleasant with no consideration for what’s best.  And 
I say that it is not a craft, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of 
whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it is unable to state the 
cause of each thing.  And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a 
craft. 
 
                                                
 
 62 Gill (2012, 170) 
 
 63 See Franklin (2011, 12) “Again, that species are called parts of their genera indicates that each 
species is to be contained entirely within the proximate genus and thus also entirely within all of the genera 
above it. It is, therefore, a problem that the Stranger divides the genus of disputation (antilogike) into a 
species ‘[that] isn't carried out in any systematic or expert way’” 
 
 64 Which for Gill, along with persuasion, is labeled sophistry’s “product”. 
 
 65 Gorgias 463a-d.  
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The problem for the seventh definition then, as Gill notes, is that in the 5th branch of the 
division66 the Stranger distinguishes between those who know what they are imitating, 
and those who imitate out of ignorance.  Given that the seventh is a species that falls 
under the branch of the ignorant imitator, the question arises as to how this individual, 
one who does not know that which they imitate, and thus, does not meet the requirements 
Plato places upon the possession of a craft, could rightfully be situated as a species of the 
productive techne.67  Given his proposed ignorance, it would seem that he should be 
disqualified entirely from the very branch in which he is placed.   
 A further critique against positing sophistry as a craft arises from Brown, who 
adds that in addition to the possession of an account, any craft must also be goal 
oriented.68  For instance, the goal of the ship builder is to build a ship, just as the goal of 
the doctor is to promote health in their patients.  And, on Brown’s view, sophistry lacks 
                                                
 
 66 Soph. 267b5-d2 
 
 67 Gill (2012: 171) 
 
 68 Brown (2010, 164) For a discussion on the complexities regarding what qualifies as techne, see 
Roochnik (1992: 185-192).  Here Roochnik argues, contra Irwin (1977), that techne is not limited to 
productive knowledge, e.g., carpentry, sculpture, etc., but also should include theoretical knowledge, e.g., 
mathematics.  On Roochnik’s view, the issue with interpreting techne as “craft” in the strict sense requires 
that all craft be goal oriented in the sense that they “produce something”.  And, while the completed, i.e., 
produced, ship stands as testimony to the ship builders craft, when we look to more theoretical fields such 
as mathematics, Roochnik argues that the answer to an equation, e.g., 4 in response to 2+2,  “is 
meaningless in and of itself and so cannot be used to measure the calculative techne.” In other words, it 
would seem that the theoretical knowledge of mathematics, i.e., the ability to come to the correct answer, 
should be used as the measure of techne, not simply that it produces answers.  And, while I am inclined to 
agree with Roochnik regarding the limiting of techne to what is strictly productive in this narrow sense, 
especially when considering passages from the Charmides 166a5-b3, not to mention the Sophist itself, 
wherein Plato distinctly  distinguishes two additional branches of techne outside of the productive branch, I 
ultimately believe that despite his critique, techne must still be goal oriented.  In other words, yes, we 
would say that a doctor’s theoretical knowledge of medicine should stand distinct from the results of his 
practice, in other words, that he knows how to heal someone should be understood as distinct from the 
health of his patient.  However, if a doctor has the knowledge and yet has the goal of using it to harm his 
patients, then it would be difficult to see how he could be understood as the true practitioner of medicine. 
Thus, while techne need not be limited to the production of tangible things (such as a house or a ship), I 
would more readily side with Irwin, for, under my reading, to be considered a craft, that craft must also be 
properly aligned toward a goal.  See for example the discussion of fields of study in Republic VII, e.g., the 
discussion of astronomy at 527d-530c.   See also Irwin (1977, 227) 
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such a goal.  To explain this point, we must recall that we are looking for that essential 
characteristic, the singular thing that distinguishes sophistry from all other technai.   Yet, 
if we comb through the preliminary definitions: Definition 1, the hunter, Definitions 2-4, 
the salesman of his wares, Definition 5, the argumentative combatant who seeks glory or 
fortune, in none of these do we find a goal that is unique to sophistry.  In fact, with all 
save Definition 5, the goal is singularly the acquisition of money, with Definition 5 
differing only in that we must add the desire for glory as well. 
 Turning our attention then to the seventh definition, Brown argues that similar 
issues arise.  We recall that, according to the final definition, the sophist is the individual 
who produces false images, specifically the beliefs instilled in his audience that he is 
wise.  However, Brown writes: 
“…producing deceptive images is not his goal.  His goal is not, de dicto, to create 
false beliefs; rather it is to create a belief in his own wisdom.  That the belief is a 
false one follows from the fact the sophist is a sham wise person.  Deception is the 
means to his goal, but not his goal.  Once this is spelled out, it becomes clear why 
sophistry is not a genuine techne.69 
 
 To fully illustrate Brown’s position here, let us look to the counter example of the 
medical doctor.  The medical doctor is in possession of a particular kind of knowledge, 
specifically how to promote health.  Further, the goal of medicine is to promote health in 
individuals.  This example thus illustrates that for any activity to be considered a techne, 
the knowledge must properly align with the goal.  Granted, there can be additional 
benefits, such as wages, that one receives for their efforts, but, as we read in Rep. 345d1-
5, we need to distinguish such additional benefits from the craft itself.  Looking to the 
text: 
                                                
 69 Brown (2010: 166) 
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Then this benefit, receiving wages, doesn’t result from their own craft, but rather, if 
we were to examine this precisely, medicine promotes health, and wage-earning 
provides wages; house building provides a house and wage-earning, which 
accompanies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other crafts.  Each of them 
does its own work and benefits the thing it is set over. 
 
The point here is that Plato is quite clear that each techne must be associated with a 
particular goal unto itself.  Any additional goals must be considered as external to the 
craft itself.  So, (1) while medicine might carry with it compensation in the form of 
wages, and, (2) while the individual who seems to be practicing medicine might do so for 
those wages, in doing so he is acting not as a doctor, but as a wage earner.  To practice 
medicine in the true sense is to do so for the health of the patient.   
 With this evidence in place, Brown’s argument appears quite compelling.  If we 
are to take the seventh definition of sophistry as the true definition, then, Brown argues, it 
cannot be considered a true techne since it fails to meet this requirement.  To explain, the 
ultimate goal of the sophist of definition seven is to be perceived of as a wise man.  
However, his “skill” is that he is able to produce the false appearance that he is in fact 
wise.  To accomplish his task, he utilizes deception, fooling his audience into believing 
him to be something that he is not. Thus, Brown notes, “Deception is the means to his 
goal, but it is not his goal.”70  If his goal were strictly to deceive his audience, then 
perhaps this point would be moot.  However, as his goal is not to deceive, but rather to be 
considered wise, Brown argues that we must consider his skill set as a means to another 
end, and just as the person practicing medicine only for money is not truly practicing the 
craft of medicine, Brown argues that we must similarly disregard sophistry as defined in 
Definition 7 as a true techne.  
                                                
 70 Brown (2010, 166) 
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 Yet, while I agree with Brown that expertise as defined by Plato does require a 
proper goal, I ultimately find issue with her argument, specifically regarding her view 
that the activity of sophistry is not properly aligned with the correct goal.  To explain, we 
recall Brown’s claim that, “His goal is not, de dicto, to create false beliefs; rather it is to 
create a belief in his own wisdom….Deception is the means to his goal, but it is not his 
goal.”71  Thus, on Brown’s argument, the goal of the sophist is to produce the belief in 
others that he is a wise person, accomplishing this through the production of false 
appearances, specifically in the form of false statements.  Granted, his goal is not, as 
Brown notes, to create false beliefs in general, but to create the very specific belief that 
he is wise.   
 However, the problem with Brown’s argument is that the sophist as described 
does not deceive his audience with general false statements, but rather specifically 
tailored false statements designed for him to appear wise and thus to promote the belief 
that he is wise.  It is important to remember here that, according to this definition, the 
sophist of Definition 7 knows he is not wise.72 Considering this awareness, he is not 
producing false appearances in order to produce the true appearance that he is wise, as 
such a true appearance would have to be true.  And, considering the sophist knows that, 
or at the very least fears that, he is not wise, his goal is still to produce the false 
appearance that he is wise, doing so through the production of false statements 
(appearances) that make him appear to be something that he is not, i.e., the wise man.  As 
such, while I am largely in agreement with Brown’s general argument regarding the 
                                                
 
 71 Brown (2010, 166) 
 
 72 Soph. 268a1-4 
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definition of sophistry, I do not find her argument regarding the failure of the seventh 
definition to be compelling. 
 Yet, despite the weakness of Brown’s case, I do agree with Gill that, (1) given the 
admitted lack of knowledge the sophist of Definition 7 is professed to have, coupled with 
(2) Plato’s requirement that all those with an expertise be able to provide an account 
thereof, it seems to be the case that Definition 7 cannot rightly be situated under the 
genus of expertise.  In response to this dilemma, I would still contend that we should take 
the seventh definition of the sophist as the true definition of sophistry.  I make this claim 
for the following reasons: (1) As has been shown, all attempts to include any of the other 
definitions into an amalgamate definition have failed, including Notomi’s more nuanced, 
hybrid attempt.  (2) While Gill’s point regarding expertise requiring an account is one 
that admittedly presents considerable difficulty, we might perhaps take this to be Plato 
subtly showing us, (without directly telling us), that, similar to his views from the 
Gorgias, sophistry is not a techne, and yet, the very trouble with sophistry, and perhaps 
its most dangerous quality, is how closely it resembles one.73  Indeed, if the seventh 
definition is correct, and the sophist is the person who, like the magician, produces the 
appearance of that which is not, would it not stand to reason that, given their ability, we 
would be likely to mistake sophistry as a techne?  Indeed, this is precisely the danger of 
sophistry.  And, given this danger, the need for philosophy is imperative, for, if we 
                                                
 73 Such an act on Plato’s part should be of no surprise, especially considering the importance he 
places on the individual’s own struggle in the learning process, i.e., that we must work through it ourselves.  
Such a view is quite readily seen in two of his most readily recognized examples: The slave boy from the 
Meno and, of course, the struggle to escape the Cave. 
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ourselves are not wise enough to recognize the imposter, then how could we ever know 
for sure that we are not being fooled?74 
Is Socrates a Sophist?    
 I have thus far argued that we should consider the seventh definition of the sophist 
to be Plato’s true definition of sophistry.  With this argument in place we are now ready 
to ask the question laid out at the beginning of this chapter: Is Socrates a Sophist?  As 
many scholars have noted the similarities of many of these definitions to the character of 
Socrates, the question demands to be addressed.   And while I ultimately conclude that 
Socrates is not a sophist, others have taken the contrary position.  To prove my position 
then, I will look to confront the work of C.C.W. Taylor, who strenuously argues that the 
Sophist offers evidence to suggest that Plato did consider Socrates to be a sophist, albeit 
of the sort unique unto himself.75 Proceeding then through the seven definitions once 
again with Socrates in mind, we begin with the Definition 1, which, we recall, describes 
the sophist as the hunter of prominent young men.  Taylor notes that while this may be 
construed as a nod towards figures such as Protagoras,76 we recall that in the very 
dialogue that shares Protagoras’ name, it is Socrates who is accused of precisely this sort 
of hunting!77  And, while accusations by unnamed characters78 should not be blindly 
taken as evidence, if we turn our attention to the Theaetetus, we find Socrates himself 
                                                
   
 74 I grant that this interpretation requires more work to flesh out fully, however, such a detailed 
investigation is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 75 Taylor (2006) 
 
 76 Prot. 315a – “Following behind and trying to listen to what was being said were a group of what 
seemed to be mostly foreigners, men whom Protagoras collects from the various cities he travels through.” 
Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 77 Prot. 309a.  Indeed, the dialogue opens with this accusation. 
 
 78 Prot. 309a – The accuser is simply labeled as “friend” (εταιροs) 
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inquiring to Theodorus about those “young men that are thought likely to become 
distinguished.”79  And so, while Socrates is portrayed as a hunter of young men, he is so 
portrayed in a qualified sense, namely, that he is interested not in their money, but rather 
their intellect.80  
  It must be noted that this distinction is paramount, for as we recall in the 
Stranger’s account of definition one, the sophist as the hunter of young men does so not 
for their intellect, but for their money.81  And, while Taylor argues that the professional 
aspect of a particular skill, i.e., whether or not one is paid, is irrelevant to the activity 
itself, in this instance I must disagree.  To explain, I do agree with Taylor that in certain 
examples, e.g., playing the guitar, whether or not one is paid does not impact the activity 
of playing the guitar itself.  So, on Taylor’s view, since both Socrates and Protagoras 
engage in the activity of hunting prominent young men, that one is paid and the other is 
not does not provide sufficient evidence to exclude Socrates from the charge of sophistry 
as such.82   Yet, while Taylor is correct in this sense, what he fails to recognize is that 
sophistry is being defined here as a techne, which, as I have argued above requires both 
an account (knowledge), as well as the proper goal.  And, in the description of the 
sophist of Def. 1, we find that wage earning is not merely an ancillary characteristic, but 
the final division.  It is that he hunts for money that distinguishes him from all other 
kinds.  We read at 232a: 
                                                
 
 79 Theat. 143d 
 
 80 Taylor also references Charmides 153d 
 
 81 Soph. 223a2  
 
 82 Taylor (2006, 160) See also Gill (2012: 144) Here Gill sees the final division as separating 
Sophistry from Flattery.  However, on my reading, the Stranger defines flattery as the act of pleasing 
people so as to be granted free room and board, as opposed to sophistry, which seeks wages. 
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Stranger - “But does not the kind of wage earning that actually earns money, 
though it claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, deserve to be called a 
different name?  What name? Try and tell me.” 
Theaetetus – “It’s obvious. I think we have found the sophist.” 
 
Therefore, (1) Given the goal of the hunter of Def. 1 is money, whereas for Socrates it is 
the acquisition of knowledge, and (2) the goal of any techne is essential to its definition, 
contra Taylor we absolutely can distinguish Socrates from the sophist of Definition 1. 
 In his examination Def. 2-4, Taylor again speculates on the similarities between 
Socrates and the sophist as depicted therein, though, again, given that these definitions 
explicitly depict the sophist as a merchant, Taylor seems more willing to admit the 
inherent discrepancy between such individuals and Socrates.  Similarly, Taylor admits 
that Def. 5, the oral combatant, resembles Socrates insofar as he is typically associated 
with such activity.  However, once more, Taylor readily admits that despite the 
similarities between the sophist of Def. 5 and Socrates, given the former is paid for his 
services, whereas Socrates is not, we must distinguish Socrates accordingly.     
 Following the brief dismissal of the preliminary definitions, Taylor finally moves 
on to the infamous 6th definition.83 As this definition is one of great importance for my 
argument as a whole, we see it again below in its entirety: 
They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying something though he 
is saying nothing.  Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these 
people will easily scrutinize them.  They will collect his opinions together 
during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with 
each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things 
and in the same respects.  The people who are being examined see this, get 
angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others.  They lose their 
                                                
 83 It should be noted that Taylor’s numbering of the definitions differs from my account (which 
follows the ordering of Gill (2012) and Brown (2010), amongst others).  In Taylor’s text, there are only two 
types of merchants, not three, thus explaining the numerical differences.  For the purposes of this paper, 
however, I will refer to the definitions as discussed by Taylor in the order I have prescribed. 
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inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter 
to hear or has a more lasting effect on them.84 
 
Given this description, we need only recall any of the exchanges between Socrates and 
his interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues to recognize the similarities between this 
description and the individual who practices the elenchos.  These obvious similarities, 
coupled with the more positive outlook on the practice described85, leave little doubt that 
this sixth definition is meant as a direct nod to Socrates.86  Perhaps in recognition of this 
similarity to the revered figure of Socrates,87 the Stranger is quick to reassess the figure 
described, noting that such sophistry does not deserve to be associated with such a person 
as described by the sixth definition.  Yet, when faced with the similarities between this 
individual and sophistry as understood thus far in the discussion, the Stranger reluctantly 
acquiesces, but not completely, noting that such a practice is, “nothing other than our 
noble sophistry.”88 
 Given this labeling, Taylor concludes that the sixth definition, one which clearly 
depicts the Socratic elenchos, is: 
…properly conceived as sophistry of a kind; a very different kind, clearly, from 
that practiced by Protagoras or Prodicus, but a kind of sophistry for all that.  That is 
                                                
 
 84 Soph. 230b3-c2 
  
 85 Taylor draws our attention to the cleansing aspect of the definition, in particular the care for the 
souls of others, a characteristic unsurprisingly lacking in all other definitions. 
 
 86 While there is a fair level of scholarly dispute regarding whether or not the 6th definition is to be 
taken to mean that Plato considers Socrates to actually be a sophist, most scholars generally do agree that, 
at the very least, the sixth definition is referring to Socrates.  For arguments against the view the Def. 6 is in 
reference to Socrates, see G.B. Kerferd (1954), and the response to Kerferd by Trevaskis (1955).  While I 
ultimately side with Trevaskis, Kerferd’s argument is intriguing to say the least.  
 
 87 And, while it would be humorous if this reassessment of the sixth definition as “noble” was 
made by the Stranger only out of politeness to Socrates (considering he is supposedly still standing 
amongst them), I highly doubt such is the case. 
 
 88 Soph. 231b7 
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to say, when it comes to classifying the activity of sophistry, it is more illuminating 
to place it on the sophistic side than on the philosophical. 89  
 
Before attempting to justify this claim, Taylor first moves on to the seventh and final 
definition, an individual that Taylor likens to a magician; a description that seems to fit 
quite nicely for the individual that, through the production of false appearances, produces 
the false beliefs in the minds of his audience.  Taylor also asks that we pay special 
attention to the particulars of the sophist of Def. 7, specifically that he, “uses short 
speeches in private conversation to force the person talking to him to contradict 
himself.”90  
 With this established, Taylor posits that for Plato, this method of argumentation, 
i.e., the exposure of inconsistencies in belief via the elenchos, is one of the distinctive 
marks of sophistry, and, as such, Plato’s argument, “must be that ‘noble sophistry’ is 
more like sophistry tout court than it is like philosophy, since it shares one of the most 
distinctive marks of sophistry…while it does not share the most distinctive mark of 
philosophy.”91  Immediately following this claim, Taylor admits that he does not know 
with certainty what the “distinctive mark of philosophy” is.  Thus, he suggests that: 
 …the answer must be that philosophy is comprehensive knowledge of the nature of 
reality, which, the practitioner of purgative elenchos depicted in the dialogues, i.e., 
Socrates, by his own confession lacks.92 
 
Yet, as Taylor asks, if Socrates is not a philosopher, then how, if he lacks the necessary 
knowledge, is he able to excel in the purging of the false beliefs of others?  In other 
                                                
 
 89 Taylor (2006: 164) 
 
 90 Soph. 268b2-3 
 
 91 Taylor (2006, 166-167) 
 
 92 Taylor (2006, 167) 
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words, for Socrates to determine which beliefs are inconsistent, would he not need some 
knowledge?  Given Socrates’ consistent disavowal of knowledge, that he is so successful 
in this practice is mysterious, to say the least.  In answer to this puzzle, Taylor posits that 
Socrates is to be considered a magician, i.e., “someone possessed of unaccountable 
powers”.93    
Thus, Taylor concludes: 
Socrates’ success in guiding self-critical thought to the elimination of false beliefs 
had then to be ascribed not to philosophy as he had previously believed but to a 
special sort of ‘divine dispensation’. Socrates is then a magician, an individual with 
an unaccountable power of divining the truth and leading others to it, and by the 
same token no longer, by Platonic standards, a philosopher, but a very special, and 
very noble, sophist.94 
 
 
Saving Socrates from Sophistry 
 
Socrates is not a Sophist 
 While I find Taylor’s argument to be fascinating, I ultimately cannot agree with 
his conclusion that we must consider Socrates to be a sophist, regardless of how “special” 
we are to consider him as such.95 Many objections to this argument are three-fold:  First, 
given the argument against the problem of an amalgamate definition I have constructed 
above, that Taylor takes the 6th and 7th definition in concert raises concern. Second, I 
                                                
 
 93 Taylor (2006: 167) See also Nehamas (1998: 85-91) 
 
 94 Taylor (2006: 168)  See Also D. Frede (1996: 223).  Frede notes that the sixth definition “seems 
to represent something like Plato’s last word on Socrates.” And, it is this image that forms the basis of her 
argument regarding Socrates in her article on the character of Socrates in the Philebus.  This will be 
discussed in Sect. 2.5.2. 
 
 95 I should also note here that I do agree with him on other aspects of his conclusion, specifically 
that Socrates’ ability is bestowed upon him by “divine inspiration”.  However, I believe that Taylor, along 
with Burnyeat (1977) (who also made similar intimations), do not push this line far enough.  The 4th 
chapter of this dissertation will thus pick up where I believe they left off, offering a full defense of the idea 
that Plato, in the later dialogues, attributed this “unaccountable” ability of Socrates to divine inspiration.  If 
I am correct, then, while his ability may be “unaccountable” in the Platonic sense, it is not left 
unexplainable. 
 95 
have also argued that for Plato, the definition of any kind is not determined by multiple 
unessential characteristics, but rather a singular essential trait.  As a result, even if we 
allow the association of definitions, it must be one trait that links them all as sophists, not 
multiple characteristics, as Taylor suggests.  Third, Taylor’s argument hinges on the point 
that Socrates is closer in kind to the sophist than philosopher on account of (1) the 
elenchos being one of the “distinctive marks of sophistry,” and, (2) that the distinctive 
mark of philosophy is a “comprehensive knowledge of the nature of reality”96 On this last 
point, I will first acknowledge that a major goal of the Sophist is to distinguish between 
sophistry and philosophy, and, as such, these considerations on the nature of philosophy 
could and should contribute to our understanding of sophistry.  However, considering 
Taylor’s labeling of Socrates as a sophist is dependent upon these “distinctive marks” 
that sophistry and philosophy bear, his lack of an account regarding his position on 
philosophy is particularly problematic. 
 While I will take each of these objections in turn, I will note that, considering that 
I have addressed the first two objections in detail leading up to Taylor’s position, these 
initial objections will be brief.  That said, let us address first the problem of multiple 
“sophists”.  As we recall, it is not possible that there be multiple accounts as to what it 
means to be a sophist, as each of these kinds represented in the varying definitions, while 
similar in certain aspects (hence their mislabeling), also exhibit contradictory qualities.  
And, the problem of inconsistency is particularly problematic in this instance, for, unlike 
Def. 1-5 which all stem from the acquisitive branch of techne, the 6th and 7th definitions 
                                                
 
 96 A point which Taylor posits with no argument.  Granted, he does indicate that he is not certain 
as to what philosophy is in a definitive sense, however, considering his labeling of Socrates as sophist is 
dependent upon these “distinctive marks” that sophistry and philosophy bear, his lack of an account is 
particularly problematic. 
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are entirely disparate in that they fall under the separative and productive branches, 
respectively.  And, while this may at first seem inconsequential, if we take a different 
example, for instance, the difference between a wolf and a komodo dragon, the severity 
of the problem becomes clear.   
 To explain, for both animals, we begin by dividing down from the original 
category of “Animal”.  Upon doing so, we find that the very first division distinguishes 
between “mammals” and “reptiles,” with wolves falling under the former, and kimodo 
dragons under the latter.  And, while it could be argued that, at the end of our divisions, 
there are a lot of similarities, e.g., both animals are quadrapeds, both animals have lungs 
(as opposed to gills), both animals are hunters, etc., considering our goal was to define 
“wolf,” not “4 –legged animals that hunt,” to say that we should consider a komodo 
dragon to be of the same species as wolf is preposterous, regardless of their similarities.  
Taking this into consideration, we must apply the same standards to the sophist. And, 
given the disparity between the separative branch (Def. 6) and the productive branch 
(Def. 7), it is simply incorrect to say that they are both sophists, despite the similarities 
that may seem apparent.97 
  A similar critique could also be offered for my second objection, i.e., that the 
sophist would have multiple “distinctive marks”.  To explain, I will concede that any kind 
will, of course, have a variety of aspects and traits that we could rightly attribute to that 
kind in question.  Returning to the example above, wolves do exhibit behavior that is 
characteristic of being a wolf.  Wolves hunt in packs (unlike panthers), each wolf pack 
                                                
 97 See Soph. 219c1-8.  I will also add that, at the very least, it is incorrect to say they are both 
sophists using the evidence as given by Plato.  In other words, if we were to define sophist under a 
particular genus, we could, possibly, then divide that definition further into types.  However, since Plato 
has the sixth in seventh definition in different branches of the genus of techne, such an option is not 
available. 
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has a mix of males and females (unlike lion prides, which have only one male per pride), 
etc.  However, while these aspects could correctly be used to distinguish wolves from 
other animals in a very general sense, these characteristics are not what define a wolf as a 
Wolf.  As argued above, definitional knowledge in the Platonic sense does not allow for 
different kinds of the thing in question in the unqualified sense, as such openness would 
lead to a level of relativity.  So, while we might say that there are different kinds of 
wolves in the qualified sense, e.g., Grey wolf, Timber wolf, etc., we must recognize that, 
for Plato, that these different sorts are still called wolves is dependent upon each distinct 
kind of wolf sharing in the essential trait of what it means to be a Wolf, whatever that 
trait may be.    
 Returning then to the problem of the sophist and the allowance of multiple 
“distinctive marks,” the problem presents itself clearly.  On the one hand, if we say that 
there is no essential trait to sophistry, but rather a collection of distinctive traits that allow 
for proper identification, then would this not open the door for false-positives regarding 
who is a sophist?  In other words, returning to the example of the wolf, if we are not 
depending upon an essential characteristic to determine what is or is not a wolf, then how 
would we ever determine the difference between a wolf or a dog?98 On the other hand, if 
we admit that there must be a essential quality that defines sophistry, then it matters not 
how many similarities Socrates shares with the sophists, for, as long as he lacks that 
essential trait that makes a sophist a Sophist, just as a dog is not a wolf, neither could 
Socrates be a sophist.99 
                                                
 98 See Soph. 231a5.  Plato himself discusses the difficulty of determining between these two types, 
and the importance of distinguishing between the two. 
 
 99 See Soph. 264d9-265a1 
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The Problem of Philosophy as Knowledge. 
 In addition to the problems listed above, I find further issue with Taylor’s 
exclusion of Socrates from the practice of philosophy, a feat accomplished through 
Taylor’s defining of philosophy as the possession of a “comprehensive knowledge of the 
nature of reality.”  Now, to begin, I must first admit that I am in agreement with Taylor 
that, at this stage of Plato’s thought, Socrates cannot be considered a philosopher in the 
unqualified sense. However, before I give my argument in defense of this point, I must 
first address the problem with Taylor’s definition of philosophy, which, I will argue, is 
untenable and thus cannot be used in his argument against Socrates. 
 We recall that Taylor defines philosophy as having a comprehensive knowledge 
of the nature of reality.  And, to be sure, such a definition would seem to fit into a 
traditional Platonic understanding as to the goal of philosophy.100  The problem with 
Taylor’s claim, however, is that his definition of philosophy requires that the philosopher 
be defined solely on the basis of his possession of knowledge.101 The problem with such a 
limited definition in this context is that Taylor does not indicate how the philosopher 
obtains such knowledge.  Such an omission of the philosopher’s methodology is of 
particular significance when we consider that it was on account of Socrates’ methodology 
that Taylor labeled him a sophist.  In other words, if it were the case that Taylor labels 
                                                
 
 100  Indeed, if we look to the divided line of the Republic (509d-513), it would seem that the 
ascension to the understanding of the Forms would be the bar of success against which we measure the 
philosopher.  
 
 101 As an aside, it must also be noted that, even if the person in possession of knowledge was a 
proper definition of the philosopher, that such a person could attain comprehensive knowledge is itself 
problematic.  Not only do we find at Soph. 233a the Stranger dismissing the possibility of a person 
knowing everything (the problems of which could be extended to knowing everything about any particular 
subject), but further, considering the topic in question, i.e., the nature of reality, that knowledge of such sort 
is even knowable is a point of contention.  For discussion on the distinction between human and divine 
knowledge, see Vlastos (1995, 61-63). 
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Socrates a sophist on account of his lack of knowledge regarding the nature of reality, 
then it would make more sense to juxtapose against this definition of sophistry the 
requirement of such knowledge if one is to be considered a philosopher.  However, as 
Taylor uses the methodology of Socrates as the determining factor in his sophistry, for the 
accusation of sophistry to stand, he needs to equally give an account of the philosopher’s 
method as well.   
 To explain, we recall that philosophy, on Taylor’s view, requires only that the 
individual possess knowledge on the nature of reality.  As such, the question of 
methodology is of critical importance here, for, if the philosopher is measured only on his 
comprehensive knowledge of the nature of reality, then one must ask: What title do we 
give to those who are on their way towards the acquisition of such knowledge?  Given 
Taylor’s use of methodology to condemn Socrates, he seems to believe that there is, at 
the very least, a wrong way to achieve such knowledge.  Given this implied statement, it 
would stand to reason that there must then be a right way, i.e., a correct methodology that 
is used by the individual on their way to becoming a philosopher.102  However, as Taylor 
makes no such claims regarding the correct methodology that must be used towards the 
attainment of the required knowledge, then it is not possible for him to say conclusively 
that any method, including the elenchos, could not, given enough time and skill, 
eventually allow for the procurement of this knowledge.  And, while I have argued 
extensively against the ability of the elenchos to acquire such knowledge, since Taylor 
sets no such limitations, he is unable to disqualify Socrates as a philosopher on such 
grounds, as he leaves open the possibility that Socrates could, via the elenchos, 
                                                
 102 I find this problem particularly Ironic then, as Taylor himself makes special note of Socrates’ 
unaccountable talent for discerning what is false, without himself knowing what is true! 
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eventually obtain knowledge pertaining to the nature of reality.   
Is Socrates a Philosopher? 
 Yet, despite the problems that arise from Taylor’s interpretation of Plato’s 
conception of philosophy, with the possibility of Socrates being a sophist now undone, 
the question does remain: Does Plato consider Socrates to be a philosopher?  While we 
may be inclined to answer in the affirmative, since the promised dialogue on the subject 
of the “philosopher” was never delivered,103 Plato’s later standards for philosophy remain 
frustratingly uncertain.   As a result of this uncertainty, a rigorous scholarly debate has 
emerged regarding Plato’s understanding of philosophy.  And, given the attention paid by 
Plato in the later dialogues to the method of division, it is of no surprise that this debate 
centers around the role this new method plays (if any) in the work of philosophy.   
 On the one hand, there are those who believe that the advent of this methodology 
indicates a sea change in Plato’s thought regarding philosophy itself, suggesting that this 
new tool introduced to us by Plato is to be considered the method of the true 
philosopher.104  On the other hand, there are those who make a softer claim, 
acknowledging the importance of the new method of division, while also recognizing that 
it is not the method of the philosopher, but part of the philosophical process to be used 
with other methods such as the elenchos or the dialectic of the middle dialogues.105  
                                                
 
 103 Soph. 217b2 – Gill (2012, 5) suggests that this omission on Plato’s part in not accidental.  By 
withholding the final piece of the puzzle, by denying us the “answer,” Plato continues on as he always has, 
showing us the way without simply handing us the answer.  As Gill writes, “Plato uses the devious strategy 
I have attributed to him because, by making his audience work very hard to dig out his meaning, he fosters 
in them (and us, his modern readers) a skill in reading and a competence in using dialectical techniques and 
developing new ones.”   See also, Frede (1996, 150). 
 
 104 See Morgan (1990, 99) 
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Finally, there are those, such as Gilbert Ryle, who argue the contrary, dismissing the 
method of division as nothing more than a rudimentary tool designed, “for the special 
benefit of the philosophically innocent novices who were at that moment getting their 
freshman’s training in the ABC of thinking.”106 And, while I cannot help but admire the 
zeal with which Professor Ryle unabashedly rejects of the method of division, given the 
evidence to the contrary, I cannot agree with his conclusion.  Therefore, since we must 
consider the method of division to be, at the very least, a necessary component of Plato’s 
later understanding of philosophy, when we consider Socrates’ lack of engagement with 
the method of division, Plato could not have considered him to be a philosopher in the 
unqualified sense.107 
Defending the Method of Division 
 In order to defend the thesis that we must consider the method of division as a 
necessary component of philosophy as understood in the later dialogues, I look to the 
work of J.L Ackrill, who, in his article, “In Defence of Platonic Division,” takes on the 
method’s most vocal opponents, Gilbert Ryle.108  And, while I must commend Ackrill on 
                                                                                                                                            
 105 Gill (2012), Ackrill (1997) It should be noted that determining precisely what the “dialectic” of 
Plato’s middle period entails is a matter of debate for scholars.  For recent work on the issue, see Benson 
(2016). 
 
 106 Ryle (1966, 139)  
  
 107 I am inclined to make this softer claim here, agreeing with Morgan (1990) that perhaps we 
must distinguish between “proper philosophy” and “philosophy in general.”  It is only the former, however, 
that could rightfully be called the method of a true philosopher. 
 
 108 Ackrill (1997), Ryle (1939) and (1966) -  Ryle’s full objection summarized by him as 
follows: “First of all it can only be applied to concepts of the genus-species or determinable-determinate 
sort, and it is not concepts of this sort that in general, if ever, engender philosophical problems.  And, 
next, most generic concepts do not subdivide into two polarly opposed species; usually there are 
numerous of a genus or subspecies of a species.  And the question whether a sort divides into two or 
seventeen sub-sorts is, in general, a purely empirical question.  So nearly any case of a philosopher’s 
operation by division could be upset by the subsequent empirical discovery of sorts lying on neither 
side of the philosopher’s boundary lines.  And finally, there is room for almost any amount of 
arbitrariness from the selection from the ladders of sorts en route for the definition of a given 
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his thorough response to Ryle’s many objections, for our purposes here I will focus on 
Ryle’s most pressing objections which can be paraphrased as follows: (1) That the 
method of division forces dichotomous division upon kinds.  
(2) As the method of division is limited to genus-species determinations, it cannot be 
applied to philosophically interesting problems. 
 
 Beginning with Ryle’s first objection, i.e., that the method forces dichotomous 
divisions, we find that there is a significant stock of evidence to the contrary of this 
claim.  Granted, the majority of the divisions we have seen thus far in the Sophist do 
seem to follow a pattern of bifurcation.  However, we need not look far at all for evidence 
to the contrary to this, e.g., the division techne into three distinct branches: acquisitive, 
separative, and productive.  Yet, despite this immediate (and prominent) example, as well 
as other similar examples to be found in the Philebus,109 the Phaedrus,110 and others, 
Ackrill notes that we also find textual evidence that Plato does not demand dichotomous 
division, but rather recommends it for the purposes of clarity.  Looking to the Philebus 
16d, we read:111  
We ought, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and 
                                                                                                                                            
concept….there are many tolerable and no perfect ways of defining most of the sort-concepts that we 
employ. 
 A chain of summa genera, genera, species, sub-species and varieties is not itself a chain of 
premises and conclusions.  But what is more, it cannot in general be deductively established or 
established by reduction ad absurdum.  The work of a Linnaeus cannot be done a priori. How could 
Plato who knew exactly what question-answer arguments were really like bring himself to say, if he did 
say, that the philosophically valuable results of such arguments are kind-ladders?” (136) 
 
 109 Phil. 16c2-3 – Sound is divided into three kinds 
 
 110 Phaed. 238a-c – Madness is divided into multiple kinds. 
 
 111 Ackrill additionally points to less direct evidence from the Phaedrus (265e), which Ackrill 
suggests, “stresses the crucial importance of following the natural articulation of the item under 
examination.  However, upon examination of this passage in particular, while I agree with Ackrill that there 
is no explicit demand that the divisions be dichotomous, the examples Socrates gives do seem to suggest 
such bifurcation.  E.g., that body parts “naturally come in pairs,” and that we ought to “cut up each kind 
according to its species along its natural joints,” which, would seem to suggest dividing by two.  As such, 
while I agree with Ackrill’s argument in general, this evidence in particular is somewhat troublesome.   
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search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then if we have laid hold of that, 
we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of their being two, 
otherwise three or some other number of forms. 
 
Furthering this point, Ackrill draws from additional evidence in the Statesman 287c: 
It is difficult to cut them into two…so since we cannot bisect, let us divide them as 
we should carve a sacrificial victim into limbs. For we ought always to cut into the 
number as near as possible to two. 
 
Thus, while it is indeed the case that the majority of divisions are dichotomous, we can 
clearly see that there is no requirement that they be as such.  However, as the goal of the 
method of division is to define a kind in the most precise way possible, it would make 
sense that we ought strive to make as few divisions as possible, for, as Ackrill explains, 
“a slapdash division into a lot of species will very probably cause important similarities 
and groupings to escape notice.”112   
 In contrast to his first critique, Ryle’s second objection, i.e., that the method of 
division is not equipped to handle philosophically interesting problems, presents a more 
pressing challenge.  For Ryle, we need only look to the Sophist as evidence to this claim, 
for, once the method of division has failed to capture the sophist, the Stranger halts the 
process, recommending that the need to first determine if false-statements are possible, a 
determination which required the discussion of non-being as discussed in section 1 of this 
chapter.  Given the discussion of non-being is not undertaken by the method of division, 
and, given the importance that the concept of non-being plays for Plato’s larger 
metaphysical system, Ryle argues that, when it comes to truly important philosophical 
concepts, the method of division simply falls short.113 
                                                
 
 112 Ackrill (1997, 103) 
 
 113  Ryle (1966, 140-144) 
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 While I agree with Ryle that the division would seem ill-equipped to handle the 
problem of non-being as discussed in the Sophist, such shortcomings do not seem to me 
to be grounds for dismissal for the method as a whole, let alone evidence that it is unable 
to handle important philosophical problems.114  To suggest this is to have an 
exceptionally narrow, and perhaps even anachronistic, understanding as to what would 
qualify as “philosophically important” for Plato.  To explain, when we look back to 
dialogues such as the Gorgias, Protagoras, Menexenus, Republic, or even as far back as 
the Apology, we are inundated with warnings about the trappings of sophistry.  One 
consistent theme that rings true in each of these dialogues is that the sophist is not only 
dangerous, but cunning as well.  And, this latter quality makes him all the more 
dangerous, as it is through this crafty charm that he is able to convince others that he is 
wise; that he knows what is right.115  Given the harm that such individuals can inflict, that 
we should be able to recognize them is of the utmost importance, as such individuals pose 
a direct threat to the success of the polis.  So, while defining the sophist for what he is 
may not share the grander metaphysical or epistemological ramifications as discovering 
the form of non-being, to say that such a determination is unimportant is to say that Plato 
did not consider matters of politics to be philosophically important.  And, while there is 
an argument to be made that Plato’s interests shifted over the course of his life,116 given 
                                                
 
 114 Ackrill offers an alternative critique than my own here, suggesting that Ryle does not take into 
consideration the fungible nature of many Platonic terms.   
 
              115  See Men. 235a-c  - “Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man 
– I’m convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden...And this high and 
mighty feeling remains with me more than three days.  The speaker’s words and voice sink into my ears 
with so much resonance that it is only with difficulty that on the third or fourth day I recover myself and 
realize where I am…This is how clever our orators are.” 
 
 116 See Vlastos (1991: ch.4) 
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the consistent attention given to politics throughout the entirety of the Platonic corpus,117 
it is entirely anachronistic to suggest Plato thought otherwise.   
 This is not to say that Ryle’s objections should be entirely dismissed, for, I would 
allow that there are certain philosophical problems that are perhaps better handled by 
other methodologies, and, to be sure, we might take the discussion of non-being in the 
Sophist as evidence to this claim.  However, despite its ineffectiveness in certain areas, 
Plato provides ample evidence to support the claim that he came to consider it to be an 
essential part of philosophy as a whole.   
 However, while I do admit that Plato does, on occasion, resort to varying 
methodologies depending upon the direction of the discussion, it does not then follow 
that Plato considers the method of division as unable to handle more metaphysical 
inquiries.   Indeed, we find an ample supply of compelling evidence in the affirmative 
position taken by Plato regarding division.  Beginning with the dialogue that has 
occupied much of our discussion here, the Sophist, we find the Stranger describing the 
method of division as follows: 
And what name shall we give to this science? …Have we stumbled unawares upon 
the free man’s knowledge and, in seeking for the Sophist, chanced to find the 
Philosopher first? 
 
THEAETETUS – How do you Mean? 
 
STRANGER – Dividing according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a 
different one or a different one for the same – is this not the business of Dialectic? 
… and the man that can do that discerns clearly one Form everywhere extended 
through many, where each one lies apart, and many Forms, different from one 
another, embraced from without by one Form; and again one Form connected in a 
unity through many wholes, and many Forms, entirely marked off apart.  That 
means knowing how to distinguish, Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds 
                                                
 
 117 A point made all the more clear when we consider the Laws. 
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can or cannot combine.118 
 
Following this thorough description of the method of division, the Stranger concludes 
that we should, “assign this dialectical activity only to someone who has a pure and just 
love of wisdom,” and further that, “…We’ll find that the philosopher will always be in a 
location like this…”119   Given this evidence, it is difficult to see how Plato could not 
have associated division with dialectic.  Further, as we can see from the laudatory 
remarks issued by the Stranger, the description of this method is one very closely 
associated with the determination of what is, or, in other words, Being itself.120    
 And, while the praise for the method as found in the Sophist is perhaps not as 
effusive in other dialogues, we do indeed find evidence in the Statesman as well.121 
Looking then to that text, we read: 
But what most people, I think, fail to realize is this: some of the things there are 
have sensible likenesses, easy to recognize, and these can be indicated without 
difficulty when anyone wishes in reply to a request for a logos of such a thing to 
avoid trouble and indicate them easily without a logos.  But the greatest and most 
important things have no images fashioned with clarity for men; to content the 
enquirer’s mind there is nothing to show which can be fitted to a sense perception 
as to give adequate satisfaction.  This is why we must practice the ability to give 
and receive a logos of each thing.  The incorporeals, the finest and greatest of 
things, are clearly shown only by a logos and in no other way; and it is for the sake 
of them that all our present discussions are taking place.122 
 
As we can see from this passage, it is clear that Plato intends for the method of division 
                                                
 118 Soph. 253c-e.  Cornford’s (1935) translation as used by Ackrill (1997) 
 
 119 Soph. 253e3-5.  Translation by White (1997). 
 
 120 Soph. 254a7 - The Stranger notes that the individual described, ”uses reasoning to stay near the 
form being.” See also Gill (2012, 241) 
 
 121 Ackrill also draws from both the Phaedrus 265d-e, and Philebus 16b-17b for further evidence 
to support his argument.  In both instances, we clearly see Socrates praising the method of division, in both 
instances attributing a divine element to the methodology. 
 
 122 Statesman 285d-286b – Italics added for emphasis. 
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to be utilized for the “greatest and most important things”.  Granted, we do find the 
Stranger recommending that division be used on easier examples, e.g., weaving.  
However, as Ackrill notes, the reasoning behind this recommendation is to prepare the 
budding dialectician for those matters that are of greater importance, inquiries that, as we 
have found, are significantly more challenging in scale.123 Once again we find that, based 
upon textual evidence to the contrary, Ryle’s argument that division need be excluded 
from philosophy on the grounds of its ineffectiveness falls flat. 
Conclusion 
 Drawing from the evidence above, I would argue that we must conclude that the 
method of division needs to be considered a necessary part of philosophy as understood 
by Plato in the later dialogues.  Thus, while we have saved Socrates from sophistry, if we 
are to make the claim that he is a philosopher, then we need to show that Socrates not 
only practiced this method, but did so successfully.124  
 To begin, we recall that in these later dialogues, Socrates has largely been 
removed from view, taking a back seat to the Stranger, and, it is the Stranger that guides 
us deftly through the complicated process of division in both the Sophist, as well as the 
following Statesman. Yet, if we turn our attention to the Philebus, we find Socrates once 
again at center stage, not only guiding the discussion, but doing so with a “new” 
methodology, one which Socrates refers to as the “divine method”.  And, in his 
                                                
 123 Ackrill (1997, 98)  I would add that we see this notion at work in the Sophist, as the Stranger 
begins with the Angler, which is only done to prepare Theaetetus for the investigation into Sophistry, a 
difficult task, to be sure, and one that carries significantly more philosophical import. 
 
 124 Theoretically, anyone could use the method of division.  However, as was evidenced in our 
discussion of the Sophist, only the true dialectician, one trained properly in the methodology, will be able to 
use it properly.  And, it is only this person, the individual that is, “capable of adequately discriminating a 




description, we find Socrates not only professing his love for this efficient methodology, 
but further confessing that it, “has often escaped me, and left me behind, alone and 
helpless.”125 And, while admissions of ignorance or perplexity are nothing new for 
Socrates, scholars such as Dorothea Frede have argued that the context of this admission 
in particular carries a deeper meaning.126  To explain, we find that when faced with the 
challenge of differentiating between various types of pleasures and knowledge, Socrates 
suggests that such a task is best tackled through a new method which, recalling an earlier 
passage I have cited above, Socrates describes as follows: 
We ought whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and 
search for it, for we shall find it there contained; and if we have laid hold of that, 
we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being two, 
otherwise for three or some other number of forms: and we must do the same again 
with each of the ‘ones’ thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one 
that we started with is a one and unlimited many, but also just how many it is.127 
 
As we can clearly see, this method that Socrates describes as a “gift from the gods” is in 
fact the method of division as we find in the Sophist.  Yet, as Frede notes, despite the 
praise he has bestowed upon it, Socrates very quickly abandons the new methodology, 
explaining that they need not continue on in such fashion, as he has been struck with 
divine inspiration, gifted by the gods with new information that will allow them to move 
forward in their discussion of pleasure and knowledge.128 This bizarre turn of events 
rightly prompts Frede to question Plato’s motives here, for, if Plato was to have the 
discussion move forward not through the division process, but from Socratic inspiration, 
why would he go through the trouble of having Socrates not only introduce the method, 
                                                
 125 Phil. 16b6-7 
 
 126 D. Frede (1996, 232).  
 127 Phil. 16d 
 
 128 Phil. 20b3-5.  This point will be addressed in significant detail in Chapter. 4 of this dissertation. 
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but clumsily attempt to use it as well?129  And, according to Frede: 
The answer must be that Plato is very concerned with clearly demarcating what 
Socrates is not doing here.  Although he is following some of the injunctions of 
dialectic proper, he is not going to treat the problem in the way that a real expert 
would have to deal with it. He is not presented as a master dialectician.130 
 
Further, not only does the Philebus present Socrates as lacking the skills necessary to 
properly engage in division, when Socrates does contribute to the progress of the 
discussion, he does so through borrowing ideas from others,131 or simply stating ideas as 
facts while asking Protarchus to approve as verification132 Given this evidence, just as the 
Sophist went through great pains to distinguish the sophist as set against the philosopher, 
I would argue that we must similarly understand the Philebus to be Plato’s attempt to 
distinguish Socrates from his new understanding of the true philosopher. 
 Yet, if this is true, if the Philebus serves the double purpose of expressing Plato’s 
view that Socrates can no longer be considered a philosopher, then what are we to make 
of Socrates?  In answer to this question, in the final chapter of my dissertation I will 
present the argument that, as the skill of Socrates cannot be accounted for by philosophy 
or sophistry as defined in the late dialogues, Plato must have attributed his ability to 
divine inspiration.   
                                                
 129 D. Frede (1996, 229-232)   
 
 130 D. Frede (1996, 233) 
 
 131 Phil. 44c 
 
 132 Phil. 31b8 – See also D. Frede (1996, 38 n. 38) Frede notes that on account of these varied 
measures, “It is impossible to show in detail the means by which Socrates brings about his results.” 
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Chapter 3: Socrates and Divine Inspiration in the Early Dialogues 
The Problem of Socratic Piety  
       While I have argued that the elenchos ultimately fails in the establishment or 
uncovering of the definitional knowledge, we find that such failures do not faze Socrates.  
Instead he remains steadfastly committed to the utilization of reason to accomplish the 
very goals that elude him.1  Yet, while Socrates’ unflinching faith in the rational process 
is not in question, it is also quite clear that Socrates was not averse to accepting help from 
more unconventional sources2, i.e., divine influence.  To the modern eye, this distributed 
reverence for both reason and the divine may seem problematic, as religion and reason 
are most often set in diametric opposition.3 For Socrates, however, religion and reason 
are not at odds, but rather emerge as two sides of the same coin, seamlessly working in 
tandem towards the acquisition of knowledge.4  And, looking to the early dialogues we 
are indeed presented with an array of evidence in support of this position: (1) Socrates’ 
                                                
 1 Vlastos (1991, 157) cites Cr. 45b. “Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man 
who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me to be the best when I reason 
about it.” 
 
 2 Interestingly, given the religious climate of the time in Athens, an appeal to the divine would be 
entirely conventional.  For an account of religion in Socratic Athens, see Vlastos (1991: 157-78), 
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 182-87), and McPherran (1996, 19-28).  Vlastos however, suggests that the 
religious views of Socrates are distinctly unconventional, as Vlastos argues that Socrates invents a new 
understanding of the divine, one of benevolent, omniscient gods as opposed to the more 
anthropomorphized fallible gods of the Homeric/Hesiodic tradition.  For a counter argument to Vlastos, see 
Wildberg (2002).  While Wildberg agrees with Vlastos that Socrates’ conception of the divine is distinct 
from the traditional view, such an understanding of the gods predates Socrates. 
 
 3 While the list of philosophers who express antagonistic views of faith and religion is perhaps too 
long to list, we find support for this hostile dichotomy from the religious perspective as well. For example, 
we might look to the works of Kierkegaard, notably in Fear and Trembling, wherein it is clearly expressed 
that reason stands in the way of faith.  Considering Kierkegaard’s position that it is through faith alone that 
one is able to experience freedom, such a hindrance is especially problematic. 
 
 4 On Vlastos view (1991, 157 n. 3), Socrates must understand religion and reason to be in “perfect 
harmony,” a point that has merit considering it was precisely in adherence to divine command that Socrates 
began to practice philosophy in the first place.  See Ap. 33c. 
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consistent reference and acquiescence to the instruction of his daimonion, referred to as a 
divine voice5 or sign,6 one which consistently warns him against performing actions that 
would be to his detriment, (2) his adherence to the commands of the gods received via the 
oracle, an obligation he equates with the duties of a soldier standing a post,7 and (3) his 
recognition of the divine gifts as exhibited in other individuals, specifically divinely 
inspired artists who seem to have access to the truth, despite being unable to provide an 
account for such abilities.8  
  Yet, despite this evidence, some scholars are quick to dismiss these more 
fantastical leanings of Socrates as instances of irony, i.e., tongue-in-cheek references to 
the supernatural designed to appeal to the irrational minds of the majority.9  
Interpretations in this line see Socrates as a staunch atheist, a hyper-rationalist entirely 
void of any religious feeling or belief.10 Martha Nussbaum, for one, argues that Socrates 
is so dismissive of religious belief, that his claim that the “unexamined life is not worth 
living” can be seen as a condemnation of religion in its entirety, for, as religious lives 
                                                
 5 Ap. 31d1-3 and Phdr. 242c2 
 
 6 Ap. 40b1; Eud. 272e2; Phdr. 242b9. 
 
 7 McPherran (1996, 209) See Ap. 33c4-8; 23b; 37e-38a 
 
 8 See Ion 534a, as well as Laws 719c. 
  
 9 Nussbaum (1985, 234) See also McPherran (2005: 14)  McPherran notes that even Aristotle fails 
to mention Socrates’ daimonion, not the sincerity he attributes to the prophetic nature of dreams.  He 
further notes that Rhetoric 1419a6-19 is evidence that Aristotle would have been aware of the daimonion. 
From Aristotle we read, “For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, 
asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went 
on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again 
said yes, Socrates rejoined, ‘Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without 
at the same time admitting that the gods exist?’” 
 




“lack a rational basis,” then such lives are not worth living.11 Further, in response to 
Socrates’ consistent appeal to his daimonion, a Socratic practice that would seem to 
undermine her anti-religious position, Nussbaum suggests that in these moments Socrates 
is not appealing to a god in the proper sense, but to reason itself, explaining that, “what is 
really happening is that reason itself is being made a new god…” and that any reference 
to the daimonion is but an, “…ironic way of alluding to the supreme authority of 
dissuasive reasoning and elenctic argument.”12   And, according to Nussbaum, this 
supplanting of the gods with reason is so obviously true, that Meletus or “any Athenian” 
would immediately recognize Socrates’ not-so-hidden agenda.  On Nussbaum’s 
interpretation then, Socrates is indeed guilty of the charge of impiety, for, in declaring 
reason as the divine, he would not only be denying the gods of Athens, but of all divine 
entities. 
 Alexander Nehamas, for his part, offers a different line of critique, arguing 
against Socrates’ acceptance of the perfection of divine wisdom.   For Nehamas, while 
Socrates does unquestionably listen to his daimonion, he exhibits uncertainty in other 
matters, specifically the message given to him via the oracle.13  For instance, while it is 
true that Socrates attributes his mission’s provenance to the god’s command, he does not 
accept the oracle’s message blindly, and instead proceeds to investigate the veracity of 
the oracle’s claim that he is the wisest of the Athenians.14 As Nehamas explains, “It is 
                                                
 11 Nussbaum (1985,234)  
 
 12 Nussbaum (1985, 234)  
 
 13 Nehamas (1987, 304-306) – Here Nehamas is directly critiquing Kraut (1981: 549) who claims 
the contrary, i.e., that Socrates exhibits absolute submission and obedience to the god. 
 
 14 Ap. 21c1 
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only after his many conversations with the politicians, the poets, and the artisans that 
Socrates came to see that the god might have been right to proclaim him wise on the 
grounds that he, at least, was aware of his ignorance.”15 Thus, Nehamas concludes, while 
we may be presented with the appearance of Socrates’ adherence to divine command, 
when carefully examined we discover that, despite appearances, Socrates only does what 
he has determined, through reason alone, to be right.   
 The result of the arguments above is that of a secularized Socrates.  However, 
while such a religion-less figure may be appealing for a contemporary worldview,16 one 
which quite often pits philosophy and religion at odds with one another, such an 
understanding of Socrates is not only anachronistic, but is also not supported by textual 
evidence, a point of contention which has not gone unnoticed in recent scholarship.17 
Stefan Buttner, for one, notes that when we look to the disciples of Plato, e.g., Philip of 
Opus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle, they “refer to Plato’s statements on enthusiasm without 
a suggestion that there is any doubt about their seriousness.”18  This consistent lack of 
dismissal regarding issues of inspiration by contemporaries of Plato ought encourage us 
to be cautious when asserting our contemporary views upon these classical works.  
                                                
 15 Nehamas (1987, 305) 
 
 16 McPherran (2005, n.7) McPherran notes that there have only been twelve records regarding the 
daimonion in the Philosopher’s Index from 1940-2004.  See also, Todd (2001) and Joyal (2000) 
 
 17 See Vlastos (1991, 158), as McPherran (1996, 6).   Upon examining the religious climate of 5th 
century Athens, one wherein religion is inextricably interwoven into every aspect of life, to suggest that 
Socrates would be so absolutely and obviously dismissive of this, despite his words and actions suggesting 
the contrary, is extremely problematic.  While a detailed account of the religion in 5th century Athens is 
beyond the scope of this paper, for a detailed account see McPherran (1996: 19-28, 144-160) as well as 
Dodds (1951). 
 
 18 Buttner (2005, 112) – Buttner supports his claim through the following evidence: (1) On Philip 
of Opus and Xenoncrates see Heinze (1892: 92-96), (2) For Aristotle see EE 8,2 as well as Maritou (1994, 
83-100) and Schirren (2005). (3). On Xenophon see Berry (1940, 42-48)  See also McPherran (2005,14) 
Xenophon Mem I 5-9, wherein we find Socrates depicted as sending his student enthusiastically to oracles. 
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Gregory Vlastos, as well, argues vehemently against those who would oppose the idea of 
a religious Socrates.  For Vlastos, given the extensive evidence in support of Socrates’ 
acceptance of the supernatural, to ignore these references to the religious affinities of 
Socrates would be akin to a, “surgery which kills the patient.”  In other words, the 
religious aspect of Socrates is so ubiquitously interwoven into Plato’s representation of 
the character as a whole, that to deny this is to deny the entirety of Plato’s testimony on 
the life of Socrates.19  On Valstos’ view, the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues 
“subscribes unquestioningly”20 to a belief in divine beings, entities with power and 
wisdom that far exceeds our own.21  In fact, it is precisely because of this unabashed 
belief that Socrates has dedicated himself to a life of philosophy at all.  We read in the 
Apology: 
To do this (philosophy) has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means 
of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever 
ordered a man to do anything.  This is true, gentleman, and can easily be 
established.22 
 
                                                
 19 Vlastos (1991, 158) also adds that such excision of the religious would also preclude our use of 
the testimony of Xenophon as well.   And, this point is well taken, especially when considering evidence 
such as is found at Mem. IV.8.1, wherein we find that Socrates’ daimonion not only warns Socrates what 
not to do, but further, providing positive information as well. Thus, we find in Xenophon a presentation of 
Socrates that lends even more credibility to the wisdom of the gods, let alone their involvement in Socrates’ 
life.  See also McPherran (1996, 8) and Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 177-179). 
 
 20 As Vlastos (1991, 158 n. 6) notes, never once in the Socratic dialogues (or the works of 
Xenophon, for that matter) does Socrates question the existence of the gods.    
 
 21 Indeed, the gap between human wisdom and divine wisdom is a point of consistent concern for 
Socrates, as, on Socrates view, only the gods are truly in possession of wisdom. (Ap. 23a5-6)  And, given 
Socrates belief that the wisdom is directly linked to virtue, if the gods possess true wisdom, then it follows 
that they must be truly virtuous.  See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 179).  Vlastos (1991, 164) argues that 
the assignment of infinite wisdom does not necessarily lend itself to virtue. As Vlastos explains, “It may 
only lead one to conclude that god transcends the difference between good and evil, and, with Aristotle 
(Nic. Eth. 1178b8), that to ascribe moral attributes to god is to demean him.”  Vlastos attributes Socrates’ 
association of wisdom with right action as a product of his singular focus upon practical knowledge, a 
narrow view that allows for such oversight on Socrates’ part.   
 
 22 Ap. 33c4-8   
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In this evidence, we thus find a direct link between philosophy and religion, as it is only 
because of the latter that Socrates claims to engage in the former.    
 Further, if we take these explicit moments of reverence for the divine as ironical, 
as Nussbaum insists we must, a more serious problem arises.  As Mcpherran rightly 
notes: 
…to reread them all as sly tongue-in-cheek verbal pandering or as simply 
allegorical in intent would be to employ a principle of interpretation that, once 
loosed upon the texts, would no know end, rendering every Socratic utterance 
fatally indeterminate.23 
 
Granted, the excision of the religious side of Socrates would result in a cleaner, easier to 
understand individual, one that fits squarely into the philosopher’s box.  Yet, Socrates is 
not clean24, nor simple, nor easily understood.    
  Thus, if we are to avoid the slippery slope McPherran warns us against, we must 
accept Socrates as he is presented, i.e., a man who values reasoned argument but also 
acknowledges the superiority of divine wisdom.  In the following then, I will argue in 
favor of this thesis, doing so through an analysis of Socratic theology and Plato’s account 
of divine inspiration throughout the early dialogues.  In doing so, I aim to prove that we 
must recognize Socrates as an individual who not only acknowledged the validity of 
divine revelation, but as one who utilized such dispensation, in concert with reason, as an 
effective, if not necessary, aspect of his philosophical inquiries.25  
 
                                                
 23 Mcpherran (1996, 7)   
 
 24 A point which can similarly be applied to his physical appearance as well.  We need only think 
of Symposium 215b, wherein Socrates is described as a resembling a Satyr, a mythical beast that is as far a 
cry from beauty as one could imagine.  See also Theaetetus 143e.   
 
 25 McPherran (1996, 9-10, and Ch. 4) 
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Socratic Theology  
Socrates as a Religious Skeptic 
 If Socrates is in fact guilty of the charge of atheism, then any reference made to 
matters of divine intervention are, at best, allusions to reason itself veiled in religious 
phrasing26, or, at worst, empty gestures, i.e., mere trickery used as a ploy to convince the 
ignorant masses.27  Thus, before we investigate the specifics of divine inspiration in the 
early dialogues, as my argument is contingent upon Socrates taking such divine 
intervention seriously, it is necessary to first prove that Socrates was in fact religious, or, 
at the very least, was not an atheist. 
 To begin, we recall the introductory remarks of this chapter, wherein it was noted 
that contemporary depictions of Socrates quite often hail him as a champion of reason, 
i.e., an individual who epitomizes the philosophical life, always seeking the truth even 
under pain of death.  Indeed, one could argue that Socrates applies this doubt to religion 
as well, as he often does not seem to fit the standard of the devoutly faithful Athenian 
citizen.28  We need only look to the Euthyphro, wherein he is depicted as a critic of the 
Homeric tradition.  For example, we find that, when responding to Euthyphro’s 
description of the gods as capable of violent and vengeful action, Socrates notes: 
                                                
 26 Nussbaum (1985, 234) 
 
 27 One might argue that we find evidence of this dishonest hand-waving in the Apology 26a-d, 
wherein we see Socrates manipulating Meletus to alter the charge of “not honoring the gods of the state” to 
atheism.  For Vlastos (1991, 166 n.41), Socrates orchestrates this manipulation of the charges to insulate 
himself from facing the original charge, of which, on Vlastos’ view, he is unequivocally guilty.  See also 
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 184) and McPherran (1996, 130-142). 
 
 28 Again, there existed a variety of religious sects and influences in Athens at the time, including, 
but not limited to the Homeric tradition, the practices of Eleusian cults, Orphism, and Pythagoreanism. See 
McPherran (1996, 26-27) And, while the existence of these varying traditions do complicate the matter of 
understanding the traditional religious practices/beliefs of 5th century Athens, for our purposes here, we 




Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I 
find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely the 
reason I shall be told I do wrong.29 
 
Yet, while this admission of uncertainty may appear as direct evidence that Socrates has 
issue with the traditional gods, held on its own this uncertainty does not require that we 
consider Socrates to be offering a critique of religion as a whole.  In fact, given Socrates 
singular interest in matters of ethics,30 such a critique would be beyond the scope of 
Socrates’ philosophical purview, a point Plato himself makes quite clear in the 
Phaedrus.31 In response to Phaedrus’ inquiry as to Socrates’ belief in the myth of Boreus, 
Socrates replies as follows: 
Actually it would not be out of place for me to reject it, as our intellectuals do.  I 
could tell a clever story: I could claim that a gust of the North Wind blew her over 
the rocks where she was playing with Pharmaceia…Now, Phaedrus, such 
explanations are amusing enough, but they are a job for a man I cannot envy at all.  
He’d have to be far too ingenious and work too hard—mainly because after that he 
will have to go on and give a rational account of the form of the Hippocentaurs, and 
then of the Chimera; and a whole flood of Gorgons and Pegasuses and other 
monsters…Anyone who does not believe in them, who wants to explain them away 
and make them plausible by means of some rough ingenuity, will need a great deal 
of time.32 
 
Now, to be sure, if we look only to this first half of Socrates’ response, one could 
interpret such a reply as Socrates mocking the myth as a whole, pointing out the 
                                                
 29 Euth. 6a4-6 
 
 30  See Aristotle, Metaph. 987b1-2 “But Socrates, occupying himself with ethical questions, and 
not at all with nature as a whole…”.   For an extensive argument in favor of (1) the necessary distinction 
between the Socrates of Plato’s early period and the Socrates of Plato’s middle period, and (2) that the 
Socrates of the early period is solely interested in matters of ethics, see Vlastos (1991, Ch. 2, 3, and 4). 
 
 31 See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 188-189) While I agree with Brickhouse and Smith that 
caution must be exercised when using middle and late dialogues to justify claims in the early dialogues, 
given the context of this passage, i.e., that it is direct relation to similar critiques made in the Euthyphro 
regarding his trouble accepting certain aspects of Homeric mythology, I believe such use to be appropriate 
here. 
 
 32 Phdr. 229c5-e4. 
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impossibility of providing a rational account of such inventive fantasy, thus once more 
seeming to belittle those that would believe such foolishness.  However, if we push 
forward to the conclusion of Socrates’ response, we find that it is difficult to maintain 
such an interpretation. Returning to the text, Socrates concludes: 
But I have no time for such things; and the reason my friend, is this.  I am still 
unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me 
ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that.  This is why I do 
not concern myself with them.  I accept what is generally believed, and, as I was 
saying, I look not into them but into my own self…33 
 
From this final passage, we can glean two important points: (1) That Socrates clearly 
admits to unquestionably accepting, at the very least, various aspects of mythology that 
are generally believed by the people of the polis, and (2) that he does not have time, 
inclination, nor ability, to properly critique them.  Thus, Socrates as depicted here is a far 
cry from the so-called “philosopher” that militantly mocks religion and its followers.  Far 
from holding such disdain, we are presented with a Socrates who consistently professes 
to have a strong belief in the gods, and, importantly, a belief that extends beyond the 
scope of his own reason. 
What Socrates Believed  
              Yet, even with this evidence of Socrates’ belief set before us, the question arises 
as to precisely what it is that Socrates believes regarding the gods.  In answer to this 
question, we find that, first, and perhaps most importantly, Socrates claims that the gods 
are unquestionably wise.34  And, given Socrates’ belief that there is a direct correlation 
between knowledge and right action, as the gods have perfect knowledge, it follows that 
                                                
 33 Phdr. 229e2-230a3.  Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 34 Ap. 23a4-b2.  See Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 179-181), Vlastos(1991, 162-166), and 
McPherran (1996, 133-144)    
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they are also perfectly moral.35 Thus, unlike the gods as depicted by Homer, gods who 
exhibit vengeful action upon those who fall out of their favor, the gods of Socrates can do 
no harm.36  Evidence for this is expressed quite clearly in the Republic, where we read: 
Now, a god is really good, isn’t he, and must be described as such?...And surely 
nothing good is harmful, is it?...And can what isn’t harmful do harm?...Or can what 
does no harm do anything bad?...And can what does nothing bad be the cause of 
anything bad?...Morever, the good is beneficial?...It is the cause of doing 
well?...The good isn’t the cause of all things, then but only good ones; it isn’t the 
cause of bad ones...  Therefore, since a god is good, he is not—as most people 
claim—the cause of everything that happen to human beings but of only a few 
things, for good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives.  He alone is 
responsible for the good things, but we must find some other cause for the bad 
ones, not a god.37 
 
Given this understanding of the divine, one which posits the gods as perfectly 
knowledgeable, and thus perfectly moral, it is perfectly logical that Socrates would hold 
the commands of the gods in such high esteem.  Had he not truly believed in the gods’ 
                                                
 35 On this point I agree with the argument given by Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 68-72). 
However, there admittedly exists healthy disagreement between scholars on how one should interpret 
Socrates’ belief in the unity of virtues. For a summary of these oppositional views, see Brickhouse and 
Smith (1994, 68 n. 52 and n. 52, as well as 179 n. 5 and n. 6).  Vlastos (1991, 163-164), for his part, while 
in agreement that the gods are omnibenevolent, argues that this is not a necessary result of omniscience.  
According to Vlastos, “To allow one’s gods infinitely potent intellect is not of itself to allow them 
flawlessly moral will.  It may lead one to conclude, with Heraclitus, that god transcends the difference 
between good and evil.”  Thus, on Vlastos’ view, the conclusion drawn by Socrates regarding the gods 
benevolence is the result of Socrates’ personal belief that the highest form of wisdom is not theoretical, but 
rather, practical.  Given this caveat, Socrates, and the fact that Socrates “could not have tolerated a double 
standard of morality, one for men, another for the gods,” Socrates concludes that Reason is consistent 
across the board for all beings, human and divine.   
 
 36 This follows logically from Socrates views on the harm of retribution as found in the Cr. 49b10-
c1. As is rightly noted by Brickhouse and Smith (1994), this logic provides insight into Socrates’ disbelief 
as expressed to Euthyphro regarding the depiction of the gods as constantly disagreeing with one another 
(Euth. 6a6-8).  If the gods truly have knowledge of the good, and this knowledge is shared by all gods, then 
it would not be possible for such disagreements to occur. 
 
 37 Rep. 379b1-c6.  Again, as the Republic is a middle dialogue, caution should be exercised when 
using passages such as these as evidence for interpreting the early dialogues.  For example, while the 
reasoning as laid out in the passage above will lead to the banishment of the poets, as their affinities for 
Homeric myth affirms the possibility of malicious divine action, the Socrates of the early dialogues never 
calls for such censorship (See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 181).  However, with this difference taken into 
consideration, I contend that, given the consistency between the early dialogues and the Republic regarding 
the perfection of divine wisdom, this evidence is acceptable. 
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perfection, let alone their existence, then why would he so unwaveringly heed the advice 
of his divine sign, a protective agent that never provides the reasons behind its suggestive 
force? Given the fact that Socrates faces the death penalty on account of his unending 
line of questioning everything, to suggest that he would blindly listen to the command of 
a god if he did not thoroughly believe in the superiority of that god’s wisdom, let alone 
it’s existence, is absurd.   
The Problem of Divine Creation  
 While the set of beliefs as given above would appear to save Socrates from the 
charge of atheism, the issue is not entirely resolved as a problem remains that still 
requires our address, namely, Nussbaum’s claim that all references to the divine should 
be taken as instances of Socratic irony.38 This suggestion39 by Nussbaum hinges on the 
premise that, as the religion of Athens at the time, and those that would follow it, would 
not be entirely rational, the fact that Socrates is positing a divine entity that is itself 
perfectly rational would amount to the creation of a “new god,” which, as Nussbaum 
makes clear, is not meant to be understood as a divine entity, but rather as an allusion to 
reason itself.  Under this interpretation, it would make sense for Socrates to always obey 
the dictates of his daimonion, as doing so would be to follow the dictates of reason, 
which only Socrates is able to recognize clearly.  Thus, if Nussbaum is correct in her 
                                                
 38 For a thorough overview of development of the concept of irony throughout ancient Greek 
culture and philosophy, see Vlastos (1991, 21- 44).  Vlastos concludes that we must distinguish between 
“simple” and “complex” irony, the former is when “what is said just isn’t what is meant,” whereas in the 
latter, “what is said both is and isn’t what is meant.” Vlastos uses Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge as an 
example of complex irony, for, while it is true that Socrates lacks knowledge of a certain kind, i.e, 
definitional knowledge on matters of moral principles, it is false that he is ignorant of all knowledge, as he 
is able to justifiably believe certain things, e.g., his name.  This distinction between types of knowledge is 
further developed in Vlastos (1991, Ch.4).  
 




reasoning, then despite the direct appeals made by Socrates to the divine, all such appeals 
were merely veiled references to reason itself.  Socrates would thus be an atheist, and all 
mention of the divine, even his appeal to the daimonion must be considered as instances 
of irony.40 As will be shown, however, this position is untenable once subjected to more 
rigorous analysis. 
 To begin my response against Nussbaum, it must first be noted that many scholars 
have offered similar, though not identical, accounts of Socrates’ and his “creation of new 
gods”.  For Vlastos, this issue regarding the creation of new gods is so pressing that 
Socrates himself is concerned about this specific charge levied against him, i.e., that he 
disbelieves in the gods of the state and creates new ones.41  And, to an extent, Socrates 
seems to accept as true the former of the two charges, for, as Vlastos suggests, when 
challenged by Meletus on the charge of impiety, Socrates cleverly manipulates his 
accuser to change his charge to atheism, doing so to avoid addressing the original charge 
of not honoring the city’s gods, for which he is surely guilty.42  Thus, on Vlastos’ view at 
least, the moral gods of Socrates discussed above seem to be completely at odds with the 
traditional gods of Homeric and Hesiodic mythology. 
 Yet, does this posited difference in kind between the gods of Homer and the 
Socratic gods provide reason enough to justify Nussbaum’s claim that, given these 
differences, Socrates must be alluding not to gods but to reason itself?  In other words, 
Nussbaum’s critique is based on the notion that the Socratic view of the gods is so 
                                                
 40 Nussbaum (1985, 235) 
 
 41 Euth. 2b – “They say I am a god-maker.  For disbelieving in the old gods and producing new 
ones.” 
 
 42 Vlastos (1991, 166 n.41) and McPherran (1996).  For an argument to the contrary see 
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 184-186). 
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radically distinct from the traditional gods, that to suggest that Socrates is referring to 
such gods is implausible.  The question thus arises: Are the moral gods of Socrates so 
radical as to be unrecognizable from the accepted gods of 5th century Athens? If it can be 
shown that Socrates’ views are not quite as radical as Nussbaum (and to a lesser extent, 
Vlastos) would suggest, then her claim that all Socratic reference to the divine are 
instances of irony begins to fall. 
 In answer to this question then we turn first to the work of Mark McPherran, who 
notes that it is important to first recognize that “religion” in 5th century Athens is 
distinctly different in kind than modern/contemporary religious practice and belief.43  The 
most important distinctions are as follows: (1) Greek religion did not have a standard 
text, e.g., the Bible.  (2) Greek religion did not have an organized church.  (3) There did 
not exist a standard set of religious practices that were strictly enforced by religious 
clergy.  Given the lack of these more regulatory aspects of religion, McPherran notes, it is 
not a belief in specific doctrine that qualifies one’s piety, but rather, “correct, timely 
observance of ancestral tradition by maintaining and participating in a host of 
activities.”44  Drawing from these distinctions, it is important to note the following two 
points: First, that while a belief in the existence of the gods was required, there was no 
universal standard in place regarding the essence or activity of those gods.  Second, that 
so long as one consistently followed the practices and traditions, coupled with a belief in 
                                                
 43 McPherran (1996, 19-28 and 142-144). See also, Dodd (1951) and Van Riel (2005, 31-33) 
  
 44 McPherran (1996, 21) While such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, the link 
between cult practices and Socrates’ conviction on the grounds of impiety has been argued for 
compellingly by McPherran (1996, 144-160) See also Van Riel (2005, 31) 
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the existence of the gods, they would, for all intents and purposes, be considered pious in 
the eyes of the state.   
 Given these conditions, that Socrates would openly criticize the gods as depicted 
in the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition would not have been as shocking as some scholars 
have claimed, as it would have been entirely common for beliefs regarding the gods to 
vary.45 Further, McPherran notes, there is little to no evidence that anyone was ever 
prosecuted for exhibiting skepticism regarding the veracity of Homer’s account of the 
gods.  Indeed, the “common” conception of religion had been subject to consistent 
criticism by the likes of Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Pindar, and Heraclitus.46  As the 
Homeric tradition and the gods depicted therein was not left wanting for criticism, it 
seems odd that the positing of perfectly moral gods would be so entirely radical as to 
warrant persecution.47 Indeed, had the moralization of the gods been as shockingly 
revolutionary as many scholars have claimed, would not we have found evidence in the 
text to support this view?   
 To answer this question we might look to the work of Brickhouse and Smith, 
specifically their reading of Plato’s Euthyphro.  On their reading, when confronted with 
Socrates’ uncertainty regarding the veracity of Homeric myth on account of the Homeric 
gods’ lacking perfect morality, Euthyphro is not only unfazed, but even concedes 
Socrates’ point, recognizing the difficulty such issues cause.48 And, while it is necessary 
to take Euthyphro’s reaction with a grain of salt given he too is a character created by 
                                                
 45 McPherran (1996, 142).  See also Dodd (1951, 142-144).   
 
 46 Lefkowitz (1989, 241-244) 
 
 47 Van Riel (2005, 32)  
 
 48 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 183)  See Euth. 6b5-c7. 
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Plato utilized to serve specific purposes within the context of that dialogue,49 if we turn 
our attention to the Apology, a dialogue focusing directly on the charges levied upon 
Socrates, nowhere do we find any attention given specifically to the issue of Socrates’ 
positing of perfectly moral gods.  Now, to be sure, Socrates is charged with failing to 
honor the gods of the city.  Yet, when directly asked by Socrates to clarify precisely what 
this means, Meletus explains that the charge of impiety is actually the result of Socrates’ 
alleged atheism.50  While some scholars have suggested that this revised charge was the 
result of clever manipulation on the part of Socrates,51 if it were the case that the original 
charges came to be as a result of Socrates’ creation of new, perfectly moral gods, then 
why would no one, Meletus, Anytus, Lycon, or even the jurors present, make any 
mention of this?52  Admittedly, this point does carry with it a great deal of speculation, 
however, if the moralization of the gods was so egregious as to warrant the charge of 
impiety, that it would never be mentioned at all, by the accusers or even Socrates himself, 
seems unlikely.   
 Despite the unlikeliness of such omissions going unnoticed at the actual trial, we 
must once more note that Plato, as author of the Apology, cannot escape his own biases.  
However, while the works of Plato may present problems of positive prejudice, surely 
                                                
 49 McPherran (1996, 142. n.169) – McPherran finds issue with Euthyphro’s non-reaction for two 
reasons: (1) Euthyphro is not only Plato’s creation (and thus carries Plato’s own bias, even if not 
explicitly), but the character of Euthyphro is there to play a part that would serve to push the argument 
regarding Piety in a specific direction.  (2) Euthyphro is also depicted as an atypical individual regarding 
piety.  As such, that he expresses no shock at Socrates unconventional views in not at all surprising. 
 
 50 Ap. 26c7 
 
 51 See n. 26. 
 
 52 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 186).  Brickhouse and Smith note the fact that disturbances and 
outcries were common occurrences at trials of this sort.  And, in fact, Socrates consistently must appeal to 
the jury to avoid such disruptions.  See Ap. 17d1, 20e4, 21a5, 27b1.  Also, see Bers (1985) for more on the 
nature of these disturbances.    
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those writers who manifested disdain for Socrates would not omit such damning details.  
And yet, when we look to the account of Aristophanes, perhaps the most famous of all of 
Socrates’ critics, we again find no mention of the problem of the moralization of the 
gods.53  Instead, Aristophanes’ caricature of Socrates in the Clouds presents him as an 
atheist, directly associating him with the so-called “natural-philosophers”.  Again, had the 
issue been the moralization of the gods, why would Aristophanes, an individual who was 
not only not apologetic, but critical of Socrates, fail to bring this to light?54 Thus, 
according to Brickhouse and Smith, this lack of attention to the moralization of the gods 
on the part of Socrates’ accusers and detractors, coupled with Socrates’ own consistent 
reference to his own beliefs on this point at his trial (which, again, go unchallenged or 
flagged by his accusers),55 provide evidence to suggest that such beliefs were of no real 
concern in the legal sense. 
 As a final point on the matter, many scholars have additionally argued that 
Socrates’ moralistic conception of the gods were not only not unique, but gaining in 
popularity.56  McPherran, drawing from the Phaedrus (229c), states that not only was it 
becoming quite commonplace to doubt the Homeric tradition, but further that there were, 
“…also affirmations of the justice and morality of the gods, gods with such appellations 
as ‘Zeus Meilichios,’ ‘Zeus Xenios,’ and ‘Delphic Apollo who cannot lie.’”57 This 
                                                
 53 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 183) 
 
 54 For an argument against these points McPherran (1996, 157 n. 218 and 219).   
 
 55 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 184)  Ap. 21b6-7 – The gods do not lie, and Ap. 23a5-6 – The 
gods are truly wise. 
 
 56 See McPherran (1996, 143), Wildberg (2002), and Van Riel (2006) 
 
 57 See also, Lefkowitz (1989, 244) 
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position is echoed by Gerd Van Riel, who argues that throughout the 5th century BCE, we 
find that the common conception of the gods had evolved away from the more conflict 
ridden gods of Homer, and towards gods possessing of upright character and virtue.58 
Finally, we might also look to the work of Christian Wildberg, who, through rigorous 
analysis, argues that the moralized conception of the gods is not, as Vlastos argues, born 
from Socrates alone, but rather, is present throughout the literature of 5th century Athens, 
most notably in the works of Sophocles.59  Following from this evidence, we find the fact 
that Socrates would grant the gods the attributes of perfect reason and morality is not 
altogether shocking, nor uncommon.  As a result, Nussbaum’s claim that such attribution 
of perfect reason would require that Socrates be referring to reason itself, as opposed to 
actual divine beings, is significantly weakened. 
 Yet, while the above argument does well to prove that the Socratic conception of 
the gods was not as revolutionary as has been suggested, it does not completely solve the 
original problem posed by Nussbaum.  Indeed, one might argue that simply because the 
rest of the population is willing to take seriously the positing of perfectly rational or 
moral gods, this acceptance by the populace does not necessarily guarantee that Socrates 
truly accepts this.  Thus, it is still not yet certain that we ought take Socrates seriously 
regarding his reference to the divine.  To accomplish this task, I will investigate both 
Socrates’ daimonion, as well as other forms of divination, Socrates understanding of 
poets, diviners, and oracle-givers.  Through this analysis, it will be made clear that not 
                                                
 58 Van Riel (2006, 32) 
 
 59 Wildberg (2002) – It should be noted that in his commentary on Wildberg’s article, David 
Kasdan argues quite convincingly against many of Wildberg’s points.  However, the intricacies of this 
debate exceed the scope of this paper. 
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only must we take Socrates’ reference to the divine sincerely, but further, that such divine 
inspiration plays a fundamental role in his quest for knowledge. 
Preliminary Remarks on Inspiration 
 To begin this defense regarding the sincerity with which Plato recognizes divine 
inspiration, it is necessary to first lay some basic groundwork.  As it is the task of this 
analysis to refute the claim that all references to divine inspiration need be taken as 
ironic, I will follow the lead of Stefan Buttner, who explains as follows: 
(The) essential criterion for taking a passage of Plato which refers to enthusiasm as 
being free of irony is that the passage is integral to a context of which one can 
assume that it represents authentic Platonic teaching.  It is then probable that the 
statement concerning enthusiasm is intended to be serious, above all when 
statements occur in more than one dialogue in comparable contexts.60 
 
As such, in what follows then, I will take care to make note of the context of each 
passage to ensure that the mention of divine inspiration is sincere.   
The Problem of the Oracle and Inspired Dreams   
 Before delving into the problem of Socrates’ daimonion, I want to begin with an 
account of other instances of divine inspiration removed from Socrates own internal 
divine sign.  While it may seem odd to put aside the more obvious example of inspiration 
for later review, we recall that Nussbaum’s suggestion that we need to take all instances 
of Socratic reference to the divine as ironic is directly linked to her assertion that such 
reference to the “divine” is in reality a winked reference to reason itself.  Under 
Nussbaum’s interpretation then, it would not be too far a stretch to suggest that the 
daimonion is not at all considered by Socrates to be an actual divine spirit, but rather 
nothing more than a veiled reference to reason, disguised as such to appeal to the 
                                                
 60 Buttner (2005, 113) 
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religious sentiment of the mob.61  To avoid this pitfall, I will start with Socrates’ 
recognition of instances of divine inspiration removed from the personal nature of the 
daimonion.  The purpose of this account will be to show that Socrates clearly 
distinguishes between reason and divine inspiration, a distinction that is deeply 
problematic for Nussbaum’s position.62  
 To begin, we first revisit the oft-cited passage from the Apology, where we find 
that, in response to questions regarding his need to philosophize, an endeavor for which 
he now faces the death sentence, Socrates explains: 
To do this (philosophize) has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means 
of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever 
ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentlemen, and can easily be 
established.63 
 
Looking to this passage, it is important to note two items: (1) Socrates is confident in the 
necessity of his philosophical mission on account of its provenance arising from the 
command of the god. (2) Socrates expresses confidence in the ability of oracles and 
dreams to delineate the truth. 
 Given Socrates consistent disavowal of knowledge, whether feigned or not, that 
Socrates would so brazenly assert his confidence in his duty to philosophize on account 
of the command by the god should strike the reader as a bit out of character.  Note, in his 
explanation to the judges, Socrates does not say that, despite his initial befuddlement by 
                                                
 61 That Socrates would do this is enigmatic, however, considering it is, on his understanding, in 
large part due his consistent reference to his own private divine sign that he is charged with impiety in the 
first place, a point which, evidence suggests, he would have recognized as potentially problematic for 
garnering sympathy from the jury.  See Euth. 3b5-9 and 5a7-8 and Ap. 31d1-2.  See also McPherran (1996, 
169-174) 
 
 62 I will here largely follow the overview as succinctly laid out by Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 
195-201). 
 
 63 Ap. 33c4-7 – Italics added for emphasis 
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the message received by the oracle, he has managed via his own rational process of 
elenchtic testing to determine that he has a duty to philosophize.  Rather, he asserts 
clearly that his duty to philosophize is in fact the truth, a point that he confidently asserts 
on account of its connection to divine command.64 Further, he is so absolutely assured of 
the moral justification for his actions, which, again, is due to their divine sanction, that he 
remains committed to that duty despite the threat of death.65   
 Yet, while the evidence from the Apology is of particular interest to my argument, 
the most compelling evidence regarding Socrates’ confidence in dreams and oracles as 
being capable of revealing the truth is not found in the Apology, but rather, the Phaedo.66   
At Phaedo 60d8-61b8, we read: 
…but I tried to find out the meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my conscience 
in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice.  The 
dreams were something like this: The same dream often came to me in the past, 
now in one shape, now in another, but saying the same thing: ‘Socrates, ‘ it said, 
‘practice and cultivate the arts.’  In the past I imagined that it was instructing and 
advising me to do what I am doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race, 
that the dream was thus bidding me to do the very thing I was doing, namely to 
practice the art of philosophy…But now, after my trial took place…I thought that 
in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not disobey 
it but compose poetry.  I thought it safer not to leave here until I satisfied my 
conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream.67 
 
From this passage we can glean a number of important points:  (1) We once again find 
Socrates taking seriously the messages to be decoded from dreams.  Indeed, in this 
                                                
 64 Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 195-196)  
 
 65 Ap. 28d6-29d5 – See McPherran (1996, 178) 
 
 66 McPherran (1996, 178) – Further, while not as convincing as the evidence gleaned from the 
Phaedo or Apology, we also find evidence at Crito 44a5-b4, wherein we find that, based upon a dream, 
Socrates is confident that the arrival of the ship from Delos would be delayed, an act not lacking in 
importance given its arrival would mark the final countdown to his own demise.   
 
 67 Phd. 60d8-61b8 
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example in particular, Socrates likens the message of his dreams to that of commands that 
one need obey.  (2) We find Socrates speaking with a sense of urgency regarding that 
obedience.  He explains that while he thought he was already doing the dream’s bidding 
by philosophizing, following the unfortunate events that have transpired in his trial and 
present circumstances, he is now uncertain he was correct in his interpretation.  As a 
result, as he believes the dreams may have been bidding him to perform a different art 
form, he has decided to write poetry as he awaits his death, a decision made, in part, to 
guarantee his safety.   What we find here is a level of consistency between this passage 
and those found in the Apology as to Socrates’ consistent adherence in his belief that we 
must stand in obedience to the gods. 
 And, it is this final point that I find most striking for two reasons: (1) It illustrates 
the seriousness with which Socrates recognizes the importance of obeying the gods, i.e., 
that even while facing death, he is writing poetry out of fear that he had misinterpreted 
the god’s original command.  This grave concern with properly following the god’s 
command is quite telling. 68  (2) Such an attempt to appease the god is one that is done 
contra Socrates’ originally conceived conclusions.  To explain, if one were to take up 
Nussbaum’s position, one could argue that when Socrates says that he has a duty to 
philosophize on account of the god’s command, he does not mean this literally, but rather 
that it is by his own understanding of reason itself that he recognizes the necessity of 
philosophizing.69  In other words, given the logical conclusions he has drawn through 
                                                
 68 As his change to poetry is done out of concern for his own safety (despite him already facing the 
death penalty), if Socrates did not believe in the gods, precisely what it is that he would fear is something 
of a mystery. 
 
 69 In this line of thinking in particular we find Nussbaum in agreement with the main critique as 
given by Nehamas (1987, 304-306) 
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rational processes and arguments, he has come to the irrevocable conclusion that he must 
philosophize.70    
 However, if this were true, and all mention of his divinely decreed duty to 
philosophize was merely a dressed up metaphor for following the dictates of reason itself, 
then how could one explain Socrates’ actions and frame of mind as depicted in the 
Phaedo?   In the passage above, we find Socrates admitting that he thought that he was 
doing as the god commanded.  In fact, over time he was able to provide, at the very least, 
a limited account as to why such philosophical questioning is necessary.  However, in the 
Phaedo, we find Socrates admitting that he now does not truly know what the god 
wanted, and so he is now lending his hand at poetry in a desperate attempt to appease the 
god should that have been his true command.   
 Note, Socrates admits no understanding aside from recognizing the obligation to 
comply with the will of the gods, whatever that may be.  The point here is not to suggest 
that Socrates understands the will of the divine, but rather, that he follows those 
commands even if devoid of understanding.71  Granted, more often than not, the 
revelations received from dreams and the oracle are subject to reflective rational 
assessment. And, further, given the perfect nature of the divine, that command will 
always, of course, be perfectly rational.   However, in this instance, Socrates professes to 
not have a full understanding of the god’s will.  Thus, that Socrates would attempt to 
follow the command of the god without such grounded understanding makes it difficult to 
assert that Socrates does not truly believe in the distinction between reason itself and 
                                                
 70 An understanding of philosophy that many philosophers today, no doubt, feel themselves. 
 
 71 Granted, A point that will be echoed in the following discussion on the daimonion. 
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those divine beings in possession of it.  What justification would Socrates have to act in 
this manner if not faith in the reason of the god? 
  Put simply, if Nussbaum is correct, and there is no actual deity external to 
Socrates that possesses perfect wisdom whose commands Socrates would obey on 
account of such perfection, then it would follow that Socrates would only act in 
accordance with reason as understood by himself.  In other words, if, as Nussbaum 
claims, Socrates recognizes that (1) wisdom, as opposed to ignorance, as the root from 
which all action should arise, and, (2) there exist(s) no perfectly moral god(s), then (3) 
when Socrates says that he acts in obedience to the will of the god, he is actually acting 
by the dictates of reason itself.  Thus, when he claims that he knows certain things to be 
true, e.g., that his mission to philosophize is obligatory, he knows these things through 
reason, i.e., he would understand them as true. 
 However, given his admitted lack of understanding in the Phaedo, this position 
becomes problematic.  To explain, we recall that Socrates is now writing poetry due to 
his own lack of understanding of the divine command.   Thus, under Nussbaum’s model, 
Socrates would be acting according to “reason” for reasons that he does not understand.  
If this is true, from where does the certainty arise?  What justification would Socrates 
have for these actions if he does not understand why he is doing them?  Would there not 
need to be a belief in some entity in possession of perfect understanding, and it is through 
a deferment to their judgment that Socrates derives his confidence?  It would seem to me 
then, given the evidence from the Phaedo seen in concert with those passages from the 
Apology, Nussbaum’s position that we must consider all references to the divine as 
ironically veiled references to reason itself cannot hold.  Thus, we find Socrates clearly 
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distinguishing between reason itself, and the sort of knowledge only accessible through 
divine dispensation.72 
The Problem of the Poets and Diviners  
 The need for this distinction between the sort of knowledge Socrates himself can 
claim to know, and the sort of truth he receives from divination is clearly illustrated in his 
account of others who themselves have experienced divine inspiration.   Looking first to 
the Apology once more, we read at 22b8-c4: 
Regarding the poets, I soon realized that it is not by wisdom that poets do what they 
do, but by some natural talent and by inspiration, like the diviners and oracle 
givers, who also say many fine things, but know nothing of what they say.73 
 
In reading this passage, it could be interpreted as a condemnation of those mentioned, 
belittling them through the exposure of their ignorance.74  Indeed, Gregory Vlastos, in 
favor of this interpretation, writes,  
For Socrates diviners, seers, oracle-givers, poets are all in the same boat.  All of 
them in his view are know-nothings, or rather worse: unaware of their sorry 
epistemic state, they set themselves up as repositories of wisdom emanating from a 
divine, all-wise source.  What they say may be true; but even when it is true, they 
are in no position to discern what there is in it that is true.  If their hearer were in a 
position to discern this, then he would have the knowledge denied to them; the 
knowledge would come from the application of his reason to what these people say 
without reason.75 
 
Note, Vlastos is correct that those who are divinely inspired would be unable to properly 
claim to be in possession of knowledge, as such a claim would require the individual 
                                                
 72 I do not here mean that through divine inspiration Socrates is able to claim actual knowledge, 
for insofar as it came through revelation, he would, as with the poets, lack an account.  
 
 73 Italics added for emphasis.  Note that Socrates distinguishes between “natural talent” and 
“inspiration”.  Such a distinction, one which sets inspiration against that which is natural, once again 
provides evidence to Socrates’ belief in supernatural influence. 
 
 74 Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 196) 
 
 75 Vlastos (1991, 170) 
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provide an account of that knowledge, which, as their insights were gifted to them by the 
gods, they simply cannot do.  So, in this sense, it is true that such individuals “know” 
nothing about that which they speak.  However, this lack of knowledge in the strict sense 
does not preclude the possibility of revealing the truth, as Vlastos himself seems to 
suggest.  In other words, there seems to be recognition on the part of Socrates of those 
individuals who are somehow able to glean and express the truth (even if incomplete), 
regarding beauty, love or even the divine itself, all the while failing to provide any 
rational account as to how they have come to “know” such things.   
 As evidence to this, let us look first to the Ion, where we read at 534b1-c7: 
For of course poets tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from 
glades and gardens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry 
honey, flying like bees. And what they say is true.  For a poet is an airy thing, 
winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and 
goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him.  As long as a human 
being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make 
poetry or sing prophecy.  Therefore, because it is not by mastery that they make 
poems or say many lovely things about their subjects, but by divine gift, each poet 
is able to compose beautifully only for that which the Muse has aroused in him.76 
 
To be sure, this passage once more reveals that the poets lack knowledge, a point that has 
led many scholars to condemn divine inspiration as the antithesis to the Socratic search 
for wisdom.  However, while I do not deny that Socrates, and by extension Plato, does 
find issue with those who claim to have knowledge when in fact they do not, a point 
which is clearly represented in the above passage from the Ion, what is of greater interest 
is that in this very same passage where Socrates denies the poets knowledge, he also 
admits that what they say is true.  In other words, that the poets can provide no rational 
account of what they are saying does not rob those expressions of the truth that they 
                                                
 76 Italics added for emphasis. 
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represent.  And, again, these insights into truth are derived directly from divine 
inspiration, a moment wherein the person’s intellect is “no longer in him.”  They are, in a 
sense, possessed by the gods, their body a mere conduit for the expression of the wisdom 
of the divine.77   
   And, this point, i.e., that divine inspiration is akin to momentarily losing one’s 
mind, is positively echoed in other dialogues as well, namely the Phaedrus 244a6-d5 
wherein we read: 
There’s no truth to that story that when a lover is available you should give your 
favors to a man who doesn’t love you instead, because he is in control of himself 
while the lover has lost his head.  That would have been fine to say if madness 
were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness, 
when it is given as a gift from the god. 
 
Here again we find Socrates praising the revelations brought about through divine 
revelation.  In fact, it is precisely because the person is mad, i.e., void of reason, that they 
are able to produce such truths78.  Given the limitations of human wisdom and the 
superiority of divine wisdom,79 that the divinely inspired, having been lost of their own 
reason in those moments of divine inspiration, are thusly able to reveal the truth is of no 
surprise to Socrates, nor should we suspect him of believing otherwise.80  Thus, again, 
when passages such as these are applied to Nussbaum’s suggestion that all references to 
                                                
 77 Gonzalez (2011, 96) 
 
 78 See Gonzales (2011, 105)) – Drawing from the Phaedrus and the Ion, Gonzalez argues that the 
“philosopher,” like the poet, is at his best when exposed to bouts of inspiration.  Yet, while the rhapsode 
remains mired in the ignorance about which they speak, the philosopher pushes forward, attempting to 
produce order from the truth they do not quite yet understand.  Thus, “Philosophy is a constant and 
irresolvable tension between reason and inspiration and thus between self-control and madness”  
 
 79 Ap. 20d2-e1 
  
 80 Plato maintains this position regarding the relation between madness and divine inspiration as 
late as the Laws 719c. 
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the divine are ironic, we find a problem of incompatibility, as it is precisely because the 
inspired individuals are “out of their mind” that they are able to access these deeper 
truths.  Again, I do concede that this does not grant them knowledge in the purely 
Platonic sense.  However, this is precisely the point.  Through these passages we clearly 
see an absolute distinction between inspiration and reason for Socrates: In the moment of 
inspiration, the individual is outside of oneself, and thus, not accessing truth through their 
own rational capacity.  They did not come to any realization on their own, nor can they 
provide an account of it after the fact.  Given this incompatibility, it is difficult to see 
how one could claim that they are, in Socrates’ mind, one and the same thing. 
The Problem of the Daimonion  
 With the stage now set before us, we turn our attention to the most infamous 
example of divine inspiration in the works of Plato, Socrates’s daimonion. We begin with 
some basic foundational points of reference.   We recall that Socrates’ daimonion is 
described as a divine voice81 or sign.82  We also learn that this divine sign has frequently 
appeared to Socrates since childhood,83 and has since then offered him consistent, though 
by no means regular, guidance in the form of apotreptic warnings.84  Never in the early 
dialogues do we find an instance where the daimonion has ceded to Socrates any kind of 
positive knowledge, nor the reasoning behind its admonishments regarding the course of 
                                                
 81 Ap. 31d1-3 and Phdr. 242c2 
 
 82 Ap. 40b1; Eud. 272e2; Phdr. 242b9. 
 
 83 Ap. 31d2-2 
 
 84 Ap. 31d3-4, Eu. 3b-c 
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action that Socrates should avoid.85 Further, these warnings always feature a predictive 
power that far exceeds the capacity of human reason.86  Finally, it appears as though 
Socrates has an absolute faith in the soundness of the warnings given by the daimonion, a 
point which could be drawn not only from his belief regarding the absolute wisdom of the 
gods as discussed above, but further, upon his own reflection regarding the outcomes and 
consequences that followed from his heeding of this advice.87  
 With this foundation in place, the next task before us is to establish that Socrates 
considers the daimonion to be of legitimate epistemological value.  As evidence for his 
claim, we look once more to the work of McPherran, who first turns his attention to the 
Apology 31c4-32a3, wherein we find Socrates discussing his reasoning for avoiding a 
career in politics.88  As Socrates explains, the reasoning for his daimonion’s opposition 
against Socrates engaging in politics, while unknown to Socrates at the time of it 
warning, is, through the use of basic reasoning, not only proven to be correct, but also 
quite obvious.  Given Socrates affinity for questioning, as well as his distaste for any 
instance of injustice large or small, it is quite clear that had Socrates engaged in public 
life, he most assuredly would have met an early demise at the hands of those he would 
speak against.89 Thus, McPherran notes, upon examination of the passage, Socrates does 
not merely accept the admonishment of his daimonion, but, following the instance of the 
                                                
 85 McPherran (2005, 16) Yet, while the daimonion fails to provide Socrates with the certain moral 
knowledge he seeks, he is, on McPherran’s view, advised on “nonexpert moral knowledge,” such as which 
students he would be ill-advised to take on.  See Tht. 150e1. 
 
 86 McPherran (2005, 17) See Ap. 31, Euthd. 272e-3a 
 
 87 See Vlastos (1991, 229-232) 
 
 88 McPherran (2005, 17) 
 
 89 Similar, of course, to the current circumstances of his trial! 
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warning, reflects back upon it, subjecting it to the elenchos to determine why an activity 
such as politics, one which was not only obligatory, but further, was a possible 
opportunity for Socrates to engage in the sort of just activity he sought, would be so 
adamantly, and consistently, rejected. Socrates is thus able to discover that the advice of 
his daimonion is, upon review, perfectly in line with reason, and not, as could be the case, 
randomly beneficial. Given this consistency between the advice of the daimonion and 
reason, we find a relationship between the two emerging, one which serves as further 
evidence towards Socrates on convictions regarding the divine.  
 As an additional piece of textual evidence, we look to Apology 40a3-c3.  Here, 
after having been issued a death sentence, Socrates argues sincerely that this outcome 
must be for the best, as his daimonion had not warned him during his preparation for his 
trial, nor during his actual defense that his strategy was against his best interest.90  Indeed, 
Socrates notes that the silence of his divine voice in this matter should be recognized as 
“great proof”91 that his actions are not only justified, but also morally virtuous.  Note that 
this example differs in that Socrates not only recognizes the warnings of the divine sign 
regarding potentially damaging action, but further, recognizes the silence of the 
daimonion as confirmation that his own reasoned decisions were in fact beneficial or 
virtuous.  What we glean from this is that the assurance that Socrates feels regarding the 
outcome of his trial (or any action for that matter) arises not from his own deliberation, 
but from the affirmation, whether by interjection or silence, of his daimonion.   
 Finally, McPherran provides additional evidence in support of this point by 
drawing from the Euthydemus 272e1-3a3.  We read: 
                                                
 90 McPherran (2005, 19) See also Brickhouse and Smith (1991, 191) 
 
 91 Ap. 40c1 
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As good luck would have it, I was sitting by myself in the undressing room just where 
you saw me and was already thinking of leaving.  But when I got up, my customary 
divine sign put in an appearance.  So I sat down again… 
 
It is important to note here that prior to the arrival of the divine sign, Socrates had, after a 
period of deliberation, decided to leave.  Then, with the arrival of the divine sign, this 
decision to leave was reversed.  Here again, it was not the case that after deciding to 
leave, Socrates realized that he should stay due to his own deliberative process and 
reconsideration.  His decision to stay was based solely on the presence of his divine sign, 
which, as explained above, never provides Socrates with the reasoning behind the 
warnings.  And yet, despite this lack of understanding the benefit that he would 
eventually incur from his staying, Socrates trusts in the daimonion.  Granted, Socrates 
does have reason to trust the daimonion, for (1) not only has it never led Socrates astray, 
but (2) when he reflects back upon those decisions, e.g., his avoidance of politics, he 
comes to the reasoned conclusion that he made the right decision.92  As such,Socrates is 
justified in making the inductive leap that he should always heed the warnings of his 
divine voice.  However, the point here is that, in the moment of the warning, Socrates is 
left wanting for the rationale behind the warnings issued.  Thus, if it is true that all 
references to the daimonion are merely references to reason itself, we are once again left 
with the bizarre circumstance wherein Socrates would be claiming that he, through 
reason, realized that he should avoid a particular action without understanding the 
reasons for doing so.  The alternative, much more plausible scenario, would be that 
Socrates does actually believe in the existence of perfectly wise gods, i.e., his daimonion, 
and it is this belief that allows him to act confidently in accordance with the warnings and 
messages issued therefrom. 
                                                
 92 McPherran (2005, 18) 
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3.4.2 – Objections and Replies 
 As has been discussed at length, the prominent critique levied against the 
legitimacy of divine inspiration as a source of epistemological value arises in the form of 
the reducing of all divine reference to more rationalized phenomena.  And, in the case of 
the daimonion, this critique once again comes to the fore.  Gregory Vlastos, who himself 
has argued extensively in favor of recognizing the legitimacy of religious belief and 
sentiment in the case of Socrates, surprisingly offers a view of the daimonion that seems 
to severely diminishes its role in the philosophical process of Socrates.93  Speaking on the 
nature of his encounters with his “divine sign” Vlastos explains: 
Socrates has a “hunch” – a strong intuitive impression – that a certain belief or 
action is correct without being able to articulate his grounds for it at the moment.94 
 
Drawing from the Theatetus, Euthydemus, and Phaedrus, Vlastos highlights three 
passages that he believes firmly support his position.95  Beginning with Tht. 151c, when 
asked how he is able to determine which students are worth his attention, Socrates 
responds, “…the daimonion which comes to me forbids it in the case of some, allows it in 
that of others, and they are the ones that make progress.”  Thus, Socrates, without fully 
understanding how, is able to properly choose which students to avoid and which to focus 
                                                
 93 For the full account of Vlastos’ critiques of the epistemological role of the daimonion see 
Vlastos (1991, 223-232 and 280-286).  For replies see McPherran (1991, 190-208) and Brickhouse and 
Smith (1991, 191-194) and (2005, 44-55). 
 
 94 Vlastos (1991, 283) – It should be noted that Vlastos does distinguish between two types of 
daemonic encounters, the first, as indicated above, and the second pertaining to those instances where he is 
able to immediately recognize the rationale behind the daimonion’s warning.  Instances of such encounters 
on Vlastos’ account include Ap. 31c-32a, wherein Socrates is told to avoid politics, as well as Ap. 40a-c, 
wherein the silence of the daimonion serves as an affirmation of Socrates’ actions. 
 
 95 I agree here with Brickhouse and Smith (2005, 44) that the selection of passages is odd on 
Vlastos’ part, considering he consistently warns against using passages from later or middle dialogues as 
evidence towards claims regarding the Socratic dialogues. See Vlastos (1991, Ch. 2 and 3) and Vlastos 
(1994, Ch. 1). 
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on.  And, Vlastos explains, these “hunches” are, for Socrates, “convincing enough to 
justify action.”   
 Vlastos also posits similar accounts for Socrates decision to stay in the palaestra 
in the Euthydemus 272e, as discussed above, as well as his decision to stay and atone for 
his first speech about love in the Phaedrus 242b-c, wherein Socrates explains: 
As I was about to cross the stream the customary divine sign came to me – it holds 
me back from doing what I am about to do on each occasion – and I seemed to hear 
a voice, forbidding me to leave the spot until I had made atonement for some 
offense to the god.96 
 
On this last point, Vlastos explains that while Socrates does recognize that he does have 
good reason to atone as indicated, at the time of the daimonion’s admonition, “those 
reasons had not yet been clearly articulated in his mind…(and) became articulate only in 
retrospect.”97   
 And, while this interpretation may not appear immediately problematic for my 
position, such an interpretation seems to belittle the power of the daimonion, as it seems 
to belittle its epistemological force.   As McPherran rightly warns, this interpretation 
“…has Socrates ‘accepting the supernatural’ in little more than name only.”98  Thus, to 
maintain my position that Socrates considers divine inspiration with the utmost sincerity, 
it must be demonstrated that the daimonion is not merely a “hunch,” nor simple moments 
of “rational intuition,” but rather is of such great epistemological significance that it is 
able to rightly challenge secular reasoning.   
                                                
 96 Interesting, too, that here Socrates not only heeds the warning of his daimonion, but also shows 
a recognition that he had offended the god, an act that, on his own view, required his repentance. 
 
 97 Vlastos (1991, 285) 
 
 98 McPherran (1996, 194)  Which is surprising on Vlastos’ part considering his argument against 
those that would seek to detach Socrates from sincere religious belief. 
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 For McPherran, we first find evidence against the reductionist account insofar as 
there exists not a single instance where Socrates ignores the warning of the daimonion.  
The reason such perfect consistency regarding the daimonion is so detrimental to the 
reductionist account is that we find Socrates not only doubting the assumed “knowledge” 
of all of his interlocutors, but further, his own beliefs, beliefs which he does not carry 
lightly.99  Indeed, that he takes these warnings as “certain” would indicate that Socrates 
holds this information in a significantly higher regard than he would any other source of 
knowledge.  The question thus arises as to how this could be justified if, as Vlastos and 
others have claimed, he considers these warnings as mere “hunches”?  
 In answer to this concern, McPherran suggests that this certainty on the part of 
Socrates is justifiable on Socrates’ part due to, “…(his) full confidence that the 
daimonion is always caused by a divinity that would never purposefully mislead him; i.e., 
it would never warn him away from an action that is not wrong, harmful, or 
unbeneficial.”100  And, this absolute confidence is evidenced by Socrates absolute 
consistency in heeding the command or warning of the daimonion.  Never once does 
Socrates ignore the call of his divine sign, nor does Socrates ever stop first to subject the 
warning to elenchtic testing before following its advice.  Instead, Socrates always 
assumes that the daimonion is correct, an uncharacteristic assumption that is made based 
upon his absolute belief in the perfect wisdom and morals of the god.101 Given Socrates’ 
                                                
 99 For instance, his own consistent disavowal of knowledge.  Also, Socrates doubts other forms of 
revelation as well, e.g., Phd. 60d8 , wherein he believed his mission in life was to philosophize, only to 
come to doubt his own interpretation.  This last example is of particular importance given it came to him 
initially through revelation.  Thus, we find that it is only the warning of the daimonion that Socrates accepts 
unquestioningly. 
 
 100 McPherran (1996, 199) McPherran cites Mem. 1.1.5; and Thg. 128d1 as evidence to this claim. 
 
 101 McPherran (1996, 200) 
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caution regarding certainty of knowledge, not to mention his proclivity towards 
questioning, had these warnings been recognized by Socrates as mere “hunches” one 
would expect Socrates to have, at the very least, approached the issue with a healthy dose 
of skepticism.   
 Yet, this is not the case.  McPherran notes that not only does Socrates not ever 
question the warnings of the daimonion, but further, Socrates never even questions 
whether or not such encounters are in fact with the divine.  It would seem then that 
Socrates belief that he is truly the recipient of divine knowledge is never in question, a 
point which again lends explanation to his lack of concern regarding the veracity of the 
content of that message.  Again, however, despite this certainty in the truth of the 
message, Socrates can still not claim knowledge, as he recognizes that the messages 
received are still subject to his own interpretation, which, given his fallibility as a mortal, 
would necessarily dilute the purity of the knowledge.  And, on McPherran’s view, it is 
because of this potential fallibility of interpretation that goads Socrates to subject the 
warnings to elenchtic testing, though again, always after he obeys the command.  Thus, it 
is not because Socrates doubts the certainty of the wisdom of the god, but rather he 
doubts his own interpretive skill, and as a result, investigates to the extent his rational 
powers allow to ensure as great a degree of certainty as is possible.102  
 Thus, McPherran suggests that we understand the daimonion as follows: 
(1) After some prior deliberation (or without), Socrates forms the intention to perform 
some action-token x (e.g., Leaving the marketplace) 
(2) Prior to or while engaged in x, Socrates receives a daemonic message similar to “No, 
don’t do x,” which he takes as certainly deriving from an all-wise authority. 
                                                
 102 In this way we gain insight as to how Socrates could appear to honestly disavow all knowledge, 
while, at the same time, appear to “know” things with such apparent certainty. 
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(3) From this, he infers that “doing x would be unbeneficial,” something he would claim 
to know.  But this claim, since it rests on Socrates’ experientially warranted 
presupposition that deamonic warnings and his interpretation of them is always 
accurate, is taken by hum to be only a practical, and thus fallible, certainty 
(4) It is more certain, nonetheless, then the results of practical ratiocination in the here and 
now because of its superior inductive warrant (e.g., Socrates’s recognition of the 
daimonion and the truth of its warning have apparently never gone awry in a lifetime 
of experience of it), a warrant that has convinced Socrates of its divine origin.103 
 
On McPherran’s view then, we see the daimonion not as a threat to the superiority of 
reason,104 but rather as an extra-rational source used in concert with reason.  In other 
words, that Socrates would follow the dictates of the daimonion are not to be seen as an 
irrational action, but as entirely rational because of his belief in the superior reason of the 
divine.  Yet, it must be noted, that inspiration and reason are complementary does not 
preclude the reality that they are quite often in conflict, for, considering the warnings are 
always apotreptic, it stands to reason that Socrates must have already planned on 
engaging in the very activity he is warned against.105  As McPherran notes, it is precisely 
in these moments of conflict that we bear witness to the degree of faith with which 
Socrates holds the wisdom of the daimonion, for, “in these instances his reasons for 
proceeding are deemed insufficiently compelling by Socrates simply on the basis of the 
daemonic opposition.106  
 Given his recognition, McPherran makes clear that it is simply incorrect to assert, 
as Nussbaum does, that when we witness Socrates reconsider a course of action, a 
decision which he attributes to the warning of the daimonion, that he is doing so as a 
                                                
 103 McPherran (1996, 200)  
 
 104 Vlastos (1991, 229) 
 
 105 Such as a life of politics, leaving the palaestra, etc. 
 
 106 McPherran (1996, 205) Italics added for emphasis. 
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“cover for conclusions rationally arrived at.”107  That Socrates would be engaging in this 
unnecessary level of deception108 is simply not compatible with the overwhelming textual 
evidence to the contrary, i.e., that not only are there consistent, sincere religious 
references on the part of Socrates, but further that these beliefs play a major role in his 
philosophical work.109  Also, we recall examples as seen in the Euthydemus, where, aside 
from the warning of the daimonion we are presented with no discernible cause for 
Socrates to expect any benefit whatsoever from staying, as the interlocutors with whom 
he would engage had not yet arrived.110  Indeed, in this instance, to suggest that his 
decision to stay was nothing more than rational intuition would be to suggest that the 
“rational” capacities of Socrates are nothing short of clairvoyant!111 Finally, McPherran 
concludes, in addition to the evidence above, we have numerous textual incidences 
wherein Socrates explicitly mentions experiencing a “rational hunch,” and, in these 
moments, makes no mention whatsoever of his daimonion.112 If, as Vlastos and 
Nussbaum suggest, the daimonion and rational intuition are one and the same, then why 
would Socrates distinguish them at all?   
                                                
 107 McPherran, (1996, n. 65) 
 
 108 Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 186) Brickhosue and Smith argue here that if Socrates did not 
honestly believe in the existence of the gods, then he would in effect be guilty of flagrantly lying to the jury 
at his trial, especially considering his guarantee that he would speak only the truth. See Ap. 18a5-6, 20d5-6, 
22b5-6, 28a6, 32a8).  Against the strength of this accusation, see McPherran (1996, n. 219) 
 
 109 See Ap. 27b3-28a1 and Ap. 33c4-7 
 
 110 Euthd. 272e-273a.   
 
 111 Brickhouse and Smith (2005, 47) We recall that it is only after he decides to stay that his 
interlocutors even arrive 
 




 Given this evidence, evidence that is not only consistent throughout the dialogues, 
but further, indicates that Socrates does distinguish clearly, through his own actions, 
between secular reasoning and divine wisdom, we must consider Socratic references to 
the daimonion as sincere.113  
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, I have argued that we cannot take Socratic references to religion 
and divine inspiration as ironic.  Further, I have argued that Socrates not only believes in 
the legitimacy of such instances of divination, but further, holds them in such high esteem 
as to recognize them as a viable source of truth, albeit a source that must, on account of 
the limitations of human understanding, be reviewed and subject to rigorous analysis to 
determine the proper interpretation.  I argue this on the following grounds: (1) Socrates’ 
belief in perfectly rational, and thus perfectly moral, gods is not, as some have 
maintained, so radical as to require that Socrates must be an atheist.  As was shown, such 
beliefs, while not traditional in a strict sense, were not entirely uncommon.  As such, we 
should dismiss his beliefs regarding the gods as veiled reference to reason itself. (2) 
                                                
 113 If we are to take the preceding arguments as true, i.e., that Plato sincerely believes Socrates to 
be divinely inspired, then the question might be raised as to why Plato himself was not the recipient of such 
divine assistance.  To explain, given the gods’ status as perfectly wise beings as depicted in the early 
dialogues, it cannot be the case that those individuals selected by the gods are done so at random.  As such, 
given Plato’s own philosophical ability and mission towards the understanding of the good life, that he 
should be lacking in the sort of divine assistance given to Socrates may strike us, and Plato for that matter, 
as odd.  As Plato is particularly silent regarding the question of why the gods choose one individual over 
another, any response to this question would be speculative by nature.  However, if we turn our attention to 
the Ion, we may actually uncover an answer.  Looking to Ion 533d-e, we read: 
It’s a divine power that moves you, as a Magnetic Stone moves iron rings.  This stone not only pulls 
those rings, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does – pull 
other rings.  
Here, while not an answer to the question of why the gods choose one individual over the other, we do find 
evidence to suggest that Plato may have considered himself to be divinely inspired, albeit indirectly.  As the 
above passage shows us, on Plato’s view, those that are inspired are themselves able to inspire others, just 
as a magnetized ring can move other rings.  Thus, as I have argued that Plato sincerely believes Socrates to 
be inspired directly by the gods, given Plato’s relationship to Socrates, it is not to far a stretch to suggest he 
considered himself to be inspired as such.   
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There is evidence to suggest that Socrates recognized revelation, whether via dreams or 
the oracle, as providing a legitimate path to the truth.  That this is true is evidenced not 
only in his own experiences, but further, by his own recognition that certain individuals, 
e.g., poets, diviners, etc., while lacking in actual knowledge, are able to speak the truth on 
those ideas given to them via moments of inspiration.  (3) His strict adherence to the 
daimonion, whose warnings he always obeys despite his lack of understanding at the 
moment of the event.  Again, it is true that Socrates can, and does, subject the 
admonishments of the daimonion after the fact to determine why such a warning was 
issued.  The point, however, is that such reflections are precisely that, reflections after the 
fact. As such, we find that the motivating force behind Socrates’ obedience to the advice 
of the daimonion is his recognition that it is, in fact, originating from a divine being, one 
which, based on his own beliefs, is in possession of divine wisdom.  And, it is this belief, 












Chapter 4: Socrates and Divine Inspiration in the Late Dialogues 
           
  It has been argued in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that, as Plato transitioned into 
his late period, the character of Socrates no longer consistently resides at center-stage of 
the dialogues. In dialogues such as the Sophist and Statesman, for example, we find in his 
place the Eleatic Stranger, an individual who utilizes a new methodology, i.e., collection 
and division, in his efforts towards the acquisition of definitional knowledge. Given the 
change in cast and methodology of the Sophist, Statesman, as well as the Laws359, it could 
be argued that Plato finally dismisses the more supernatural aspects of his earlier work, 
favoring instead the rigidly rational methodology prominently featured therein.  Yet, 
while both the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist and Statesman and the Athenian Stranger of 
the Laws, do not themselves directly appeal to the divine for assistance in their 
philosophical endeavors360, when we turn our attention to those dialogues of the late 
period where Socrates takes center stage, we are subject once more to a consistent appeal 
to the divine for assistance in his philosophical endeavor. 361  Given this disparity, the 
                                                
 359 Indeed, in the Laws, Socrates is absent entirely.  Also, while the method of collection and 
division is not used by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, it is, in contrast to the earlier, and even middle 
periods, similarly rigid and meticulous in its presentation, lacking any traces of the elenchtic questioning 
that drives those earlier dialogues. 
 
 360 While it will be argued below, it should be noted here that despite the Athenian Stranger’s lack 
of appeal to the divine for direct assistance in his own presentation of the laws, it is argued consistently 
throughout the laws that the gods and their supreme wisdom must serve as the foundation for the laws of 
men. 
 
 361 I fully acknowledge that much can be said regarding Socrates and divine inspiration in Plato’s 
middle period works.  However, as the focus of this dissertation rests upon the role of divine inspiration in 
the case of Socrates in the late dialogues, an analysis of the middle period will be postponed for a future 
date.  For an excellent overview and analysis of the role of religion and the divine in Plato’s middle period, 
see Morgan (1990).  See also Buttner (2011) and Gonzales (2011)  
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question arises as to Plato’s views on Socrates in this late period, in particular the role 
that divine inspiration plays in the case of Socrates. 
 To answer this question, however, requires that we address a problem that arises 
in Plato’s late period, i.e., the varying images of Socrates.  To explain, in the late 
dialogues, we are given multiple images of Socrates, all of which are, at least on the 
surface, distinctly different than the last.  In the Sophist, for example, we are presented 
with the image of Socrates as the “noble sophist,” i.e., the individual who, through the 
elenchus, is able to purge his interlocutors of their false beliefs.362  In the Theaetetus, on 
the other hand, a dialogue that serves as the dramatic predecessor to the Sophist, we are 
presented with a slightly different image, i.e., Socrates as midwife.  Here, Socrates is able 
to assist in the delivery of wisdom from within the mind of his interlocutor.  And, while 
this may seem similar to the “noble sophist” as described, given the more positive 
capacity exhibited by the expertise of mental midwifery, such an image of Socrates 
appears markedly different from the strictly purgative Socrates of the Sophist.  Finally, in 
the Philebus, we are yet again presented with a seemingly distinct Socrates, one who 
takes up the method of collection and division as his weapon of choice in the search for 
the definition of the good life.  As before, this new image of Socrates seems to be set 
apart from his fellow late period Socratic counterparts, most notably in his apparent 
acceptance of the superiority of the method of collection and division over his traditional 
elenchtic approach.   
                                                
 362 I have argued extensively in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that, while this is not explicitly stated 




 Yet, despite these seemingly disparate depictions of Socrates, I would argue that 
we ought to see these varying images as one and the same character, with each depiction 
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of his mentor as Plato has now come to see 
him.  And, while this position will be argued in full in the pages to follow, it is important 
to note here at the outset that, regardless of the differences in methodology utilized by the 
varying depictions, there arises a common thread that carries through these late period 
Socratic dialogues, i.e., Socrates’ unwavering appeal and adherence to his divine voice.  
Given this consistency despite all else, it is my position that Plato maintains his continued 
belief regarding the influence of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates. 
Divine Inspiration and Religion in the Late Dialogues 
The Diviner in the Statesman 
 Given the many changes that arise in Plato’s late period, before turning our 
attention to Socrates in particular, it is necessary to first establish that Plato’s recognition 
of the validity of divine inspiration is not limited to a nostalgic portrait of his mentor.  To 
do so, we look first to two dialogues of Plato’s late period that do not feature Socrates as 
its protagonist, the Statesman and the Laws. 
 Beginning with the Statesman, we find that, in his attempt to determine the 
precise nature of kingship, the Eleatic stranger notes that a division must be made 
between two types of expertise regarding the giving of commands: (1) the skill exhibited 
by individuals who give commands of their own design, and (2) those whose expertise 
pertains to the distribution of the commands of others.363 While the true ruler is of course 
to be associated with the former category, we find that the latter category involves a 
                                                
 363 Pol. 260c1-261a.   
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variety of individuals, namely, “…the rowers, the seer, the herald, and many other sorts 
of expertise related to these…”364 That Plato considers the diviner (or seer) to be in 
possession of an expertise is of particular importance here, as it shows a consistency of 
thought that is carried over from the earlier dialogues.365 For one, in the Ion, Socrates 
clearly states that the diviners are in possession of an expertise.366 Further, in the Laches, 
we find that the diviner is given a position of importance on the staff of the general, a 
point which indicates that the general ought utilize the talents of the diviner in matters of 
military strategy.367  
 What, then, is the expertise of the diviner as seen in the Statesman? As argued by 
Brickhouse and Smith, the answer might be derived through an examination of another 
expertise listed in this division, i.e., the herald.368  To explain, it is the herald’s role to 
properly relay the commands of the ruler to those that ought here these commands.  Note, 
the herald need not know why the ruler issued such commands, nor need the herald 
understand the details or consequences of those commands.  The expertise of the herald 
lies not in possessing an understanding of the commands, but rather, possessing the skills 
required to properly deliver the commands of others.369  
                                                
 364 Pol. 260e1-3. Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 365 This connection, and the evidence that follows, has been given by Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 
196-97. 
 
 366 Ion 538d7-e3 
 
 367 Laches 198e-199a4  As an additional note, in the Charmides 173c5-6, Socrates distinguishes 
between true diviners and false prophets.  That this distinction is made is evidence to the sincerity of his 
belief in the divine and veracity of messages derived therefrom.   
 
 368 Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 197) 
 
 369 And, while this may seem somewhat simple, it is indeed a skill, as we can easily imagine 
someone ill-equipped to this task, whether that be due to lack of memory, or even a lack of confidence 
when challenged on the exact wording of the command issued. 
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  It is in this way then that we ought understand the expertise of the diviner, an 
individual who not only possesses the ability to properly receive the commands of the 
gods, but further, is able to correctly deliver this message.  Again, similar to the herald, it 
is not necessary that the diviner understand the gods’ motives, or even the precise 
meaning of the message revealed.  As such, the diviner, unable to give an account of the 
divine wisdom he has received, is not himself in possession of knowledge.  Yet, despite 
this lack of knowledge, it is clear from the evidence that the true diviner is not one 
associated with sophistry or charlatanism, but as someone who, by the Stranger’s 
admission, possesses an expertise that plays a role of importance in the governing of the 
polis.370  
The Divine and the Statesman in the Statesman 
 Looking deeper into the Statesman, we find that the role of the divine is not 
limited to the diviner, but further, is of significant importance to the true ruler as well.371  
As the stranger explains, in order to establish stability, the rulers must possess the ability 
to reconcile seemingly incompatible individuals under their rule.372  As an example, the 
Stranger notes that, if not properly handled, a conflict will inevitably arise between those 
individuals who are more inclined towards the virtue of courage and those who favor a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 370 As Brickhouse and Smith note, this seems to be precisely the point made by Socrates at 
Apology 22b8-c2, where, Socrates explains that poets, like diviners, are able to create as they do not due to 
wisdom, but on account of inspiration.  And, given my argument regarding the role that divine inspiration 
plays in the case of Socrates, this oft quoted passage from the Apology is perhaps more prescient than 
coincidental, as we might see this same ability in the nature of Socrates’ craft, i.e., his ability to properly 
guide his interlocutors towards the truth, all the while sincerely denying a personal understanding of the 
truth towards which he is pointed.  
 
 371 In this argument I follow closely that of Buttner (2011, 119-120) 
 
 372 Pol. 308d-309c 
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more moderate approach.  While both courage and moderation are virtues to be praised, 
given the disparity between the two, the course of favored action between individuals 
occupying the opposing worldviews will quite often be in conflict.  Thus, to avoid this 
potential confrontation, the ruler must possess the ability to “interweave” the two 
together to create a harmony that is conducive to each individual, as well as the society at 
large.   
 In response to the question posed in the dialogue by Young Socrates as to how the 
ruler is able to peacefully mix these two dichotomous individuals together, the Stranger 
explains that the ruler has two options: (1) through creating a mortal bond between the 
two, i.e., by uniting them through marriage,373 and (2) by “fitting together that part of 
their soul that is eternal with a divine bond.”374  To elaborate on precisely what is meant 
by the forging of a “divine bond,” the stranger explains as follows: 
I call divine, when it comes to be in souls, that opinion about what is fine and good, 
and the opposite of these, which is really true and guaranteed; it belongs to the 
class of the more human…Then we do recognize that it belongs to the statesman 
and the good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this thing about, by means 
of the music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those that had their correct share 
of education.375 
 
Thus, the statesman possesses the ability to instill within his citizens the correct opinions 
on matters of the Good, Beauty, Justice, etc., which, in turn, will prevent them from 
veering off into the extreme form of whatever virtue they may naturally favor.  So, for 
instance, lacking in such guidance, the courageous individual will, through unchecked 
                                                
 373 Pol 310b2-4 
 
 374 Pol. 309c1-2 
 
 375 Pol. 309c4-d5 
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aggression, eventually become more of a beast than a man.376 As such, it is the 
responsibility of the true statesman to introduce the courageous individual to ideas that 
properly highlight the benefit of a more moderate approach in certain instances, to 
educate him in such a way as to instill a balance in his soul.377 It is important to note, 
however, that the Statesman is not claimed to possess the knowledge of these things, but 
rather, merely the correct opinions. Thus, we once more are provided the image of the 
divinely inspired individual who, while lacking knowledge of their own, is in possession 
of correct opinions, i.e., they have access to truth.378 Further, given the sincerity of this 
description, not to mention the pivotal role this divinely gifted skill of interweaving plays 
for the stranger in the final definition of the true statesman, that Plato would ironically 
attribute this ability to divine provenance seems distinctly improbable.379  
The Role of Religion in the Laws 
 In addition to the evidence found in the Statesman, if we look to the Laws, Plato’s 
final, and perhaps most practical text, we find additional evidence in support of the claim 
that matters of religion, including instances of divine inspiration, are seriously considered 
by Plato even removed from reference to Socrates.  To begin, we look to Book X, 
                                                
 376 Pol. 309e1-4 
 
 377 While there are indeed differences between the Republic and the Laws, I would contend that 
the two texts are, in fact, surprisingly similar, a point which can be seen here in the stated importance that 
the soul, and the balancing thereof, plays in the establishment of justice in the polis.  For more on the 
similarities between the Laws and Republic, see Larkin (2015). 
 
 378 See Buttner (2011, 120).  Buttner adds that such an image of the true statesman, i.e., one that, 
through a connection to the divine is in possession of correct opinions, and, as such, is able to properly 
guide his subjects in matters of ethics and morality, is consistent with earlier depictions of the divine ruler, 
most notably in the Meno 98e7-99d.   
 
 379 Buttner (2011, 120) 
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wherein we find the Athenian Stranger380, in an effort to stave off the dangers of atheism, 
providing an elaborate proof designed to prove that (1) the gods exist, (2) that the gods 
are concerned with the human race, and (3) that they are not easily swayed by offerings 
or sacrifices.  And, while a detailed analysis of this proof is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, what is important is the underlying message we might gather from the Stranger’s 
efforts, i.e., that the gods do exist, and that, their supreme wisdom and control over the 
universe should serve as the basis from which the laws of men be established.381 And, 
while some scholars have argued that the Athenian Stranger’s consistent reference to the 
gods should not be taken literally,382 I would contest that such argumentation is once 
                                                
 380 It has been suggested by some scholars (such as Strauss (1975, 2) and Pangle (1988, 511) that 
the Athenian Stranger represents Socrates.  In support of this position, Aristotle’s Politics 1265a is often 
referenced, as, transitioning from his analysis of the Republic to the Laws Aristotle writes, “Now it is true 
that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it 
is no doubt difficult to be right about everything.”   However, while this passage might be seen as Aristotle 
identifying Socrates as the Athenian Stranger, we find that Aristotle never explicitly states this connection.  
Further, later on in this same passage, Aristotle refers to the author of the Laws as “the writer,” whereas in 
his description of the Republic the preceding passage, Aristotle consistently identifies Socrates by name.  
Additionally, given Plato’s willingness to use Socrates in other late dialogues, it would seem odd that he 
would, in his final work, feel the need to hide Socrates behind a curtain of anonymity.  In support of this 
position, see also Cherry (2013, 50-51).  On Cherry’s view, “What (Aristotle) finds most praiseworthy 
about the Socratic dialogues – their searching, or zetetic character – seems to be wholly absent from the 
Laws.” 
 
 381 Laws 903bb-905d, 907a, 967b.  See also Bobonich (2002) 93-96.  See also Buttner (2011).  
Buttner calls attention to Laws 811c, wherein, in defense of the legitimization of the constitution thus far 
constructed, the Stranger notes that their discussion has “not been conducted without a certain breath of the 
gods.”  As Buttner argues, considering the context here, it seems unlikely that we are to take this claim 
ironically.  See also 691e and 696b. 
 
 382 Strauss (1975, 3-7) and Stalley, (1983, 24-5), both argue that the Stranger’s positing of the 
divine as the basis from which we ought establish the laws of men is nothing more than a veiled reference 
to the authority of reason itself.  Welton (1995, 58-60), posits a similar, though softer claim.  On Welton’s 
view, the Stranger’s reference to the divine is one of utility, i.e., Plato, understanding the climate of his day, 
uses an appeal to the divine to supply an authority to the laws that would resonate with the citizens of the 
polis.  However, while it may be the case that references to the particular activities of specific divinities 
(e.g., that Dionysus gifted wine to men 672a5, or that the gods literally play and dance with humans, 
653d4, 654d1) may be taken with a grain of salt, it has already been argued in chapter 4 of this dissertation 
that a lack of belief in the official gods of mythology does not preclude the possibility that Plato truly 
believed in the divine.  Indeed, there is evidence throughout the dialogues that we ought not take the 




more guilty of anachronistic reasoning, i.e., forcing a hyper-rationalist worldview upon 
Plato and the characters of his dialogues.383 
  As evidence to this claim, we find that, on the Stranger’s recommendation, those 
who dishonor the gods, whether that offense arise as atheism, theft from a temple, or 
even the practicing of improper rituals, should be subjected to capital punishment.  Thus, 
following the resolution of the proof for the existence of the gods, the Stranger lays out 
the details for the punishments to be levied against such individuals.  Beginning with 
atheism, we find that these non-believers are subject to the harshest of punishments, as 
such an individual, “…deserves to die for his sins not once or twice, but many 
times…”384 And, this condemnation for atheism should not be taken lightly, for, while 
there are other offenses Plato believes deserving of capital punishment aside from those 
pertaining to impiety, e.g., premeditated murder (871d), wounding a family member with 
the intention of murder (877b7-9), and waging a private war without the backing of the 
state (955c), that the punishment for atheism should be more severe than the punishment 
for violent charges is quite telling.385  Yet, perhaps this crime is quite fitting within the 
context of the Laws, as it would seem that, given Plato’s belief in the supreme wisdom in 
the gods, a supreme wisdom that must be the basis for the foundation of the laws of 
                                                
 383 See Cherry, K (2013, 55-57) Cherry argues that Aristotle, Plato’s contemporary and student, 
takes the role of the divine in Plato’s Laws quite seriously.  On Cherry’s view, while not explicitly stated by 
Aristotle in his direct critique of the Laws, when we look to other works, specifically the Nicomachean 
Ethics and De Anima, we find evidence that would suggest Aristotle would consider any government 
established upon a presumed knowledge of the divine would be particularly dangerous. 
 
 384Laws 908e2-3.   
 
 385 While it is obvious that one cannot be put to death more than once, that the atheist is deserving 
of multiple deaths, whereas the individual convicted of pre-meditated murder need only be put to death 
once, is particularly interesting. 
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society, insofar as the atheist denies the existence of the divine, and thus, the supreme 
wisdom contained therein, he arises as a threat to the stability of society itself.386   
 As an additional example regarding the seriousness with which religion and piety 
is treated in the Laws, we turn our attention to the punishment reserved for temple 
robbers.  Looking to the text, we note first that, if an individual is caught robbing from a 
temple, and this individual is a foreigner or a slave, that individual will be branded on his 
face and hands, and will be whipped and exiled from the city.  However, as the Stranger 
explains: 
“If a citizen is ever shown to be responsible for such a crime – to have perpetrated, 
that is, some great and unspeakable offense against the gods or his parents or the 
state, the penalty is death.387 
 
The reasoning behind the increased severity for the citizen is that, unlike the foreigner or 
slave, the citizen has been afforded an education, one which, on Plato’s view, would have 
provided that individual with the required insight to steer him away from such offenses.  
Thus, given his transgressions despite this education, the offender should be considered 
incurable, and as such, put to death.  And, while the death penalty is quite often reserved 
for those individuals who are deemed incurable after being subject to rehabilitation,388 in 
the case of the temple robber, they are given no such chance of redemption.   
                                                
 386 Laws 908d   The Stranger notes that such individuals are often incredibly cunning, and, through 
the use of beguilement, will persuade other citizens into similarly atheistic worldview.  Again, given the 
laws in the Laws are given weight via the authority of divine ordering of the cosmos (upon which they are 
modeled), a lack of belief in the gods could result, on the Stranger’s view, in anarchy. 
 
 387 Laws 854e3-6 Italics added for emphasis. 
 
 388 E.g., the individual who, despite consistent warning, continues to maintain a private shrine in 
their house. (910c-d).  Another interesting example arises in the atheist whose lack of belief was the result 
of foolishness, as opposed to the “complete atheist” who uses cunning and guile to disrupt the belief of 
others.  This foolish individual is first sent to the reform center for rehabilitation.  However, if, following 
their rehabilitation, this individual is once again convicted on a similar charge, he is now subject to the 
death penalty. (908e6-909a7) Note, that both examples pertain to impiety. 
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 The severity of this punishment is made particularly clear when it is compared to 
that reserved for thieves in general.  Looking once more to the text, we read at 8578a1-
b4:  
Again, a single law and legal penalty should apply to every thief, no matter what 
his theft is, great or small:  
(a) He must pay twice the value of the stolen article, if he loses the day, and has 
sufficient surplus property over and above his farm with which to make 
repayment. 
(b) If he has not, he must be kept in prison until he pays up or persuades the man 
who had him convicted to let him off. 
(c) If a man is convicted of stealing from public sources, he shall be released from 
prison when he has either convinced the state to let him off or paid back twice 
the amount involved. 
 
The punishment thus prescribed manifests two points of interest: (1) the fact that the 
common thief is not only spared the death penalty, but is further afforded the chance 
to atone for his transgressions, and (2) the Stranger’s initial insistence that there need 
be a single law for every thief.  Beginning with the former, the difference in the 
severity of punishment between the temple robber and all other thieves once again 
makes clear the importance that religion and piety play for Plato here in the Laws.  
While the common thief is given the opportunity to pay for his transgressions through 
monetary means or imprisonment, those foolish enough to rob from temples commit a 
crime so heinous in the eyes of the Stranger that they are sentenced to death with no 
chance of rehabilitation or atonement.  
 The key to understanding why these punishments are so disparate despite the 
supposed similarity in the crimes committed is perhaps found in the latter point of 
interest listed above, i.e., the Stranger’s insistence that there be a single penalty for 
every thief.  To explain, it would seem to be the case that the temple robber, insofar as 
he is guilty of stealing, should be included in the category of “thief” as indicated by 
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the stranger in the above passage.  However, given the disparity in punishment handed 
down to the temple robber in comparison to all other thieves, I would contest that such 
a crime is not one to be associated with common thievery at all.  Indeed, given the 
severity of the punishment, it would seem that theft from the temple is not to be 
categorized as thievery simpliciter, but rather as, first and foremost, an offense against 
the gods, which, similar to the transgressions of the atheist, is an offense punishable 
by death.   
 Given these examples, we find evidence to support the claim that Plato 
considers crimes against the gods in particular to be of such danger to the community 
that any individual convicted of such acts should be put to death.  Yet, it is not simply 
atheism nor those who rob from temples that merit such a punishment,389 but also 
those individuals who merely conduct private sacrificial rituals.390 And, it is this last 
example that I believe truly shows the sincerity of Plato’s religious convictions, for, 
while the atheist might be construed as an individual who, owing to his lack of belief 
in the authority of the gods wisdom, seeks to undermine the laws of the polis, it is 
much more difficult to understand why private sacrifices to the gods would warrant a 
punishment so harsh as death if the Plato’s reverence for the divine391 was not sincere.  
As such, it is difficult to support the claim that we ought not take the Stranger, or 
Plato, at his word regarding matters of the divine in the Laws. 
 
                                                
 389 Though, it is of note that the atheist deserves to be put to death, “not just once or twice, but 
many times.” (908e) 
 
 390 Laws 909d5-910d1 
 
 391 As spoken through the Stranger. 
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Divine Inspiration in the Laws 
 In addition to the role of religion as discussed above, we also find instances 
within the Laws wherein the Stranger specifically refers to divine inspiration.  The 
distinction to be made between such instances of divine inspiration and the role of 
religion is that, whereas the established laws are to be modeled after the divine 
ordering of the cosmos to the extent that is humanly possible, the Stranger also 
comments upon individual instances of divine inspiration, wherein the individual is, 
similar to the diviner as described in the Statesman and earlier dialogues, the direct 
recipient of wisdom from the gods.  And, given these moments of revelation, by the 
Stranger’s own admission, often do lead to truth, that these instances are mentioned is 
of particular importance for our purposes here. 
 To begin, we look to 682a, where we read: 
He (Homer) composed these lines…under some sort of inspiration from God.  And 
how true to life they are!  This is because poets, as a class are divinely gifted and 
are inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they 
frequently hit on how things really happen. 
 
Here we find direct testimony regarding the ability to those divinely inspired to gain 
access to truth.  Note, however, the Stranger is not claiming that such moments of divine 
revelation result in the acquisition of knowledge, a point which is once more strikingly 
consistent with comments regarding divine inspiration as seen in the earlier dialogues, 
most notably the Apology.392 Yet, while the divinely inspired may lack knowledge insofar 
as he cannot provide an account for that which is gifted to him, he nevertheless stumbles 
                                                
 392 Ap. 22c1-3 
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upon the truth, an occurrence that occurs with such consistency that it cannot be reduced 
to mere coincidence or luck.  
 Interestingly, that Plato takes such moments of actual inspiration seriously is 
made clear in another passage found later in the Laws, one that serves as a warning of the 
potential dangers that arise from adhering to the revelations as given by the gods.  We 
read at 719c: 
When a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the muse, he cannot control his 
thoughts. He is like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked.  
His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting 
characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he does not know which of 
the opposing speeches contains the truth.  But for the legislator this is impossible, 
he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject. 
 
From this passage we might glean a number of important points.  First, while the passage 
does indicate that the inspired poet cannot determine which of his gifted revelations 
contains the truth, we do find the Stranger indirectly noting that the truth is revealed.  The 
problem, then, is not the source of the revelation, nor the potential veracity of such 
revelation, but rather the inspired individual’s lack of understanding.  In other words, we 
are once again given evidence that Plato, through the Stranger, recognizes that the truth 
can be, and is, revealed through moments of divine inspiration.  Second, it is admittedly 
true that this passage is presented with an admonitory tone, warning us that the legislator 
cannot rely on divine inspiration in matters of law, as the contradictory accounts that so 
often accompany revelation would be detrimental to the consistency required for a stable 
constitution.  However, while this warning clearly indicates a hesitancy to rely upon 
divinely inspired revelation for matters of law, it does not condemn such revelation as 
chicanery, but rather, once more indicates a sincere belief in its legitimacy, albeit one that 
should be approached with caution.  
 162 
Images of Socrates in the Late Dialogues    
 With the evidence from the Statesman and the Laws now established, we can 
proceed on to our analysis of Socrates and the role of divine inspiration in Plato’s late 
dialogues.  As noted above, while he is often silent, or even absent, from many of the 
later dialogues, he is very much present in others, most notably in he Theaetetus, a 
dialogue which dramatically precedes the Sophist and Statesman, and in the Philebus, an 
oddly “Socratic” dialogue wherein Socrates, though similar in many ways to the Socrates 
of the early period393, substitutes the elenchos for the new method of division.  In 
addition to these two obvious examples, I would add a third, i.e., the image of Socrates as 
indirectly presented via the 6th definition of sophistry as found in the Sophist.  And, while 
these three presentations of Socrates may, at first glance, strike us as three distinct 
representations of Socrates, I would argue that, when viewed through the lens of divine 
inspiration, these somewhat disparate images of Socrates are revealed as one and the 
same, each image providing a deeper insight into Plato’s late understanding of his 
mentor, and the role that divine inspiration plays in his philosophical endeavors and 
ability. 
Setting the Stage for Change: Socrates as Midwife in the Theaetetus 
  In terms of chronological events within the dialogues, the Theaetetus is the direct 
predecessor to the Sophist and Statesman.  And, given the Sophist and Statesman both 
feature the Eleatic Stranger as its protagonist, it is of note that the Theaetetus features 
                                                
 393 See Frede (1996, 215).  Frede notes a number of striking similarities that are almost nostalgic 
in effect: (1) The dialogue begins abruptly, which recalls similar literary approaches as found in the Meno 
and Gorgias. (2) Socrates claims that moral mistakes are involuntary (22b). (3)  The different pleasures and 
kinds of knowledge are afforded the opportunity to speak for themselves, which, as Frede notes, ought 
remind us of the Crito, wherein the Laws themselves are personified. 
 
 163 
Socrates front and center, leading a discussion regarding the definition of knowledge. 
Interestingly, despite its late placement in the Platonic corpus, in many ways the 
Theaetetus may strike the reader as fairly reminiscent of the earlier Socratic dialogues, 
for not only is the dialogue fairly elenchtic in nature, but further, it ends in aporia!394  
 Yet, despite this familiar mise-en-scene, if examined closely, it becomes apparent 
that this familiarity is actually a forbearer of change for Plato, not only in terms of a 
break from the middle period395, but also as an indication of the need for new 
developments, i.e., the methodology found predominantly in the Sophist and 
Statesman.396 In defense of this position, let us look first to the image of Socrates we are 
presented with at the beginning of the dialogue: Socrates as midwife.   
` Typically speaking, a midwife is an individual who is instrumental in the birthing 
process, not only in their ability to rightly determine when a woman is pregnant, but 
further, and more importantly, aides in the delivery of that child.  Regarding the 
                                                
 394 Tht. 210a8-b2.  While the dialogue does successfully determine what knowledge is not, i.e., 
perception, true judgment, or an account added to true judgment, the discussion fails to find a satisfactory 
definition of knowledge.  Also, given the contextual connection to the Sophist and the significant change in 
cast and methodology that comes with that dialogue, the methodology used by Socrates in the Theaetetus, 
and its failure to achieve satisfactory results in the eyes of the interlocutors, is, I believe, of significant 
importance.  For the contrary position, i.e., that the Theaetetus does end with a positive account of 
knowledge (or at the very least, human knowledge) see Sedley (2004). 
 
 395 Bunyeat (1992, 57) argues that Plato appears to distance himself from the metaphysical 
commitments he introduced in his middle period, e.g., the theory of recollection, as well as, to an extent, 
the theory of the forms.  Indeed, we see this at Tht. 188a, where the idea of recollection is somewhat 
dismissed outright.  Further, and of particular interest, Burnyeat draws the distinction between the image of 
the barren midwife in the Theaetetus and that of the pregnant Socrates of the Symposium.  In both 
dialogues, the imagery of pregnancy and delivery are used to explain the development of ideas, however, 
whereas in the Symposium, Socrates seems to be in possession of the wisdom himself, the Socrates of the 
Theaetetus cannot make such a claim, as he admits that he is barren.  I agree with Burnyeat that this 
revisiting of theme is not coincidental, and would add that this once more indicates that Plato is rethinking 
and breaking from his more positive account of the Socratic method as found in the middle period. 
 
 396 Granted, the method of collection and division is utilized by Socrates in the Philebus.  
However, it is my contention that such use only further proves the point that Socrates is ill equipped to use 
the methodology, as his inability to utilize it properly shows.   
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midwifery of Socrates, however, there are some critical differences.  As Socrates 
explains: 
The difference is that I attend to men, not women, and that I watch over the labor of 
their souls, not of their bodies.  And the most important thing about my art is the 
ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young 
mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.397 
 
In short, Socrates aids in the delivery of wisdom, guiding his interlocutors in the 
development of their own beliefs and ideas.  Further, in line with his consistent disavowal 
of knowledge, Socrates admits that, similar to actual midwives’ inability to have children 
themselves, he is himself barren of all wisdom.  Thus, Socrates explains, when an 
interlocutor does succeed in the discovery of wisdom through their interaction, it is not 
from Socrates that this wisdom arose, but from within the interlocutor alone.398   
 However, while Socrates adamantly maintains that any wisdom delivered is not 
his own, he does insist that he plays a critical role in the discovery of truth.  As evidence 
to this claim Socrates points to those individuals who, failing to recognize the role of 
Socrates in the delivery process, mistakenly believe that the truth was discovered by their 
work alone.  By Socrates’ account, these unfortunate pupils who leave his tutelage 
prematurely, believing themselves to be fully capable of delivering additional truths 
without the assistance of their former midwife, are destined to fall back into the very 
ignorance from which he so selflessly delivered them.  As Socrates explains: 
After they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the 
result that what has remained in them has miscarried; while they have neglected the 
children I helped them bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon 
                                                
 397 Tht. 150b7-c3 
 
 398 Tht. 150d6-7 
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lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant 
fools, both by themselves and by everyone else.399 
 
Thus, based on this testimony, it is clear that Socrates believes that he plays a 
fundamental role in the delivery of wisdom from the minds of his interlocutors.   
 Yet, this certainty on the part of Socrates regarding his role in both the delivery, 
and rearing, of truth should strike us as perplexing.  Given his admitted lack of wisdom, 
questions arise as to how Socrates is able to (1) exude such confidence in his ability, (2) 
successfully determine who is (and is not) worthy of his tutelage, and (3) successfully 
determine which ideas are in fact true.   And, similar to the evidence found in the early 
dialogues regarding Socrates’ seemingly inexplicable abilities, we find that the answer to 
each of these questions arises through an appeal to divine inspiration. 
 Beginning with the first inquiry regarding the confidence exuded by Socrates 
regarding his own abilities, we find that, similar to statements made as early as the 
Apology400, the reason why the Socrates of the Theaetetus engages in such mental 
midwifery is that he is compelled by the god to do so.401  Indeed, as Socrates notes, not 
only is his engagement in mental midwifery ordered by the god, but further, it is the god 
himself that leaves Socrates barren.  Thus, given this lack of wisdom, it cannot be the 
case that Socrates, in recognition of his own wisdom, feels obligated to instruct others.  
Rather, it is divine command alone that serves as the catalyst, spurring him on towards 
the assisting of young minds in the development of their ideas.  And, given Socrates’ 
                                                
 399 Tht. 150e2-151a 
 
 400 See Giannopoulou (2013) for a critical comparison of the Theaetetus and Apology. 
 
 401 Tht. 150c9, Ap. 30e, 28e, 29d. 
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belief in the superiority of divine wisdom to human wisdom402, a point made clear to 
Socrates throughout his life via the advice of his daimonion, the origin of Socrates’ 
confidence regarding his role as midwife is made quite clear. 
 Moving now to the question of Socrates’s determination of which students are 
worthy of his assistance, we find once more Socrates directly attributing this ability to the 
divine.  As we read at 151a1-6: 
Sometimes (those that leave) come back, wanting my company again, and ready to 
move heaven and earth to get it.  When that happens, in some cases the divine sign 
that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they 
begin to make progress. 
 
We see here, yet again, direct testimony to the involvement of the daimonion in the 
decision making process of Socrates.  What is also of interest here is the similarity to the 
description of the daimonion as understood in the early dialogues, both dissuading 
Socrates from engaging in activities that he ought avoid403, as well as the more positive 
act of permitting other action.404 The point here is that we find a continued acceptance of 
Socratic appeal to the divine in these later dialogues, an acceptance that is consistent in 
manner and tone.  In other words, if it were the case that Plato were trying to distance 
himself from the more fantastical aspects of Socrates ability from the early dialogues, one 
might think that by the time he set out to write the Theaetetus, an intricately woven 
treatise on the nature of human knowledge, such whimsical references to the supernatural 
would be absent, or at the very least relegated to a significantly diminished role.  
                                                
 402 Ap. 23a4-b2 
 
 403 For example, engaging in a life of politics. See Ap. 31c4-32a3 
 
 404 As we find at Ap. 40c1, Socrates notes that the silence of his divine sign is to be taken as 
affirmation of his course of action. 
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However, given Socrates’ consistent and unapologetic appeals to the wisdom of such 
divine insight, it is difficult to see how such a claim could withstand this blatant textual 
evidence to the contrary. 
 Finally, we look to the most interesting of the above concerns, i.e., how Socrates, 
a man who lacks all wisdom himself, is able to determine which ideas are true, and which 
are false.  To answer this, let us look very briefly to the methodology employed by 
Socrates in the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus we are once more presented with a Socrates 
who consistently admits his own ignorance, knowing nothing of the topic at hand 
himself.405  And, while this may not seem a remarkable point, we find that such 
consistent admissions of absolute ignorance are, in a way, a return to form for Socrates.  
To explain, while the earlier dialogues are rife with such pleas of ignorance, as Plato 
develops into his middle period, we find a change in the character of Socrates as well.406  
Specifically, in such middle period dialogues as the Meno, Republic, and Symposium, we 
find Socrates now holding a variety of metaphysical commitments, e.g., recollection, the 
forms, etc., that neither the Socrates of the early dialogues, nor the Socrates found in the 
Theaetetus maintain.407  Thus, with the image of Socrates as midwife we find Plato 
giving up on many of the conventions introduced in his middle period, conventions that, I 
would argue, were used as attempts to build upon the Socratic method, allowing for a 
more positive methodology, as opposed to one used merely to expose the inconsistencies 
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 406 Vlastos (1991, 46 – 49).  See also, Burnyeat (1992) 
 
 407 See n. 36. 
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in the beliefs of others.408  Thus, the Socrates of the Theaetetus does not possess any 
wisdom of his own.  Thus, he does not, and cannot, impregnate his interlocutors with his 
own ideas as sophists do,409 but rather, merely assists in the delivery via the elenchtic 
form of questioning more reminiscent of his earlier engagements.   
   Yet, despite his lack of wisdom, we recall that, in the Theaetetus, Socrates does 
claim that he is able to determine which ideas are worthy and which should be discarded.  
Since such determination cannot be the result of his own wisdom (as he admits none of 
his own), I would once more suggest that, on the view of Socrates, this inexplicable 
ability is made possible, at least in part, by divine assistance, a claim which, again, is 
admitted to by Socrates himself.410  This claim is supported by a number of factors: (1) 
As noted above, in his description of his own ability, Socrates consistently refers to 
divine influence as a major component of his craft.  (2) The image of Socrates as midwife 
that we are presented with in the Theaetetus is quite similar to the Socrates of the early 
dialogues, i.e., an individual who, unlike the more protreptic figure of the middle 
dialogues, is able to properly guide his interlocutor away from false beliefs without 
admitting any wisdom of his own, yet, is effectively guided by his divine sign.  And, (3) 
given Plato’s acceptance of divine inspiration as a plausible source of assistance in these 
earlier works,411 when we consider the nostalgic portrayal of Socrates found in the 
Theaetetus, it stands to reason that we ought take Socrates (and thus Plato) at his word 
regarding the role of the divine in the case of Socrates in the Theaetetus. 
                                                
 408 See also, Burnyeat (1992, 57). 
 
 409 Tht. 151b 
 
 410 Tht. 150d7-e2  See also Burnyeat (1992, 60-61).  Burnyeat here points to such a possibility, 
though he does not strongly commit. 
 
 411 See Ch. 3 of this dissertation for extensive arguments in support of this claim. 
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Evidence from the Philebus 
  Yet, while the Theaetetus might provide us with an image of Socrates as reliant 
upon divine inspiration, the image of the midwife is not the only version of Socrates we 
are given in the late period.  Indeed, in what would seem to be a directly contradictory 
image to the classically elenchtic Socrates of the Theaetetus, we find in the Philebus a 
Socrates that seems to do away with the elenchos altogether in favor of the method of 
collection and division!  Yet, despite these disparate appearances, I would argue that the 
evidence in the Philebus only lends additional support to my position.  My reasons are as 
follows: (1) Socrates is not especially adept in his deployment of the method of division, 
a lack of expertise which I will argue only helps prove my position that Plato does not 
consider Socrates to be a philosopher in the unqualified sense at this later stage of Plato’s 
development. (2) While Socrates does indeed use the new method of collection and 
division, to aide in his progress he consistently appeals to, and relies upon, divine 
assistance.  Thus, while the Socrates of the Philebus, insofar as he discards the elenchos 
in favor of the method of collection and division, may, prima facie, appear to be in direct 
opposition to the image of Socrates as depicted in the 6th definition of the Sophist (let 
alone the midwife of the Theaetetus), I would argue that upon closer examination, the 
seemingly different images of Socrates we are given are not as disparate as they might 
first appear.  
Socrates and the Method of Division 
 It is widely accepted that the Philebus should be counted amongst Plato’s latest 
dialogues.412 Given the dialogue’s placement in the corpus, and considering the 
                                                
 412 See Thesleff (1982, 198-200), Brandwood (1990), and Ledger (1989, 198-199), cited in Frede 
(1996, 214). 
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diminished role of Socrates in the late period, the question arises as to why Plato would 
choose Socrates as his protagonist.  In answer to this question, some scholars have 
suggested that perhaps the reemergence of Socrates is owed to the ethical nature of the 
discussion at hand.413 Yet, while I do agree that the earlier dialogues do primarily focus 
on more practical matters, such concerns are not entirely absent in the late period, 
especially when taking the overall project of the Laws into consideration.414  If the sole 
reason for Socrates’ resurrection was simply on account of the topic’s connection to more 
traditionally Socratic themes, then it seems odd to render him silent or absent entirely 
from other dialogues which feature similar connections to earlier dialogues.415   
 Given the implausibility of the above suggestion, I would argue that there must 
exist other reasons as to Plato’s selection of Socrates in the Philebus.  And, in this vein, I 
agree with Dorothea Frede’s claim that Plato’s use of Socrates in the Philebus was, at 
least in part, to distinguish Socrates from the master dialectician.416  To quickly recap, 
while Socrates does indeed discuss the “divine method” of division, and further, uses it 
throughout the dialogue to determine the proper ranking of goods,417 the dialogue ends 
with Protarchus noting to Socrates that the task is not complete, and that Socrates should 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 413 Waterfield (1980, 271).   
 
 414 Also, as has been noted in Ch. 1 of this dissertation, Socrates general interest in matters 
pertaining to ethics does not preclude his interest in other, more theoretical fields of inquiry.  See Ch.1, p. 2 
n. 8 
 
 415 See Frede (1996, 215)  On Frede’s view, not only would Socrates, on these grounds, be 
qualified to lead the discussion regarding the ideal state as found in the Laws, but similarly, in the Timaeus 
19b-20c, Socrates would appear qualified and willing to discuss the ideal state, and yet, passes this duty on 
to Timaeus and Critias. 
 
 416 See Ch.2, pp. 51-54. 
 
 417 Phil 66a-d 
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continue on to finish what he started.418 And, while this incomplete result is fairly 
common (if not expected) for a “Socratic” dialogue, when compared to the Sophist and 
Statesman, two dialogues that feature the same method of collection and division, we find 
the conclusions to be strikingly different, as both dialogues end with a clear agreement 
that a definition has been reached by the Eleatic Stranger.  Looking first to the Sophist 
268c7-268d, we find the following exchange to close out the dialogue: 
VISITOR:      Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the 
      way we did before? 
 
THEAETETUS: Of Course. 
 
VISITOR:   Imitation of the contrary-speech producing, insincere and unknowing 
             sort, of the appearance making kind of copy making, the word  
  juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not  
  divine.  Anyone who says the sophist is of this “blood and   




Further, a definitive conclusion of this sort is echoed in the Statesman as well, for, at the 
end of the Statesman, following the final recap of their efforts towards defining the 
statesman, Socrates himself responds as follows at 311c4-7: “Another most excellent 
portrait, visitor, this one that you have completed for us, of the man who possesses the art 
of kingship: the statesman.”419   
 We find then a striking contrast between the three dialogues: While all three 
dialogues feature the method of division, only those wherein it is the Eleatic stranger 
leading the discussion does the discussion conclude definitively.  On the other hand, in 
the Philebus, where it is Socrates, not the Stranger, using the method of division, we are 
                                                
 418 Phil. 67b 
 
 419 Italics added for emphasis. 
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left wanting, as the dialogue ends in incompletion.  Given this inconclusiveness, I would 
once more state that this is precisely the point, i.e., that Plato, through his use of Socrates 
in this way, is demonstrating the need for a mastery of this new method if one is to 
achieve definitive results.  And, given his affinity for Socrates, and the skill exhibited by 
Socrates throughout Plato’s corpus, that Socrates would be shown to be inefficient is 
perhaps that most compelling way for Plato to emphasize this point.   
The Role of Divine Inspiration in the Philebus 
 Yet, while it is true that Socrates ultimately fails to bring about the definitive 
conclusion presented in other late dialogues, I would argue that we are not to take this 
failure as an indication that Plato has lost faith in the methodology or ability of his 
mentor.  In fact, I would suggest that, similar to the depictions of Socrates we are given in 
the Theaetetus and Sophist, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as a reflection of 
Plato’s mature understanding of his teacher, one which, as with those other depictions 
already described, once more prominently features an attention to the role of divine 
inspiration in the methodology of Socrates.   
 To begin, it should be noted that, despite his failure to properly execute the 
method of division, Socrates is still able to proceed quite far into the discussion.  This 
ability to do so despite his lack of expertise is particularly interesting, especially when we 
consider Socrates’ consistent appeal to the divine throughout the dialogue: (1) The 
method itself is called, by Socrates, the “divine method” (18b6), (2) there is a prayer for 
divine assistance to help establish the fourfold division of all being (25b), (3) Socrates 
consistently refers to the difference between the human and divine mind (22c), and (4) 
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Socrates appeals to the differences between the divine and human ideal state (33b).420  In 
this evidence we see, once again, that Socrates, even when utilizing the new, rigid 
method of division, does not waver from his appreciation of divine assistance. 
 Yet, while this attention to divine influence should be of no surprise at this point 
in the case of Socrates, we are presented with one extraordinary piece of textual evidence 
that demands our attention.  Following his praiseful description of the divine method of 
division, we find, now faced with a potential roadblock in in their discussion, Socrates, 
abandoning the method of division, proclaims that they need not be concerned, as, “some 
memory has come to my mind that one of the gods seems to have sent me to help us.”421 
This single line is of exceptional importance as, in striking contrast to the apotreptic 
messages of the daimonion in which Socrates was warned against a particular course of 
action, here, in the Philebus, we are given textual evidence wherein Socrates is claiming 
to have received a positive message directly from the gods.  And, in the context of the 
dialogue, this revelation bestowed upon Socrates, i.e., that neither pleasure nor 
knowledge is the good, but rather a third thing which is superior to both, is instrumental 
for the remainder of the discussion.   
 Granted, one could argue that such a direct appeal to the divine ought to be taken 
as an ironic gesture.  However, given the staggering amount of evidence that has been 
presented against such a claim, evidence that is found throughout the entire Platonic 
corpus, such a claim seems, to me, to be particularly unfounded.  Thus, instead of 
approaching this problem from a skeptic’s perspective, I suggest that we take this 
moment of positive divine influence with the utmost sincerity, as doing so would provide 
                                                
 420 D. Frede (1996, n.36) 
 
 421 Phil. 20b3-4.  Italics added for emphasis. 
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us insight into how we are to understand Socrates in Plato’s later dialogues.  To explain, 
as we have seen, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as not entirely skilled regarding 
the method of division.  And yet, he is able to continue the discussion significantly 
further than would be expected for someone lacking in expertise.  And, while this lack in 
ability would have crippled other individuals, Socrates, through the direct assistance of 
the gods, is able to proceed onward.   
 The point I am attempting to convey here is that, in the Philebus, we are given 
insight into Plato’s understanding of his mentor.  To explain, as I have argued, as Plato 
progressed into his late period, his conception of philosophy has evolved.  As such, he 
has come to realize that Socrates can no longer qualify as the embodiment of what the 
philosopher ought be in an unqualified sense.  In short, Plato came to realize that the 
Socratic method, while useful for tearing down fallacious arguments and exposing 
inconsistencies in the beliefs of others, is unable to achieve the sort of definitional 
knowledge he desired.  And yet, despite this inability, Socrates does seem to know things, 
i.e., his opinions and instincts always seem to be inexplicably pointed towards the truth.  
To account for this then, what we find in these late dialogues are images of Socrates 
wherein the role played by divine inspiration is placed front and center.  Here in the 
Philebus we see evidence of Socrates, unable to push forward in the discussion, directly 
assisted by the gods. Whereas others would have faltered, or given up, Socrates, through 
divine revelation is able to continue.  And, it should be noted, that this revelation occurs 
must be seen as positive in the eyes of Plato.  In other words, while it is true that Socrates 
must rely on divine assistance to proceed in the discussion, such assistance does not 
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diminish the results of the discussion, especially when one considers the reverence shown 
by Plato to the wisdom of the gods.   
 Yet, while Plato does, in the case of Socrates, hold such divine revelation in high 
esteem, it is my view that he recognizes the limitations and potential pitfalls of reliance 
upon those few fortunate individuals lucky enough to be so inspired.  Indeed, we might 
glean insight into this view when we consider the ending of the Philebus, wherein we 
recall that, despite Socrates being able to rank the various types of goods, Protarchus 
reminds him that his task is incomplete. To explain, we recall that in the Sophist and 
Statesman, an emphasis was placed on maintaining the proper divisions all the way 
through to the conclusion.  In other words, the method of division is so effective because 
each division can be traced back and explained to any who would inquire.  In the 
Philebus, however, we recall that the initial idea that spawned the discussion, i.e., that 
neither pleasure or knowledge alone was the good, was given to Socrates by divine 
inspiration.  As such, this wisdom is not possessed by Socrates, and is thus unexplainable.  
No account can be given, and so, the division cannot be considered complete.  Thus, 
while Socrates, via his divine connection, is able to proceed further in the discussion than 
the uninspired many, and, while this can be positive given the possibilities such 
inspiration provide,422 Plato recognizes the need for a methodology that does not rely on 
the assistance of the divine, hence his development of the method of division.423 
 
 
                                                
 422 See Phaedrus 243e-245b.  In Socrates’ Second Speech, Philosophy is describes as a form of 
madness.  See also Gonzales (2011, 102). 
 
 423 Additionally, we are left without the precise ratios between pleasure and knowledge. 
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Conclusion  
 Thus, despite the limitations that may be related to reliance upon divine 
inspiration in matters of philosophy, it is quite clear that, in the case of Socrates, Plato 
still recognizes its value.  Indeed, when we look to the three major images of Socrates 
presented in the late dialogues, we find that, despite surface discrepancies, the common 
link between them is their reliance upon and reverence for the divine.  As such, we find 
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